The Role of International Cooperation and Development Aid in the EU-Africa Partnership:

Governance, Actorness and Effectiveness Analysis

Rym Ayadi and Sara Ronco February, 2023

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trigger
Trends in Global Governance and Europe's Role

ABOUT THIS STUDY

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This study is provides an in-depth analysis on the EU-Africa partnership with a focus on governance, actorness and effectiveness. The research was undertaken between 2020 and 2022 under the TRIGGER Project.

The study is coauthred by Prof. Rym Ayadi, President, EMEA and Sara Ronco Researcher, EMEA.

The TRIGGER project is funded by the European Commission under Horizon 2020. The ultimate objectives of TRIGGER are to provide EU institutions with knowledge and tools to enhance their actorness, effectiveness, and influence in global governance and to develop new ways to harness the potential of public engagement and participatory foresight in complex governance decisions. The TRIGGER consortium comprises 14 partners led by the Centre for European Policy Studies, including four non-EU countries, divided into four distinct but highly interrelated scientific groups: the global governance group, the technology and governance group, the foresight and public engagement group and the outreach and communication group. EMEA is part of the global governance group and lead the case study on the EU-Africa partnership. This research work aims to test various aspects of the AGGREGATOR tool and the conceptual framework for the ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of EU actorness and effectiveness as were developed and defined during the first phases of the project. The application of the tool and the analysis are conducted on four "deep dives", or case studies. The four deep dives are sustainable development, climate policy, EU-Africa Partnership and Data Protection. The analysis conducted was based on participatory research among partners, coordinated by the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), and enriched by several webinars and workshops discussing the methodology and preliminary results with experts and stakeholders. The AGGREGATOR tool contains a summary and comparative view of the analysis results of the four deep dives. Visit the TRIGGER website for more information on the project, tools developed, and results achieved.

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FOREWORD

In today's multi-crisis world, the main actors of global governance are increasingly seeking ways to measure the effectiveness of their strategies, as well as the strength of their positions in both cooperative settings such as trade agreements; and in non-cooperative settings, for example when adopting legislation in key domains, or when investing in development. The TRIGGER project started measuring the "actorness" and the "effectiveness" of the European Union back in 2018, before the von der Leyen "Geopolitical" commission, as well as before the dramatic changes in the multilateral order brought by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as by the war in Ukraine.

We chose to measure actorness by breaking down the concept into specific dimensions, to capture *i.a.* the formal attribution of competence to the EU level in different sectors ("authority"); the resources investment by EU institutions in such sectors ("autonomy"); as well as the cohesiveness of EU action and the external recognition ("coherence"); but also external factors, including the attractiveness and recognition of, and overall trust in, the action of the EU in the observed domains. Even trickier was the measurement of effectiveness, defined as the attainment of EU's objectives. This presupposes that one fully grasps the actual goals pursued by the EU when acting on the ground, which may well be very different, or at least more specific, compared to the Treaty-based goals pursued by the bloc.

In TRIGGER, the methodology for measuring actorness and effectiveness was tested in various ways, and accompanied by a variety of methods, including traditional social science and data science techniques. The "deep dive" on EU-Africa relations stands out as unique, since the authors measure the evolution of EU actorness in a specific bilateral setting, rather than at the global level; and without being confined to a specific policy domain, but rather grasping the focus and quality of EU-Africa relationships over the past two decades, leading to the post-Cotonou agreement in April 2021. The results are a precious set of lessons to be learned going forward, as the EU tries to reconfigure its relationship with Africa through the lens of the new Global Gateway programme, shifting from what was often received as a "neo-colonial" approach, towards a collaboration between peers. The findings of this study will offer precious guidance as the EU-Africa partnership unfolds in the coming years. The European Commission should continue to monitor different aspects of actorness and effectiveness going forward, if it wants to become a more agile, adaptive player in the ever-changing global governance landscape.

Andrea Renda, Senior Research Fellow and Head of the CEPS Unit on Global Governance, Regulation, Innovation, and the Digital Economy (GRID),

2 February 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European and African continents are historically connected. The European Union has always reserved a central role for Africa in its international relations. Development and cooperation between the European Union and Africa have been built on various partnerships and agreements. This study aims at analysing the evolution of the relationship between the European Union and the African continent through the analysis of international governance and the EU's governance, actorness and effectiveness. The analysis is based on the definitions of Governance, Actorness and Effectiveness, developed by the researchers collaborating with the EU-Funded project, TRIGGER: Trends in Global Governance and Europe's Role. The assessments provided by this study are summarised on the website developed by the TRIGGER consortium, together with the European University Institute (EUI). The TRIGGER website also contains the definition and the framework of reference for the assessment of governance, actorness and effectiveness. The website also reports the results of the same analysis provided by this study that has been applied to other cases, mainly: data protection, climate change, and sustainable development goals.

The first part of the study aims to provide an overview of the evolution of global and European governance in development policy and relations with Africa. The research is focused on the period between 1995 and the present day. Nevertheless, in respect of both global and European governance, the analysis will also briefly explore the pre-1995 period, when the overall development policy concept started to develop and most African countries started the process of decolonisation. The analysis of governance reveals that both international governance and the EU's governance in development aid and cooperation with Africa have evolved consistently during recent decades. It highlights some key trends in international and European governance: the generally growing interest in Africa from non-traditional actors, the increasing of South-South cooperation and the transformation of the traditional ODA system, increasingly reliant upon a public-private partnership, blended finance, and more oriented towards investments and infrastructure development rather than projects.

The second part of the study analyses the EU's actorness in international cooperation and development aid with Africa. The TRIGGER project consolidated existing literature contributions into a comprehensive definition of actorness, which depends on a variety of internal and external factors. The study follows TRIGGER's definition of actorness, considered to be composed of seven dimensions. Three *internal dimensions* which are more strictly related to EU functions, behaviour and composition (Authority, Autonomy, and Cohesion). Three *external dimensions* which depend more on the external context and the actors operating in the global arena (Recognition, Attractiveness, Opportunity/Necessity to act).

Finally, a final *cross-cutting dimension* depends on both external and internal factors (Credibility). To assess EU actorness by the actorness dimension, we have identified some milestones considered to be key moments in its evolution. The definition of the milestones partially comes from the analysis of EU governance developed in the previous section. Over the years, European integration on one side and African integration on the other paved the way for a radical change in the type of relations between the two and the involvement of new actors/institutions. In fact, both in Europe and Africa, the governance landscape has rapidly and radically changed, with increasing institutionalisation and the development of a 'continent-to-continent' approach. Whilst the final objective does not seem to have been reached yet, the intention is clear, as several actions have been taken by both the EU and Africa to push forward this idea.

We have identified three milestone phases that represent key turning points for EU actorness in the EU-Africa partnership and development policy, which we used to analyse changes in actorness: the first partnership (1995-2006), the second partnership phase (2007-2016) and the third partnership phase (2017-2022). The assessment of the internal dimension of actorness (authority, autonomy and cohesion) reveals an increasing trend. EU cohesion in this domain has been assessed as moderate/low in the first period, and moderate during the second and third partnership phases. The external dimensions of actorness show a decreasing trend over the period considered – except attractiveness – maintaining a moderate/high level of assessment (the EU still leads the field in Africa for trade, ODA and investment, with an increasing engagement in new investment platforms for financing development). The level assigned to the last dimension, credibility, is moderate/high for the first partnership, moderate during the second partnership and moderate/low for the final period considered, denoting a decreasing trend. Overall, the EU's actorness level in development policy and its relations with Africa can be considered moderate, despite some critical declining trends in some of the dimensions.

The analysis of effectiveness highlights that the EU has maintained similar objectives in its cooperation with Africa over recent decades, applying several overlapping frameworks. This section aims to explore the effectiveness of the EU as an actor in development in Africa, specifically looking at its relationship with the Sub-Saharan Africa region under the Cotonou Agreement (CPA) and the post-Cotonou Agreement. Whilst the official evaluation of the CPA suggested that the partnership contributed to the eradication of poverty (one of the principal goals) and improving access to basic services, the EU has also moved towards more interest-driven international and development cooperation, widely reflected in its priorities with Africa. This approach has been sustained by new modalities and instruments for financing development objectives.

The analysis of effectiveness follows the TRIGGER definition for *which an effective actor achieves its goals, irrespective of whether such goals are desirable or not from an external viewpoint*. This definition implies looking at the external effectiveness of the EU as an actor and negotiator. Since effectiveness comes from the capacity to achieve, or pursue, the key stated goals, looking at negotiation processes is key. Starting from the identification of key EU meso-goals in development policy, with a particular focus on the EU-Africa partnership, this section focuses on the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) by looking at the evolution of the goals during the two revisions of the agreement, to then analyse meso-goals under the new EU-ACP agreement and finally moves to the analysis of the negotiation process for the new EU-ACP agreement, looking mainly at two of the most debated points as case studies: the mobilisation of financial resources for Africa and aid effectiveness, and the migration issues between the two continents. The analysis shows that the EU can be considered an effective actor in this specific case studied. Indeed, the EU was able to pursue its strategies and the objectives stated in the initial negotiation mandate, even if integrating some requests outlined in the ACP mandate - the core issues, such as the obligation in returning illegal migrants - have been maintained.

Finally, the last section highlights some factors that we believe are likely to determine the future EU's actorness and effectiveness in development policy and relations with Africa as being some possible sources of challenges and opportunities: the need for coherence, global health and future pandemics, and the strategies adopted to move beyond aid. Opportunities and challenges are brief analyses, providing some final considerations around them.

Introduction

The European Union has placed Africa amongst its strategic partners since the beginning of its institution. The relationship between the EU and Africa, from the post-colonisation onwards, has been characterised by the construction of several partnerships. The idea of a continent-to-continent approach between Europe and Africa has been gathering strength over recent decades, even though there are still many overlapping frameworks of cooperation between the two continents, involving several different actors (i.e., institutions, governments, and regional organisations). The European Union adopted a governance approach to North Africa, based on a combination of aid, trade and political coordination. Building a robust diplomatic relationship in the Mediterranean region has been a priority in the EU's external governance, since the very first steps of the European Union constitution and then its enlargement. The European Economic Community (EEC) has been implementing cooperation agreements with Mediterranean non-Member Countries (MNCs) since the 1960s. On the other hand, by 1963, the EEC and Sub-Sahara African Countries had begun a strong cooperation mechanism, with the Yaoundé Convention (based on the previous treaty between the EEC and its overseas territories), followed by many other frameworks regulating cooperation and development policies between the EU and Sub-Saharan African countries.

Beyond the EU, many other international actors have been interested in building partnerships and cooperation frameworks with Africa. Moreover, African countries started to develop their agency both individually and as part of either regional or multilateral organisations. During recent centuries, global governance towards the African continent has been strongly centred on the instrument of development aid and official development assistance. This approach was mainly driven by a post-colonial attitude and by the fact that most African countries were classified as least developed countries (LDCs), with high levels of poverty and extreme poverty. The increasing agency of Africa and development needs in response to new global challenges (i.e., from the MDGs, to the universalistic and more comprehensive SDGs), started calling upon the main actors involved in the African continent to change their development strategies. Nonetheless, whilst development aid still represents an important instrument of governance, it started to be increasingly accompanied by blending initiatives.

This study aims at analysing the role of the EU in development and cooperation with Africa. To do that, it moves from the identification of the evolution of global governance in development aid and cooperation, focusing instead on the initiatives towards Africa. After analysing the evolution of global governance and the role of some key global actors in cooperation and development with Africa, the first section moves on to the analysis of EU governance. The EU governance analysis is implemented by trying to deeply understand the different mechanisms and frameworks used by the EU in its cooperation with Africa, whilst also accounting for the evolution of the institutional frameworks, both from the EU and from the African side.

Building on the analysis of governance provided in the first section, the second section of the study is dedicated to the analysis of the EU's actorness. This section follows TRIGGER's framework and definition of actorness, to analyse the evolution of the EU's actorness in development aid and cooperation with Africa through some key historical phases of the EU-Africa relationship.

The third section provides an analysis of the EU's effectiveness in development and cooperation with Africa, using the TRIGGER definition and research framework. The analysis will start by identifying the key EU goals for cooperation and comparing them with the key partnership and cooperation frameworks that exist and regulate EU-Africa relations. Then, the sections move on to the analysis of the negotiation process for a post-Cotonou Agreement, analysing the capacity of the EU to achieve some stated goals considered to be relevant for the future cooperation and development framework with Africa.

Finally, the study will provide an analysis of the main challenges and opportunities for the EU in its future cooperation with Africa, providing some concluding considerations.

1 DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AFRICA: GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The African continent numbers around 1.1 billion people and this figure is expected to double by 2050 (Manrique Gil 2015). The continent is noted for its abundant natural resources and its young labour force, making it increasingly more attractive to the rest of the world. Furthermore, the continent's economy has witnessed unprecedented growth during recent decades, increasing the business opportunities on offer and, therefore, attracting new actors playing an economic role in Africa (e.g. Japan, Korea, BRIC countries) (Runde 2018). The African region has been one of the fastest growing during recent decades, advancing regional integration, making market access easier and the expansion of business (Runde 2018). Furthermore, Africa is also assuming an increasingly strategic role in the international arena, representing 54 countries out of 193 members within the UN and, in general, with an increasing percentage of the world population.

Global governance towards the African continent has been strongly centred on the instrument of development aid and official development assistance during recent centuries. This approach was mainly driven by a post-colonial attitude and by the fact that most African countries were classified as least developed countries (LDCs) with high levels of poverty and extreme poverty. The increasing' African Agency' (Hurt, 2020) united around the evolution of the development approach in response to new global challenges (i.e., from the MDGs, to the universalistic and more comprehensive SDGs), calling upon the main actors involved in the African continent to change their development strategies. Whilst development aid still represents an important instrument of governance, it is increasingly accompanied by blending initiatives.

This section aims to give an overview of the evolution of global and European governance in development policy and relations with Africa.

The research is focused on the period between 1995 and the present. Nevertheless, both global governance and European governance some references will be provided relating to the pre-1995 period, when the overall development policy concept was developed and the African continent started to build its own identity with the process of decolonisation.

Figure 1 reports some key events considered as milestones in development policy and relations with Africa. The green triangles represent the turning points in the evolution of governance, which will be used particularly in the next section on actorness. The turning points highlighted are considered those moments where it is possible to see a major change in overall governance and actorness, particularly in what concerns the European partnership with Africa, the focus for the analysis of actorness.

The analysis of governance will start with an overview of development policy and relations with African evolution since the decolonisation process. The analysis will cover the evolution of development and cooperation with Africa from the perspective of some key international organisations and certain key bilateral actors. The analysis will proceed to focus on the European Union's governance, starting from the EU's framework for development and cooperation with North Africa and with Sub-Saharan Africa and then to look at the continent-to-continent approach between the European Union and Africa as a whole.

Figure 1 - EU and Global Governance milestones in development policy and relations with Africa.

Note: Global governance milestones in pink; EU-North Africa Milestones in orange; EU-OACPS milestones in purple; EU-Africa milestones in light blue; EU development policy milestones in yellow. Green triangles represent the different phases highlighted as a 'turning point' that will be particularly analysed in the actorness section.

1.2 DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AFRICA: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE

The OECD reports that Africa is the region receiving the largest amount of Net ODA[1]. Figure 2 provides an overview of the ODA trends in Africa since 1995. Both multilateral and bilateral aid to Africa show an increasing trend. The US has been the largest bilateral donor for Africa over the period considered. The European Commission, when taken together with European Member State contributions, is the largest donor to Africa overall. The table in Figure 2.d shows that the United States and the European institutions are always amongst the top donors to Africa.

By the early 2000s, the effectiveness of ODA was already starting to be questioned. Whilst there seems to be an agreement globally around the important role of development aid in achieving key social improvement, the latter also comes extensively from FDI, trade and remittances, amongst others[2]. Looking at data on FDI, trade and remittances to Africa, it is evident that all these three instruments have seen a steady increase during the first decade of the 21st century (see Annexe 1). Almost all the three instruments show a sharp increase during this decade, to then assume a non-consistent trend during the most recent decade (except in the case of remittances in North Africa, see Annexe 1). The last decade has also seen an increase in blending finance for development, whilst this still seems to barely reach LDCs (see Annexe 1).

Despite various criticisms of ODA, it is still considered crucial for development, even if accompanied by other instruments, such as those previously mentioned. The international community has been strongly engaged in trying to better coordinate and harmonise aid, improving the monitoring of flows and programme delivery. Recent decades have been characterised by a strong international effort to make development aid more effective. Some key initiatives in this sense will be analysed in the next section.

[1] The OECD 'Development Aid Statistic at Glance, Statistic by Region' (2019 Edition) reports that Africa in 2017 received USD 52. 800 million of Net Oda, followed by Asia (48.769 million).

[2] For the importance of the non-aid dimension of the relation between rich and poor countries, see Bob Picciotto in his comment on 'The White Man's Burden' by William Easterly – Robert Picciotto, King's College, London, 21 September 2006 https://www.odi.org/events/116-white-mans-burden-wests-efforts-aid-rest-have-done-so-much-ill-so-little-good.

Figure 2 - ODA towards Africa 1995-2018/19.





d. Top 10 ODA donors (% total ODA to Africa, millions US$ net disbursement)
- OECD.development statistics at Glance to Africa, available reports as of 15 June 2021

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2019
1	US (17%)	US (17%)	US (20%)	US (21%)	IDA (18%)
2	EUIs (12%)	Germany (9%)	EUIs (13%)	EUIs (13%)	US (17%)
3	IDA (12%)	EUIs (9%)	IDA (12%)	IDA (12%)	EUIs (12%)
4	UK (8%)	UK (8%)	UK (8%)	UK (7%)	Germany (8%)
5	United Arab Emirates (7%)	IDA (7%)	Germany (7%)	Germany (7%)	UK (7%)
6	Germany (6%)	Saudi Arabia (4%)	Global Fund (5%)	Global Fund (5%)	France (5%)
7	France (5%)	Japan (4%)	United Arab Emirates (5%)	AfDB (5%)	Global Fund (4%)
8	AfDB (4%)	France (3%)	France (4%)	France (4%)	AfDB (3%)
9	Global Fund (4%)	Sweden (3%)	AfDB (4%)	Japan (3%)	Japan (3%)
10	Japan (3%)	United Arab Emirates (3%)	Japan (3%)	Canada (2%)	United Arab Emirates (2%)

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1.2.1 From WW II to the new millennium

In 1945, with the United Nations Charter, the promotion of social progress and better standards of living started to be considered as a means of ending poverty and preventing wars. World War II was over and the need to promote peace was a priority. It was in this context that the concept of international cooperation and development started to be shaped, to solve international economic and humanitarian problems and to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms3. The original members of the UN were 51 countries, including some European countries (i.e., Denmark, France, Poland, United Kingdom)4 and a few African countries (i.e. Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia). In 1950, the UN set up the Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance, providing technical advisory services and training opportunities for developing countries. In the following years, a specific fund was set up – the UN Special Fund – a multilateral fund to assist developing countries, based on voluntary contributions from member states. Development increasingly became the central theme for UN action and, during the decolonisation period, which began around 1960, it increased its membership. The UN was also active in the promotion of decolonisation, with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People (1960) and the relative institution of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration5. During the 1960s, the UN established the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), all agencies working on research and programming on specific issues for development and cooperation. Meanwhile, one of the key Bretton Wood institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank – WB), was shifting its attention from Europe to developing countries. Supported by the United Nations and the United States, in 1960 the WB launched the International Development Association (IDA), providing 'soft-loans' (low-interest loans, credits and grants) to developing countries for programmes with the objective of boosting economic growth, reducing inequalities and improving people's living conditions6. IDA still represents one of the largest sources of assistance for the world's poorest countries, extensively using credit (at zero or low-interest charges and repayments of up to 40 years and periods of 10 years' grace), as well as smaller grants (mainly for countries at risk of debt distress).

[3] The International Bill of Human Rights would have been announced later, in 1948.

[4] The EU has been a permanent observer at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) since 1974 and has observer status in most of the UN specialist agencies. It is a full voting member of 3 UN bodies and is the only non-state party to more than 50 UN conventions. See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/unga/

[5] The Special Committee on Decolonisation (or C-24) is still operating, examining the politic-economic situation of the Non-Self-Governed Territories (NSGTs) (through on-site missions and seminars) and making recommendations to the GA. See https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/c24/about

[6]The signatory countries in 1960 were 15 (Australia, Canada, China, Germany, India, Italy, Malaysia, Norway, Pakistan, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam). Within its first eight months of launch, IDA reached 51 members. In 2021, it accounted for 173 shareholder countries.

In 1961, the OECD published its first comprehensive survey of The Flow of Financial Resources to Countries in Course of Economic Development (1956-1959) and, in the same year, the Development Assistance Group issued the Resolution of the Common Aid Effort; the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was established (OECD 2006). The aim of DAC was to coordinate assistance to less developed countries, increasing the aggregate resources for development assistance and encouraging the participation of private and public finance. Since its constitution, DAC[7] has played a key role in defining norms for development cooperation, often in collaboration with the various UN agencies. One of the first DAC initiatives was the launching of the annual Aid Reviews and Systematic Statistical Aid Reporting, issuing specific directives for reporting aid and resource flows to developing countries. An important step for development was decided during the first UNCTAD meeting in Geneva (1964) which recommended a target of 1%[8] of national income for transfer of financial resources from each development country, where DAC discussed development and assistance problems in the Middle East and in West Africa. In 1972, the definition of official development assistance was formulated; this was used until 2017: 'ODA consists of flows to developing countries (DAC List of ODA Recipient) and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following test: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%) (OECD 2006)'. DAC issued several recommendations and guideline principles for some main scopes: better coordinating of donor efforts, better monitoring of the impact of development, untying official development assistance and private sector involvement in development assistance are among the other key issues related to development.

The 1960s was also an important decade because of the strong engagement of developing countries in the development debate, criticising the approach promoted by western countries. The idea of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) emerged from the experience of decolonisation during the 1960s, which was the

[7] DAC numbers 30 Members (the EU is a member, the only multilateral organisation in this group). The Observers are: the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (WB).

[8] The actual target of 0.7% ODA over donors' national income was first proposed by the Nobel Prize's Tinbergen (0.75% of GNP both concessional and non-concessional official flows) in 1964. Some years later, the Pearson Commission proposed reaching 0.70% of ODA over GNP by 1980 at the latest, whilst during the 1970s, the 0.7% gained acceptance from donors, although some countries were still not in favour. It was repeatedly endorsed as a long-term objective. In 2005, the 15 member countries of the EU agreed to reach the target by 2015. At time of writing (January 2021) only five countries (OECD members) have met the target: Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden (at the first target meeting in 1974), Denmark, UK, Germany and the Netherlands. The average for DAC members' ODA has been around 0.4% over recent decades.

central theme of discussion for the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. One of the main issues stressed in creating a 'new order' was the increasing inequality between developed and developing countries. The latter were asking for the reduction of trade barriers, the general restructuring of international trade and reform of the Bretton Wood System, favouring the creation of inequality between the less developed and the developed countries. The Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) originated in 1955 and held its first summit conference in 1961, a forum of 120 countries that were 'not aligned' with the major power blocs at that time. The NAM collaborated with the G77, the intergovernmental voting block at the United Nations for promoting the interests of developing countries.

The concept of development was strictly linked to economic growth, seen as the fundamental engine for enhancing development. The international community, sustained by the first economics development theories, was moved by the general thinking that an open and liberalised market was key to pushing economic growth and favouring development. Nevertheless, disparities in living standards in different parts of the world were raising concerns, particularly amongst the less developed countries. In 1958, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations (UN) established the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). It is one of the five regional commissions aiming to promote the economic and social development of its member states, foster intra-regional integration and promote international cooperation for Africa's development. In 1962 in Cairo, the Conference on the Problems of Economic Development was held, producing the 'Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries' (UNECA 1962). Organised by developing countries with the ECA, the Cairo Declaration highlighted concerns surrounding the increasing disparity in living standards around the world and placed emphasis on the need for increasing international assistance to developing countries, whilst implementing internal reforms. Furthermore, the declaration stressed the importance of increasing cooperation, trade and sharing of knowledge amongst developing countries. Furthermore, the declaration highlighted that the distribution of international aid was uneven and correcting the situation was needed, as well as integrating more international assistance with national economic development plans and programmes. In 1963, the first DAC recommendations on 'Terms and Conditions of Aid' were formulated, stressing the need for donor DAC members to 'relate the terms of aid on a case-by-case basis to the circumstances of each under-developed country or group of countries ('appropriate terms')' (Führer 1996). Nevertheless, during the following years, the recipient developing countries increasingly raised the issue that donor countries were not really taking into account the needs of developing countries when providing aid and that developing countries were not sufficiently represented at the international level (UN).

During the 1960s and 1970s, UN Decade started acknowledging that development meant economic growth, but that it also concerned the improvement of social conditions. Nevertheless, after almost two decades of development policies, both donor and recipient country populations started to become cynical about aid effectiveness. In 1970, the Pearson Report highlighted that the developing countries receiving assistance were heterogeneous in economic, social, cultural and environmental conditions and more research was needed to better address country-specific problems. Pearson and his colleagues proposed a new approach to development, focused on around 30 main objectives, amongst which were: the use of aid to finance research knowledge about the South and financing education in developing countries; promoting international and regional trade considered to be the engine for growth; linking aid to specific development objectives; recognition of debt relief as a legitimate form of aid.

One important point coming out from the report, which was particularly debated among developing countries, was: calling upon foreign donors to reduce strings attached to aid-giving, obliging developing countries to buy goods from donor countries (what will later be called 'tied aid') (Pearson 1970).

The UN Second Development Decade (1971-1980) was defined as the ultimate aim of development, to achieve a better quality of life for all, from economic development to the development of physical, moral, intellectual and cultural resources (Kurtas n.d.b). During that period, the UN development approach opened up to issues like racism and the environment.

Both the UN and the OECD worked extensively to coordinate donor efforts and to shape international development governance, particularly after the 2000s. Since the late 1970s, development aid policies started to be heavily criticised because they were seen to be driven by political self-interest objectives. Furthermore, the lack of coordination amongst donors united by ambitious targets was proving difficult to achieve and questioned the effectiveness of aid. Between the 1980s and 1990s, the definition of ODA started to be widely discussed and, particularly after the end of the Cold War, the basic rationale of aid started to be questioned. From the 2000s, the development landscape started to change rapidly, along with the overall concept of the development finance (Hynes and Scott 2013). Furthermore, the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by the massive utilisation of the structural adjustment approach of international financial institutions, providing loans to a developing country in need, but requiring typically liberal reforms that were considered fundamental for long-term macroeconomic stability (i.e., financial liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation). Whilst aid was criticised because it was considered ineffective, conditional loans were, in that period, considered to be the right way to help countries develop. Nevertheless, the required structural adjustment would have then been strongly criticised because of high social costs9. The new millennium was characterised by the international community's attempt to make aid more effective.

1.2.2 United Nations and other multilateral organisations: the evolution of governance during the 2000s

The year 2000 was the final year of the first decade of the eradication of colonialism (1990-2000). In the same year, UNGA declared 2001-2010 as the Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, calling upon member states to increase their efforts to implement the plan of action agreed upon for the first decade. A few years before the start of the new millennium, in 1997, the first United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty began.

With the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations, held in New York in September 2000, the Millennium Declaration was adopted. Under the Declaration, world leaders committed their nations to achieve eight goals by 2015. The aims of the latter, called 'Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were: 1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) achieve universal primary education; 3) promote gender equality and empower women; 4) reduce child mortality; 5) improve maternal health; 6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and another disease; 7) ensure environmental sustainability; 8) develop a global partnership for development.

In 2002, the UN First International Conference on Financing for Development was held in Monterrey. The Monterrey Consensus was adopted, becoming one of the major references for overall international development and cooperation. The consensus outlined six areas of financing for development: mobilising domestic financial resources for development; mobilising international resources for development (foreign direct investment and other private flows); international trade as an engine for development; increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development; external debt; addressing systemic issues (enhancing the coherence and consistency of international monetary, financial and trading

[9] https://publichealthreviews.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40985-017-0059-2 and https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/140146/1/v23-i05-a02-BF02925113.pdf

systems in support of development) (United Nations 2003). The consensus was followed up in 2008, by adopting the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development and, in 2015, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAA). Meanwhile, between 2012 and 2015, the UN was leading the post-2015 development agenda process, which ended with the new international framework of Agenda 2030, with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals.

Between 2003 and 2011, the OECD coordinated some high-level forums on aid effectiveness (HLF). The main purpose of these forums was to improve the coordination of aid between donor and recipient states. During the same period, the UN was also organising international conferences on financing and development. The first High-Level Forum (HLF-1) was held in Rome in 2002 and represented the first attempt to formalise the principles for aid effectiveness, better outlined in the following forum in Paris in 2005 (HLF-2) within five principles: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability. The Paris Declaration went beyond defining the main principles, also providing 12 indicators for tracking progress in aid effectiveness. The HLF-3 (Accra 2008) was built on the two previous HLFs, aimed at deepening the implementation of relative principles, resulting in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). The AAA was focused on three main areas of action, which were particularly far from being achieved: country ownership, more effective and inclusive partnership and achieving development results. The fourth and last HLF was held in Busan in 2011. The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation represented the first legal framework for development and cooperation inclusion, beyond traditional donors, South-South cooperation, BRICS, civil society organisations and private funders. With Busan in particular, the international community started to underline the need to increase and reinforce the achievements, through the diversification of instruments for financing sustainable and inclusive development: taxation and domestic resource mobilisation, private investment, aid for trade, philanthropy, non-concessional public funding and climate finance, through more public-private partnership.

With Busan, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was established, to ensure the implementation of the agreed commitments. The GPDEC supports and promotes effective development cooperation principles and, since its inception in Busan (2011), has convened at three high-ministerial levels, adopting the following documents: Mexico Communique (2014), the Nairobi Outcome Document (2016) and the Co-Chair's Statement on the Senior-Level Meeting (2019). The GPDEC aimed at going beyond aid effectiveness, building the concept of effective development cooperation. The GPDEC has a Steering Committee with four co-chairs, guiding the Joint Support Team. The Steering Committee is a multi-stakeholder governing body which meets bi-annually to guide the overall work of the partnership10. The Co-chairs are Ms Elysée Munembwe Tamukumwe, Minister of Planning, Deputy Prime Minister (Democratic Republic of Congo); Mr Mustafa Kamal, Minister of Finance (Bangladesh); Mr Thomas Gass, Ambassador, Assistant Director-General, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (Switzerland). The Joint Support Team carries on the GPEDC's work and is hosted jointly by the UNDP and the OECD. In March 2019, the GPEDC launched the 'Kampala principles', five mutually reinforcing principles developed to guide collective work for making private sector partnership for development cooperation more effective: inclusive country ownership, results and targeted impact, inclusive partnership, transparency and accountability, leaving no one behind (GPEDC 2019).

In 2018, the ODA definition changed. Official development assistance flows are defined as those flows to DAC-listed countries and to multilateral development institutions which are provided by official agencies, states and local governments. To be considered an ODA flow, the transaction must be administrated with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective and must be concessional in character, as was originally stated in the previous definition. The new definition better specifies what makes the transaction 'concessional in character. The transaction must contain a grant element of at least:

- 5% in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of LDCs and other LICs
- 15% in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of LMICs
- 10% in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of UMICs
- 10% in the case of multilateral institutions (OECD n.d.)

Beyond international organisations and agencies, which have certainly played a key role as actors promoting development and cooperation in and with Africa, many of the previously mentioned international frameworks include other global powers, such as the European Union and its Member States and other nations. Whilst all the major powers try to play a role in these international frameworks, they also pursue their objectives and strategies in development issues and relations with Africa. The next sections will provide an overview of the evolution of governance of some key actors in the global arena, before moving to the analysis of the EU's governance.

[10] In the Steering Committee, there are the Chief Executive Officer, African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) and the Deputy Director-General, Directorate-General for Development and Co-operation, EuropeAid, European Commission, amongst other participants representing the business sector, recipient and donor countries/institutions and civil society: https://www.effectivecooperation.org/landing-page/meet-leadership

1.2.3 The US development policy and relations with Africa

The United States is the major ODA donor to Africa, accounting for 21% of all the ODA flows in Africa in 2017 (OECD 2019a). Most aid is channelled through the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which has 27 bilateral and regional missions in Africa (Manrique Gil 2015). The main areas of interest and engagement for the US in Africa are fourfold: security and counter-terrorism, energy supply, cooperation on health issues and promotion of governance standards. Since 9/11, the concern about terrorism has increased and, in 2007, the Africa Command (AFRICOM) (Idem) was created. The US Defence Department is involved not only in providing military intelligence but also in security cooperation programmes and humanitarian assistance. The latter has been provided to a large extent during the recent COVID-19 pandemic[11].

In 2000, the US launched the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a trade act renewed until 2025[12]. This act implies preferential trade relations with country partners, mainly providing a reduction of tariffs and duties. The pact is available only for Sub-Saharan countries and only for those respecting some specific eligibility criteria. To be eligible, countries must be in Sub-Saharan Africa, not be engaged in activities undermining US national security and foreign interests and not engaged in violations of human rights or supporting terrorism. Furthermore, the country must have established or be making progress in establishing: a market-based economy, rule of law, elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment, having economic policies to reduce poverty and increase education and healthcare availability and combating corruption. The US President decides if countries are making continual progress, to allow them to remain part of the agreement.

A more comprehensive strategy towards the continent started in 2012, with the White House's US strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa. US-Africa relations were further strengthened in 2014 with the first US-Africa Leader's Summit in Washington, where more than 50 African leaders met US political leaders, business representatives and civil society organisations (Manrique Gil 2015). The White House's US strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa highlighted that the growing economies of African countries were threatened by lack of governance and democratic institutions. The partnership aimed at strengthening the collaboration with Sub-Sahara Africa, to promote sustainable growth and development (The White House 2012). The partnership was based on four main pillars. The first was strengthening democratic

[11] See more at https://www.africom.mil/media-room/partnerships
[12] See more at https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html

institutions, promoting accountability and transparency of institutions. An interesting point under this pillar is the recognition of the importance for Africans to build their own democracies and the willingness of the US to support leaders and actors involved in the creation of vibrant democratic models. The second pillar is to spur economic growth, trade and investment, promoting regional integration and encouraging US companies to trade with and invest in Africa. The third pillar focuses on peace and security promotion, whilst the fourth promotes opportunity and development. The latter pillar particularly stressed the importance of promoting resilience to climate change, young people and female employment (Idem). Since then, each year the African Union (AU) and the United States of America meet at the High-Level Dialogue, to review the progress on the four pillar issues (African Union 2018). During the 6th Annual AUC-US High-Level Dialogue, both parties committed to involving more regional economic communities and to strengthening dialogue with the private sector. The US plays an important role in security issues in the Sahel Region, which is stressed and reinforced during this dialogue, particularly referring to the Somalia transition plan (African Union 2018). During the 7th Annual AUC-US High-Level Dialogue (17 November 2019) African youth and opportunities for women, together with African regional integration, were key. Both sides engaged in deepening cooperation in security and digital economy capacity building, as well as in continuing consultation on the establishment of the AU Food Safety Agency. Whilst the US has held the role of Africa's first donor for many years, Africa has never represented a key strategic role for the US, but rather a way to counteract the Soviet Union immediately after the Cold War and, more recently, Russian and Chinese engagement in the continent[13]. The low interest in the region has been accrued during the years of the Trump Administration, when it became evident that interest in Africa was driven mainly by the willingness to stop the expansion of China's influence[14]. With the new Biden Administration, it has been made quite clear that, with a general US disengagement in international cooperation, the willingness to be present in Africa is mostly to counteract China. Whatever the reasons, it is worth mentioning that the Trump Administration signed an important initiative with Africa – 'Prosper Africa' - a whole-of-government initiative that leverages the services and resources of 17 US Government agencies to substantially increase two-way trade and investment between the United States and Africa, bringing together the full range of US Government resources to connect US and African companies with new buyers, suppliers, and investment opportunities'[15].

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[13] See more at https://theconversation.com/trumps-legacy-in-africa-and-what-to-expect-from-biden-150293
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/trump-ha-ignorato-lafrica-biden-fara-quasi-lo-stesso-28169

[14] Ibid.

[15] https://www.prosperafrica.gov/about/faqs/

Nevertheless, Africa's view of the US has generally declined under Trump, particularly following the restrictions on travel and refugee resettlement from Muslim-majority countries, including many in Africa[16]. With the new administration, Biden rescinded the ban and defined the partnership between the US and Africa as a 'mutually and respectful' one. Although with the Biden administration a change is expected from the previous Trump one, even though it will continue to focus on counter-terrorism and counteracting China's influence, strong cooperation is also expected on climate change related issues, health and democracy[17].

1.2.4 China development policy and relations with Africa

China started to intensify relations with Africa from the late 1960s, following the decolonisation process and this has increased significantly during recent decades (Manrique Gil 2015).

The increasing involvement in the continent has manifested in aid, trade and FDI. (Aggarwal and Ayadi 2012). Amongst the top 10 recipients of Chinese ODA, there are 7 African countries: Ivory Coast with USD 4.0 billion, Ethiopia with USD 3.7 billion, Zimbabwe with USD 3.6 billion, Cameroon with USD 3.4 billion and Nigeria with USD 3.1 billion (data for 2014) (Muchapondwa et al. 2016). Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa has steadily increased during recent years. In 2003, the total FDI flow to Africa was USD 75 million, surging to USD 5.4 billion in 2008[18]. The top 5 African destinations of Chinese FDI in 2008 were South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Zambia and Ethiopia (idem). Early Chinese economic engagement in Africa was led by state-owned enterprises but, more recently, the involvement of the private sector has increased (Manrique Gil 2015). Furthermore, trade has acquired an increasingly important role in Sino-African relations. In 2018, the value of China-Africa trade was USD 185 billion, with South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt being the largest importers and South Africa, Angola and the Republic of Congo the largest exporters. In 2018, Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia accounted for 50% of gross annual revenues in Africa of all Chinese company construction projects. Furthermore, these five African countries also accounted for 58% of all Chinese workers in Africa at the end of 2018 (Idem). This data give a sense of China's increasingly influential role in the African context since the beginning of the 21st century.

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[16] https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/trumps-africa-policy-better-it-looks
[17] https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/24204746-apathy-africa-policy-under-biden/
[18] See more at http://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa,

In 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was launched; it sets a framework for the promotion of Chinese investments in African countries and is organised every three years, alternately in Africa and China (Bertucci and Locatelli 2020). Furthermore, in 2014, the One Belt and Road Initiative was launched, under which East Africa developed a central node (Nantulya 2019). Africa represents very important energy reserves for a fast-growing country like China. In fact, both trade and investment are characterised by the focus on the extractive sector. Nevertheless, since the fifth FOCAC in 2013, with the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and relative action plan, China started building a new type of China-Africa partnership, including key objectives like: strengthening political consultation and strategic dialogue, making Africa's peace and security architecture operational, strengthening China's cooperation with AU and sub-regional organisations in Africa and taking joint measures to promote African unity and regional integration, amongst others (Manrique Gil 2015). Therefore, China's overall governance, in terms of development and relations with Africa, is not only centred on economic aspects but also increasingly involves political and security issues.

1.2.5 Other key actors involved in development policy and relations with Africa

During recent decades and particularly since the 1990s, the African continent has started to attract more and more actors in the global arena: countries, regional institutions and non-state actors.

Starting with countries and since the last section deeply analysed China's governance, it is worth mentioning the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Whilst all countries in the BRICS group have, for years, developed their relationship with Africa bilaterally, the formation of this new regional group of states gave more impetus to cooperation with Africa. This is explained by the fact that BRICS represents a group of states, part of which is called 'the South of the World' and, since the 1990s with the end of bipolarism, the multipolar world provides the opportunity for new actors to have a role in the global arena and for South-South cooperation to develop. The first BRIC Summit was hosted by South Africa and titled 'BRICS and Africa'; since then, BRICS summits include neighbourhood countries, invited by the chairing country. During the first meeting, it was decided to establish a co-financing agreement for sustainable development in Africa, to co-finance infrastructure projects across the continent. The issue of infrastructure development was also key during the 2018 BRICS Summit titled, 'BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for inclusive growth and shared prosperity in the 4th industrial revolution'. BRICS members are amongst the largest bilateral creditors in Africa for infrastructure investments. Nevertheless, more infrastructure for trade is needed, since it is still unequal, with African countries mostly exporting primary commodities to BRICS and importing manufacturing[19].

BRICS also became part of the G20, the intergovernmental forum composed of most of the largest economies in the world, which has played an increasing role in Africa's development issues during recent years. The German G20 presidency in 2017 initiated the Compact with Africa (CwA) initiative. The initiative aims at boosting private investment, mainly to increase the provision of infrastructure in Africa, creating a better environment for investment in the continent[20]. The initiative is defined as demand-driven and is open to all African countries[21]. Any country interested in starting an 'Investment Compact' is invited to engage with an international organisation involved (i.e., the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG)), to identify important issues that need to be resolved and then work with them to find investors that are interested. Finally, the third step focuses on concrete reform measures[22]. Only 11 countries have joined the initiative so far: in North Africa – Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; in East Africa – Ethiopia and Rwanda; and in West Africa – Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal and Togo[23]. Whilst the initiative has been promoted, particularly by Germany, as innovative and demand driven, there is the risk that it could increase the debt burden developing countries are already facing. Furthermore, the programme has been criticised because it seems close to the Structural Adjustment Programmes, which are very narrowly focused on macroeconomic conditions and neglects UN sustainability targets, as well as the goals set out in the African Union's Agenda 2063[24].

Other actors with an increasing role in development policy in Africa are the non-state actors (NSA) (i.e., NGOs, philanthropic organisations, private sector). NSA started to become central to the global development agenda via collaboration with private foundations, states and other private actors. The activity of the NSA became more prominent during the last decade, driven by the need for more resources for development to reach the SDGs and, consequently, the institutions of platforms

[19] https://media.africaportal.org/documents/GA_Th3_PB_sidiropolous_20180719.pdf
[20] https://www.g20-insights.org/policy_briefs/g20-compact-with-africa/
[21] https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/world/G7-G20/2017-03-30-g20-compact-with-africa.html
[22] https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home/about.html#idea
[23] Ibid.
[24] https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-new-name-but-same-mistakes-in-compact-with-africa/a-46095113

gathering public and private resources. Of course, the NSA vary considerably amongst each other (i.e., Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Oxfam) and also, therefore, regarding their governance modalities and tools.

Lastly, it is important to note that other relatively new actors are strengthening their relations with Africa. One of them is Japan, which started to build its relations with African countries in the 1990s and figured in the top 10 African donors (See Annexe 1). Japan maintained a role focused on true partnership amongst equals which enrich each other[25]. Already by 1999, Japan had launched a high-level policy dialogue between African leaders and development partners: the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Meetings are led by Japan and co-organised by the United Nations, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank and the African Union Commission (AUC). The 7th Tokyo International Conference on African Development was held in August 2019, in the City of Yokohama, focusing on the overarching theme of Advancing Africa's Development through people, technology and innovation[26]. The Yokohama Declaration is based on three pillars: (1) Accelerating economic transformation and improving business environment through innovation and private sector engagement; (2) Deepening sustainable and resilient society; (3) Strengthening peace and stability[27]. Under each pillar of the declaration, focus areas and corresponding AU flagship programmes are listed. As regards Korea, its relations with Africa are more recent, around 2006, with the launch of the 'Year of Friendship with Africa' and the 'Korea Initiative for Africa's Development'[28]. Korea is another new actor. It is still at the learning stage and only recently saw the establishment of the Korea-Africa Foundation, with the following main objectives: (1) Trend analysis and research by country, region and theme; (2) Education and promotion for Korea-Africa mutual understanding; (3) Support for Korea-Africa exchange and cooperation: private sector and organisations; (4) Other programmes determined necessary in achieving the objectives of the Korea-Africa Foundation Act[29].

To summarise, there are many actors in the global arena interested in intensifying their relations with Africa. As mentioned before, Africa is increasingly attractive for its natural resources, its youthful population and its expanding middle-class. The mix of actors involved leads to a mixture of governance tools. The common denominator is the partnership approach with the continent and increasing attention

[25] https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/japan-africa %E2 %80 %99s-subtle-effective-partner
[26] https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/about_us/ticad0/history.html
[27] https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad7/pdf/yokohama_declaration_en.pdf
[28] https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/korea-africa-between-soft-power-and-economic-interests
[29] http://eng.k-af.or.kr/eng/load.asp?subPage=110

towards investment to finance infrastructure. The following sections will show that the EU is almost following the same path, but still maintaining a strong emphasis on security and border management issues.

1.3 EU'S GOVERNANCE EVOLUTION: EU'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

The European and the African continents have been closely connected since colonial times. The way Europe has built its partnership with Africa and the overall European attitude towards development policy, builds on the decolonisation process. Furthermore, the very formation of the European Union[30] and its regional integration, took place in parallel with the affirmation of independence of African countries (and other colonies in other regions, i.e., the Caribbean and South America). European regional integration has guided and influenced the evolution of European governance towards the African continent. In parallel with the EU's formation and enlargement, cooperation agreements with neighbourhood countries began to be designed, mainly with ex-colonies. Indeed, the UK and France have played a crucial role in building relations between the EU and developing countries in Africa, since most of them were their former colonies.

Even though the EU has tried to build a partnership with Africa based on a continent-to-continent approach in recent decades, historically the EU related to Africa on a 'dual-regional scope', with different frameworks for cooperating with North African countries and those of Sub-Sahara Africa[31]. Several legal frameworks between the EU and different African regions have slowed down the building of a comprehensive strategy overall with Africa as a continent, hampered by the complicated and heterogeneous African regional integration process.

The Africa-EU relationship is based on agreements where aid and trade represent the main instruments for enhancing regional integration and human development. Despite the new attractive players in the African continent (See section 1), the EU is still the most significant trade and investment partner in Africa. In 2018, total trade in goods between the

[30] European Economic Community (EEC) was born with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 including Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. The UK joined the EEC in 1973.

[31] African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), intergovernmental body created by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975 amongst 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states, all signatories to the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 (48 Sub-Saharan, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific countries). With the Georgetown Agreement of 6 June 1975, the ACP Group was given autonomous status, establishing joint institutions and procedures for coordination and consultation between the member countries. Coordination between countries and a joint secretariat had already been established during the negotiations on the Lomé Convention. After an initial phase in which the three sub-groups of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific each had their own spokesperson, the countries had a single spokesperson and acted in a rather cohesive manner in the next phase of the negotiations. In the Lomé cooperation system, the expression 'associated states' previously used was abandoned, because of its neo-colonial nuance and to highlight the principle of equality in relations. The Organisation of African Caribbean and Pacific States (OACP) replaced the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) on April 5, 2020, under the revised Georgetown Agreement. Out of convenience, the usual ACP acronym is retained in this paper to designate the member countries of the organisation and their group.

27 EU Member States and Africa was 32% of Africa's total (around EUR 235 billion); in 2017, the EU-27 FDI stock in Africa was around EUR 222 billion[32]. Whilst China's ODA contribution to Africa is challenging to assess, regarding trade and investment the country still falls short compared to the EU, accounting for 17% of Africa's total trade and EUR 38 billion of FDI stock[33]. Moreover, the EU (with its MS) is Africa's main partner in development and cooperation, accounting for 46% of the total ODA received by Africa (2018) (see Annexe 2).

The following paragraphs will analyse the evolution of European governance in Africa: from the differentiated approach with North Africa and with Sub-Saharan Africa, to the new comprehensive strategy with Africa proposed by the European Commission in 2020, with a focus on development and cooperation policies.

1.3.1 EU and North Africa

The European Economic Community (EEC) has been implementing cooperation agreements with Mediterranean non-Member Countries (MNC) since the 1960s. In 1978, cooperation agreements between the EEC and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of Tunisia entered into force. The main purpose of these agreements was to promote development through measures in trade and social fields and strengthen relations amongst partners, promoting regional cooperation. The cooperation measures provided by the agreements covered economic, financial and technical cooperation, trade and labour. Europe built a partnership with its neighbourhood based mainly on the creation of preferential relations in trade. Reducing import duties and facilitating workers and industries to operate (both in Europe and the partner countries) were amongst the core issues. Cooperation with the Southern neighbourhoods started increasing by the end of the Cold War and evolved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or 'Barcelona Process' in 1995. The European Union was newly born at that stage and its approach radically changed from the previous decades. The optimism of these years on the opportunities offered by regional integration was high and this optimistic wave led to a very innovative attempt. The idea was to strongly enhance integration amongst countries in the Mediterranean, in order to build stability and peace for the future. Countries in the Mediterranean started a new collaboration based on three dimensions: the policy and security dimension (creation and maintenance of peace and an area of stability); the civilian dimension (promoting cultural exchange and human development); and the economic dimension (creating a Mediterranean area of 'shared

[32] See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_375, consulted on 20 April 2020 and https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/Africa-EU-relations-changing-paradigm-28665, 21 December 2020.
[33] Ibid.

prosperity') (Ayadi and Sessa 2017). The latter was particularly ambitious, having the purpose of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. With the Barcelona Process, the previous 'cooperation agreements' became 'Association Agreements'. They still represent the main legal basis of the European Union's relationship with North African countries. The agreements stress the importance of regional integration, to consolidate peaceful coexistence and economic and political stability. Furthermore, association agreements provide a framework for political dialogue to enforce political relations amongst countries, with more attention to human rights. There is no 'human rights clause', but the parties declared they would comply with the International Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, sustainable economic and social development started to become key concepts. Other key points for this new partnership are cooperation in education and training, cooperation in sharing technology, facilitating the movement of capital to attract investment and the gradual reduction of trade tariffs. All the association agreements stress the importance of regional integration, recognising the importance to involve third countries fostering intra-regional trade within the Maghreb, even if they do not provide technical measures to achieve this objective. Following the first enlargements of the EU, in 2003 the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched. The main objective was to strengthen prosperity, stability and security between the EU and its neighbourhood. The ENP was reviewed in 2011, following the 'Arab Spring' uprising and again in 2015. After the crisis and the deep instability experienced, stabilising the region in political, economic and security related issues became the heart of the renewed policy. The ENP governs relations between the EU and North African countries, with bilateral, regional and cross-border cooperation programmes, with the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) as its financial instrument. The budget under this instrument is renewed every seven years. The total seven-year ENI budget for 2014-2020 was EUR 15.4 billion (in 2014 prices). In addition to the ENI, the EU provides other instruments for financing cooperation with North Africa.

One important financial instrument is the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Particularly after 2011, Southern European countries experienced the arrival of many migrants from Africa and this issue became central in European governance. The Southern Mediterranean countries represent the shore from which many migrants start to travel towards Europe, from all parts of Africa. In 2015, the EU created the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which was particularly focused on addressing enforced displacement and irregular migration. The fund benefits a wide range of African countries that represent the major migration routes to Europe. In particular, the 'North of Africa window' of the Trust Fund operates in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt to contribute to safe, secure and legal migration from, to and within the region and to support migration governance based on human rights. As of April 2020), the total amount allocated to the EU Trust Fund for Africa is

EUR 4.8 billion, of which: EUR 4.2 billion is from the European Development Fund (EDF) and EU financial instruments (DCI, ENI, HOME, ECHO), EUR 598 million from EU Member States and other donors (Switzerland and Norway)[34].

Another important instrument under the ENP is the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP), which mobilises additional funding to finance capital-intensive infrastructure projects. The instrument pools grant resources from the EU budget and EU Member States, using them to leverage European financial institution loans. Projects under NIP must be developed by eligible European Financial Institutions which are: European Investment Bank (EIB); European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB); Nordic Investment Bank (NIB); Agence Française de Développement (AFD); Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW); Oesterreichische Entwicklungsbank AG (OeEB); Società Italiana per le Imprese all' Estero (SIMEST); Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento (SOFID); Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID). In addition, the NIP plays a key role in donor coordination, supporting the implementation of regional and multilateral processes, particularly for relations with North Africa, with the Union for the Mediterranean and under the Southern Mediterranean Investment Coordination Initiative (AMICI). The latter is an EU initiative to better coordinate strategic level investment-related programmes. It aims at optimising policy dialogue and cooperation amongst relevant actors and donors in the Southern Mediterranean and coordinating public investment and the private sector, to better target investments towards the highest possible socio-economic impact. AMICI's investment-related programmes cover typical economic sectors (i.e., trade, private sector development, energy, transport, environment) and economic governance, including macroeconomic reform and public finance engagement. The main priorities of the EU under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI 2014-2020) are: (1) human rights and justice; (2) civil society; (3) rural economic development; (4) education and employment for young people; (5) boosting small business, energy cooperation; (6) management of natural resources; (7) climate change adaptation; (8) transport connections; (9) easing mobility of people.

To strengthen the dialogue amongst Euro-Mediterranean countries and to revamp the Barcelona Process, in 2008 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was created, an intergovernmental organisation of 43 countries from Europe and the Mediterranean Basin (EU-27 plus 15 states from the Mediterranean basins). The UfM presents a well-defined institutional framework for political dialogue and operationalisation of projects. The UfM is chaired by a co-presidency, shared between the two shores, and the co-presidency applies to all levels and activities (i.e., summits, ministerial meetings, and official-level meetings). The

[34] See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/trust-fund-financials_en, consulted on 10 March 2021.

UfM Secretariat is in charge of identifying and promoting projects for enhancing regional cooperation that impact directly on the livelihoods of citizens, improve socio-economic development, regional integration, sustainable development and the exchange of knowledge amongst, and within, the members of the UfM. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean is composed of 208 members, equally distributed between the northern and the southern shores of the Mediterranean and adopts (non-legally-binding) resolutions (or recommendations) on all aspects of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Finally, under the UfM, a consultative assembly has also been set – the Euro-Mediterranean Local and Regional Assembly (ARLEM), composed of 84 representatives of regions and local bodies that hold a regional or local authority mandate in the UfM Member States, to increase local and regional actor involvement.

The European Union adopted a governance approach to North Africa based on a combination of aid, trade and political coordination. Building a robust diplomatic relationship in the Mediterranean region has been a priority in the EU's external governance since the very first steps of the European Union constitution and then its enlargement.

1.3.2 EU and Sub-Sahara Africa

1.3.2.1 From a post-colonial 'donor-recipient' approach to 'partnership' approach

The first cooperation agreement between the EEC and Sub-Sahara African Countries was signed in 1963, the **Yaoundé Convention** (based on the previous treaty between the EEC and its overseas territories). The first convention between the EEC and 18 African ex-colonies, the **Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM)** entered into force in 1964. It was extended to Mauritius in 1969, with the attempt to create reciprocal market access and enhance the aid budget. In 1973, the UK joined the EEC, raising the question of the inclusion in the cooperation agreement of its overseas countries and territories (e.g., English-speaking African and Caribbean and Pacific states). In order to better coordinate cooperation amongst the enlarged EEC and the new overseas countries and territories, in 1975 the **African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP) was created**, an alliance of 46 states. The ACP concluded with Europe staging the first Lomé Convention in the same year. It was an essential phase in the EU's history of cooperation. This convention was the **first significant aid and trade cooperation agreement between Europe and a large group of countries**. It provided unilateral free access to the Community's market for almost all goods coming from ACP countries, under a duty-free arrangement, enjoying 'most-favoured-nation' trading status. Unlike previous conventions, in Lomé it was decided to apply a unilateral trade scheme, for which ACP countries had no obligations towards the EEC. At the same time, the latter committed to open its market to ACP countries' products. Precisely because of the provision of non-reciprocity, the Lomé regime has been considered an '**alternative trade regime'**. In a context of a dominant liberal paradigm, promoted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), the Lomé Convention seemed to be more inspired by the New International Economic Order (NIEO), better addressing the requests coming from developing countries (Drieghe and Orbie 2009). Furthermore, with the first Lomé Convention, the Stabilisation for Export Earnings scheme (STABEX) for agricultural products was introduced (i.e., cocoa, cotton, coffee). It was an operational losses' compensation scheme for agrarian products, aimed at guaranteeing interest-free repayable compensation from the EEC to the ACP countries, should world market prices fall.

The **Second Lomé Convention** introduced a new scheme: the System of Stabilisation of Export Earnings from Mining Products (SYSMIN). It allowed the EEC to provide urgent financial assistance (in the form of aid, granted by the European Development Fund) to the ACP States, should there be serious upheaval in the mining industry. The European Development Fund (EDF) is the oldest European common instrument for development. It was established in 1958, with the scope of providing development aid to the ex-colonies and oversees countries, then becoming the main instrument to finance European programmes and projects with Sub-Saharan African countries. The European Development Fund (EDF) endowment, under Lomé II, doubled from the previous one (under Lomé I). During the same period, ACP countries suffered a drop in raw material prices and the famine in Africa raised the need for more development aid in the agricultural sector. The Commission started strengthening its dialogue with ACP countries in order to maximise European assistance, whilst Member States began calling for greater control over the use of funds (Migani Guia 2019).

After the Cold War, the general global pattern profoundly changed, increasing the need to discuss both trade and aid as part of the partnership. By 1980, with Lomé Convention II, the EEC had tried to introduce a **clause linking the deployment of aid to the respect of human rights**, which was only formally introduced in 1985 in Lomé Convention IV, even though it did not provide a clear legal basis allowing the suspension of an agreement, should there be severe violations of human rights or democratic principles (i.e. in 1970, the EU wanted to suspend aid to Uganda because of the bloody dictatorship that was in power, but it lacked the legal mechanisms to do so) (Idem). In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty provided that the **Community's aid would be linked to democracy, the rule of law and respect of human rights,** which started to become primary conditions for future conventions. On the trade side, GATT rules on non-discrimination in international trade challenged trade provisions under the Lomé Convention. The latter violated the Enabling Clause in GATT (1979) to support LDCs (Gibb 2000), providing preferential access to a restricted number of developing countries, consequently excluding others with a similar level of development. It became clear to the EU that there was a need to adapt its partnership with ACP countries to the new international rules. In 1996, a Green Paper on EU-ACP relations (Commission of the European Communities 1996) outlined the main challenges and options for a new partnership for the 21st century. In this paper, the EU stressed the necessity to adapt the historical ties that had governed trade and development aid between the Union and the ACP countries since 1975, to the new international political and trade scene. It represented an essential change in Africa-EU relations and was the first step towards a partnership that was more disconnected from the post-colonial approach. The Green Paper stressed four key issues for consideration to build a new EU-ACP cooperation framework, recognising that trade preferences adopted during the period of the Lomé Conventions had created disappointing reactions in most ACP countries. The first issue highlighted was the geographical scope. The Lomé Conventions included a significant number and heterogeneous group of states without any collective economic or political body. The historical context of the mid-1990s urged that regional differences be taken into account more and that different arrangements be provided for LDCs. Furthermore, the necessity to increase aid in a better coordinated and more efficient way emerged, particularly towards the poorest countries. Some other important issues were: (1) to improve competitiveness and strengthen private sector engagement; (2) the role and the functioning of the State in ACP countries, for which the EU should have put more effort into strengthening the rule of law and the creation of a satisfactory institutional framework; (3) the need to change the trade dimension, readdressing trade issues under the new WTO multilateral framework. The informal consultations on the future of ACP-EU cooperation started in 1996 and, in 2000, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) was signed.

1.3.2.2 Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA): main characteristics and evolution of the agreement regulating EU-SSA relations

The **Cotonou Agreement** came into force in 2000, with a validity of 20 years. The Cotonou Agreement is a wide-ranging agreement, covering many policy areas and with a huge geographical scope. The stated aim of the CPA remains in line with the previous conventions between the EU and ACP countries: (1) to reduce poverty, aiming at its eradication; (2) to support sustainable economic, cultural and social development; (3) to help partner countries' economies to progressively integrate into the world economy. The CPA also represented critical changes from the previous agreements stipulated with ACP countries. For the first time, it explicitly recognised the complementary role and the potentialities of non-state actors in the development process, whilst the agreement provides a well-defined joint institutional framework for strengthening political dialogue (ACP Secretariat and ECDPM 2003). Indeed, the Cotonou Agreement represented a radical change in Africa-EU relations and the EU's attempt to build a new model for development. Even so, whilst from one side the CPA adopted an approach that was more globally oriented and less 'neo-colonial', on the other side it still widely reflected the 'neo-liberal' approach that dominated international policies during the 1980s and the 1990s, characterised by a common use of terms, like 'ownership', 'participation', 'empowerment' and 'poverty reduction' (Farrel 2010). Nevertheless, in a departure from the conventions that characterised EU-ACP cooperation before 2000, the CPA was fully defined as a 'partnership agreement', underlining the EU's willingness to change international cooperation modalities, at least towards ACP countries and, therefore, its main ex-colonies.

One major change with respect to the previous Lomé Conventions was that the CPA was less prescriptive and encouraged flexible dialogue amongst partners. In fact, the CPA contains a strong political pillar, creating some **joint institutions** for strengthening the dialogue between the two 'parties' (EU and ACP), as well as supporting the implementation of the agreement's objectives. The main joint institution is the **Council of Ministers**, composed of members of the Council of the European Union, members of the Commission of the European Communities and one member of each ACP country government. The presidency of the Council of Ministers is held by a European or an ACP member on an alternating basis, which convenes the Council once a year as a rule and whenever it seems necessary. The role of the Council is key. The Council of Ministers is charged with conducting the political dialogue, examining and resolving any issues related to the implementation of the agreement and adopting the policy guidelines; it takes decisions that are necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the agreement, particularly regarding development strategy. **The Committee of Ambassadors** (monitoring body) and **the Joint Parliamentary Assembly** (consultative body) are all composed of ACP countries and EU representatives, in equal measure. The committee is composed of a permanent representative of each EU Member State, a representative of the European Commission and the head of mission of each ACP State, designated by the ACP States. The Parliament is composed of members of the European Parliament and members of the ACP States' parliaments.

The agreement also provides two other joint institutions: the **joint ACP-EU ministerial trade committee** and the **ACP-EU development finance cooperation committee**. The two committees examine the implementation of what is provided under the relative pillar of trade and of development and cooperation. This joint institutional arrangement highlights the EU's willingness to create a 'new way' of cooperating with Africa, following the pattern of EU regional integration. It is also interesting to observe how, in the CPA, the EU clearly defines its willingness to be a unique, strong actor, as highlighted by **art. 91 of the CPA** stating: '*no treaty, convention, agreement or arrangement of any kind between one or more Member States of the Community and one or more ACP States may impede the implementation of this*

Agreement'. Finally, another particularly important novelty of the CPA was provided by **art. 96** on '*consultation procedure and appropriate measures as regard to human rights, democratic principle and rule of law'*. The mentioned article serves as a '*human rights clause*' or '*democracy clause'* allowing all the parties (EU, ACP States) to open up consultation with all the parties and the Council of Ministers, if it is found that a party failed to fulfil its obligations, as in paragraph 2, art 9 of the CPA (i.e. respect of human rights, democratic principles, rule of law). During the consultation, the parties shall discuss measures that the party concerned has to take to remedy the situation. In 'case of special urgency' (or if the consultations do not lead to solutions or are refused) appropriate measures may be taken (in accordance with international law and proportional to the violation, CPA, art. 96(2))[35].

The CPA is divided into **three complementary pillars**: political dimension, economic and trade cooperation, and development cooperation.

1.3.2.3 Political dimension and institutional framework

The **political dimension**, as previously mentioned, provides the joint institutions' frameworks for the implementation of the agreement. Furthermore, this pillar sets out some of the core principles and objectives of the partnership: (1) promoting multilateralism, (2) integrating more ACP countries in international relations and (3) building stable and democratic political environments in ACP countries. The main global attempt is in line with the millennium development goals (MDGs): the reduction of poverty and the promotion of sustainable peace and security. The agreement underlines that both good governance and the rule of law underpin the overall ACP-EU partnership. Even from the first pillar, it is clear that the agreement is strongly shaped by the context of international governance. The agreement is based on the MDGs for its core objectives and on the promotion of 'good governance'. The concept of 'good governance' follows the WB and IMF approach of the 1990s, emphasising the principle of accountability, transparency and representation of different social groups in the definition of goals and development objectives (Farrel 2010). Promoting human rights and democratic principles and preventing conflict are also key in the CPA. On the migration issue, the principal focus is regulating irregular migration through return and readmission of irregular migrants.

The pillars on trade and cooperation are strictly linked. Indeed, the agreement underlines that the '*cooperation strategy is based on development strategy and economic and trade cooperation which are interlinked and complementary*' and the parties '*shall ensure that*

[35] Since 2000, the article has been applied around fifteen times (European Council,2021)

the efforts undertaken in both aforementioned areas are mutually reinforcing' (CPA, Art.18 (3)).

1.3.2.4 Trade and cooperation

The **Economic Pillar** of the CPA is included under the cooperation strategies of the agreement. These strategies are based on development, economic and trade cooperation, considered as being interlinked and complementary. Development and cooperation strategies aim at building a better institutional and infrastructural environment in the ACP countries, with a focus on institutional development and capacity building, environmental issues and gender equality as cross-cutting dimensions. Regional cooperation is considered key for enhancing development and cooperation, as is dialogue and good practice exchange amongst the involved countries. Economic and trade cooperation represents a core element in the partnership. The declared aim of the economic pillar is to '*enable ACP States to play a full part in international trade'* (CPA, Art. 34). In 1994, the European Commission accommodated its policies to the Uruguay Round of the global trade framework, reflected in the trade pillar of the CPA. The trade pillar provides a trade arrangement that replaced the previous non-reciprocal preferences: the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). A single ACP country can sign the EPA and then, ACP States which are not part of such agreement, can seek accession at any time. The joint ACP-EC Ministerial Trade committee was established to discuss trade issues and regularly monitor negotiations. The EU decided to implement EPAs, splitting the ACP group into seven regions: West Africa; Central Africa; East Africa and Southern Africa (ESA); East African Community (EAC); Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Pacific Region (see Annexe 3). Nevertheless, in most cases, this regional division does not correspond with existing regional organisations, implying overlapping measures and possible inefficiency in the implementation of the agreements (Hurt 2020).

In the EPA, there is one section dedicated to economic and development cooperation, in which the main links between the development objectives are identified, related to the region signing the agreement and the EPAs. The idea is, in fact, that an EPA, via trade-related provisions, should help sustain all the development and cooperation pillars of the CPA, highlighting the link between trade and ODA. Nevertheless, the EPA regional group includes countries with very different levels of development and, in some cases, different regional organisations. In the SADC EPA group are Lesotho and Mozambique, which are LDCs, as well as Namibia and Botswana, which are upper-middle-income countries. Furthermore, some of these countries are part of a Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia South Africa and Eswatini form the Southern Africa Customs Union – SACU). The overlapping of several different regional frameworks risks mis-targeting the type of countries involved and undermining the efficacy of the relative trade measures being adopted.

1.3.2.5 Development aid and cooperation

The aid pillar of the Cotonou Agreement is based on two main forms of cooperation: grants facility and investment facility. The agreement underlines three focal areas of support: economic development (with a focus on private sector development and investment); macroeconomic and structural policy reforms and social and human development (focusing on social sector policies), and cultural development. The agreement provides that governments and non-state actors in each ACP country produce a country development strategy setting out the priorities for development, whilst the initiatives funded under Cotonou are funded by the European Development Fund (EDF). Unlike the standard funds for cooperation that come from the regular EU budget, the EDF is funded by the Member States who decide and agree on their contribution (ACP Secretariat and ECDPM 2003). The ACP-EU development finance cooperation committee examines the implementation of development finance cooperation and monitors its progress.

The EDF is external from the EU's budget and is composed of MS direct contributions. The Multiannual Financial Framework for the ACP-EU partnership is separated from the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and follows a different procedure. Nevertheless, particularly during recent years, discussion about EDF contributions is made in parallel with the one on the EU's MFF, for the sake of coordination and effectiveness of development budget allocation. The EDF’s MFF indicates the amount of resources directly provided by MS, the division between broad categories of expenditure and additional funds that the European Investment Bank can provide for the Investment Facility of the EDF. Resources available under the EDF increased during recent years, particularly with the 11th EDF: EUR 30.5 billion, plus the availability of a further EUR 2.6 billion provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the form of loans from its resources. For each EDF, a specific regulation is issued by the European Council and has to be approved by all the European Member States. The EDF is composed of ACP spending, administrative spending and spending for the Overseas Development Territories (ODTs). The EDF’s financial regulation provides a series of controls and audit obligations: internal and external control systems. The internal control can be implemented by the Commission headquarters and EU delegations in beneficiary countries and also by national authorising officers (NAOs) designated by ACP countries. The external audit is carried out by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) each year. Aid delivery occurs through three main approaches: project approach, budget support and sector support. Furthermore, the EDF contains three different sub-categories of spending: national and regional indicative programmes (most funds are allocated to this category); intra-ACP and inter-regional cooperation (thematic actions) and investment facility (only since 2003, directly managed by the EIB) (D'Alfonso 2014).

The EDF represented the largest and the most advanced financial and political framework for North-South cooperation and one of its particularities is its intergovernmental nature. By 2003, however, the European Commission had started recommending EFF budgetisation, but Member States were strongly against this idea (particularly France, Italy and Spain, whilst Northern European Countries were more in favour)[36]. The evolution of the EDF and development policy will be better analysed in the following section.

1.3.3 Development policy and EDF evolution during the years of the Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Agreement regulated relations between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa for 20 years. The first EDF under the CPA was the 9th one (2000-2007). It signed up to an important shift in the EU's overall approach to development, driven by the MDGs launched in 2000, which set collective and globally agreed priorities for development. Political dialogue and cooperation were strictly linked and the dialogue with non-state actors was recognised and promoted. The 10th and 11th EDFs fell, respectively, under the first and second review of the CPA (2005 and 2010), reflecting several important events that occurred during these years in the landscape of international development governance. One key global governance event, reflected in the reviewed agreements, was the **Accra Agenda for Action (AAA),** resulting from the Third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2008. With the Accra Agenda for Action, a great number of heterogeneous stakeholders reaffirmed commitments to the **Paris Declaration (2005),** further calling for greater partnership between different parties working on aid and development. The Paris Declaration's principles were reflected in the reviewed CPA in 2005 and 2010, particularly concerning EDF implementation. Immediately after the Paris Declaration (2005), the European Union adopted important initiatives to improve aid effectiveness: **the European Consensus on Development** (2005, new one in 2016). The overarching objective of the consensus is poverty eradication. Particularly with the consensus in 2005, the EU committed to making aid more effective, better coordinating the delivery on the ground and committing with MS to reach the 0.7% GNI target by 2015. Furthermore, the EU committed to pay special attention to Africa and fragile states. Since 2005, the EU has adopted various initiatives aimed at better coordinating aid amongst MS, between EUIs and MS, as well as with recipient countries (i.e., **the Code of**

[36] The budgetisation of the EDF has been obtained with the post-Cotonou Agreement (political deal, 5 December 2020).

Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (2008), the **EU Toolkit for the Implementation of Complementarity and Division of Labour** (2009)).

In 2009, the **Treaty of Lisbon** came into force, completely restructuring the EU's overall external relations and, therefore, having a key impact on EU-ACP relations. The Treaty of Lisbon brought some major changes to the programming and management procedures for development. With the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a coordinating body and by merging DG DEV and DG AIDCO into the Directorate-General DEVCO[37], it required a redefinition of the division of roles between new EU institutions involved in development. Furthermore, the European Union Delegations (EUDs) gained more responsibility, playing a crucial role in drafting the proposal for 'EU response strategy', a fundamental document for programming development programmes, assessing the political situation and the national/regional development plan in the partner country/region (Herrero, Alisa et al. 2015). The principal role in development and cooperation was traditionally played by the Commission. After the Treaty of Lisbon, **DG DEVCO** (in collaboration with other DGs) took on responsibility for development and cooperation, with the **External Action Service (EEAS) being** responsible for EU Delegations and offices around the world. DG DEVCO is responsible for thematic and regional programming and the design of annual action programmes and also for their implementation and financial management. The EEAS prepares with the DEVCO Commission decisions on country and regional financial allocation. Furthermore, the **High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission**, introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon, covers a main role in defining development policies and partnership with Africa.

Nevertheless, inter-ministerial meetings between European and African countries remain crucial in setting the priorities. The programming for development is built on strong collaboration with beneficiary countries that are required to define country strategies and priorities for development (for the period of the EDF Multiannual Financial Framework). The EU and MS shall coordinate their efforts in development (geographical and thematic allocation) with joint programming involving partner countries. Most of the available fund is dedicated to **National and Regional Indicative Programmes (N/RIPs),** supporting individual ACP countries or the regional integration of ACP countries, based on Indicative Programme Documents prepared by the recipient region/state, that must underline three sectors in which EU aid should be focused. The principle of co-management at the heart of the CPA still also remains key in development strategy, with ACP countries appointing a senior government

[37] DG DEVCO was created in 2011 merging the European Commission's DG DEV and DG EuropeAid. On 16 January 2021, DG DEVCO became the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA). The transition started in 2019, reflecting the new geopolitical Commission's emphasis in the role of international partnership for building a strong EU role in the global fight against poverty and the promotion of SDGs. Out of convenience, the usual DG DEVCO acronym is retained in this paper, to designate the DG dedicated to international development, cooperation and partnership.

official as their **national authorising officer (NAO),** to represent them in all the operations financed by the EDF. Nevertheless, the EU's 'chain of command' is complicated, involving a variety of EU institutions and financial institutions and, of course, European Member States (see Annexe 4).

The CPA can be considered as the pioneering agreement that shapes the aid effectiveness agenda and, particularly, for respecting ownership (Herrero et al. 2015). The ownership principle is reflected in art. 19 and art. 56 of the CPA, where it is stated that the EU committed to respect local ownership for development strategy implementation and that the latter should be the result of consultations between government and non-state actors in each ACP country. The ownership principle was further stressed with the second revision of the CPA (2010)[38] also reflecting the important institutional and governance changes that have occurred since 2005. In the second CPA revision, there is a strengthening of the development and security concepts, more emphasis given to sustainable development and the recognition of climate change as a major development concern. The role of aid for trade and economic partnership agreements are stressed as being key for development and integration of ACP countries and the Africa Union (AU) became an official partner for EU-ACP relations (European Commission, 2017a). The EU also committed to enhancing donor coordination, aid untying and coherence between EU policies and EU development objectives. In 2011, another important international commitment to aid effectiveness was reached **in Busan (2011**), followed by the **European Agenda for Change**, which placed even greater emphasis on aid effectiveness principles. The adoption of the Agenda for Change in 2012 also brought some changes to the EDF's sector allocation. The 11th EDF simplified rules and procedures, harmonised efforts with other EFIs and introduced a shock-absorbing scheme to mitigate the impact of exogenous shocks (European Commission 2017a). The 11th EDF reflected all the lessons learnt and governance changes that had occurred since the start of the CPA, allocating 21% of funds towards Sustainable Agriculture and Food and Nutrition, followed by Human Rights, Democracy, Good Governance (19%) (European Commission 2016a). The budget allocation was, therefore, changed with respect to the previous EDFs (9th and 10th), which were more concentrated towards social and economic infrastructures (i.e., education, health, transport, communication) and budget support (i.e., mainly food aid). With inclusive sustainable development growth, human rights and rule of law as basic overarching principles, the Agenda for Change further enhanced the efforts towards aid efficiency, mainly through two principles: (a) the principle of differentiation, stressing the need for better

[38]With the CPA revision of 2010, the principle of cooperation between the EU and its partners in multilateral forums has been introduced. The principle led to positive outcomes, in particular on the Paris Agreement in respect of the climate change negotiation *'but most often, the partnership was not able to use all its weight to influence the outcome'.* From https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/joint-communication-renewed-partnership-acp-20161122_en.pdf

targeting of recipient countries towards LDCs and fragile states; (b) the principle of sector concentration, avoiding aid fragmentation through the choice of a maximum of three sectors' intervention per country or area (Jones et al. 2020), pushing for joint programming and a common results-based monitoring framework to increase coordination. After the Treaty of Lisbon, the necessity to increase financing for development, due to the increasing international challenges and global targets for development, led the EU to start developing blending instruments as a new aid modality to accompany the old way of delivering aid, combining grants with public and private financing.

Blending and involvement of the **private sector** in financing development started to be recommended by the international communities more than a decade ago and the EU followed this line, particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon, which gave the EU the legal possibility to manage multi-donor funds. The European Commission started experiencing blending facilities in **2007, with the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF) and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF),** amongst others. The **Africa-EU Infrastructure Trust Fund** (EU-AITF, 2007) was created by the European Commission and MS, with the objective of promoting infrastructure projects in Sub-Sahara Africa with regional impact[39]. Part of the donor contributions of the EU-AITF came from the EDF budget, partly explaining the main sector allocation changes that occurred with the 11th EDF budget. Between 2007 and 2012, Regional Blending Facilities spread across the seven regions of EU external cooperation (other than neighbourhood and Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Caribbean, Asia, Pacific) (European Commission 2014). The Agenda for Change (2012) emphasised the role of blending in leveraging additional resources and increasing the impact of EU aid. In the same year, the **EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation (EUBEC) was created.** The Platform aims at improving the quality and efficiency of EU development and external cooperation blending mechanisms, promoting cooperation and coordination between the EU, EIB and other FIs and stakeholders. The main role of the platform is to assist the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives and to coordinate and exchange opinions with MS. The platform is led by DG INTPA and DG NEAR and helps the Commission to carefully consider potential risks of blending and avoiding market distortion, whilst contributing effectively to poverty reduction[40]. In 2015, the UN launched the **Agenda**

[39] https://www.Africa-EU-infrastructure-tf.net/about/index.htm. In 2015, the EU-AITF was replaced by the Africa Investment Facility (AfIF), as part of the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD).

[40] The main institutions participating in blending are: the Development Bank of Austria (OeEB); the European Investment Bank (EIB); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); Agence Française de Développement (AFD); the German Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KFW); the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID); the African Development Bank (AfDB); the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB); the World Bank (WB); the Portuguese financial credit institution (SOFI); the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB); China Development Bank (CDB); Nordic Investment Bank (NIB); Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG); Development Bank of Latin America (CAF); the aid and development agency of the government of Luxembourg (LUXDEV); Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation (FINNFUND); Compañía Española de Financiación del Desarrollo (COFIDES); the Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries (BIO); Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI); the Italian Development Finance Institutions (CDP and SIMEST); International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); International Finance Corporation (IFC); other local and European

2030, with new sustainable development goals (SDGs) replacing the millennium development goals (MDGs), followed by the Addis Ababa Agenda, calling upon States to apply a more comprehensive approach, promoting a global framework for financing sustainable development, aligning all financing flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities and ensuring that financing is stable and sustainable (European Commission 2017a). Whilst the 11th EDF has not been rearranged since the aforementioned international events, in 2016 the EU issued the EU Global Strategy, highlighting the role of development aid for complementing all the external action areas (i.e., terrorism, migration, global institutions). In 2016, the EU adopted the **new European Consensus on Development,** re-defining the European action framework for development cooperation in response to Agenda 2030. Whilst poverty eradication still maintained its main relevance, more emphasis is placed on social and environmental dimensions. Amongst the most important prescriptions, the consensus states the importance of combining aid with other resources, to build better tailored partnerships with a wider range of stakeholders and to reaffirm the EU's commitment to policy coherence for development. The principles of the new consensus deeply shaped the post-Cotonou Consultation, started in 2018.

Following the rising instability in Africa and the Mediterranean, the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and the New Agenda 2030, in **2016 the European Commission launched the ambitious External Investment Plan (EIP),** specifically encouraging investments in Africa and the EU Neighbourhood region. In line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, the EU tried to develop an innovative financing model for achieving SDGs, mobilising public and private resources. The plan is based on three pillars: (1) the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD); (2) technical assistance; (3) promoting a conducive investment climate. The main focus of the instrument is to leverage investments to target socio-economic sectors, particularly those dealing with sustainability, with a particular focus on decent job creation. The importance of job creation has become even more central, given the increase of the youth population in Africa and the centrality of migration issues. In 2018, during the State of Europe, Commission President Juncker announced a new Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs between Europe and Africa. The aim of the alliance was to leverage up to EUR 44 billion of investment by 2020. There were primarily 10 actions foreseen by the alliance: (1) Boosting strategic investments via blending and guarantees; (2) Supporting opportunities for manufacturing and processing at national and regional level via the Jobs and Growth Compacts; (3) Establishing sectoral groups of African and European public, private and financial operators and academia, under the lead of a commissioner, to provide expertise, advice and recommendations; (4) Supporting

businesses, non-governmental organisations and governments. See https://ec.europa.eu/eu-external-investment-plan/partners_en and https://ec.europa.eu/eu-external-investment-plan/eu-eip-guarantees_en education and development of skills at continental level; (5) Supporting skills development at national level to match skills to strategic development choices for each country; (6) Strengthening the dialogue, cooperation and support on the investment and business climate; (7) Supporting the Africa Continental Free Trade Area; (8) Strengthening intra-African and EU-African trade in the long-term perspective of a continent-to-continent free trade agreement; (9) Supporting connectivity both intra-African and between the EU and Africa; (10) Mobilising a substantial package of financial resources (European Commission 2018b).

Particularly after COVID-19, the role of the private sector in financing development has assumed increasing importance. The need to gather funds for boosting sustainable and inclusive development, raised by the 2030 Agenda, has been hampered by the current pandemic, which risks worsening the precarious socio-economic situation in most developing countries and fragile states.

> 'Over the next seven years, under the new EU financing instrument, 'Global Europe' EUR 29 billion is foreseen for Sub-Saharan Africa and EUR 12.5 billion is set aside for our Southern Neighbourhood, of which a significant part will go to North Africa. Our collective financial firepower will further increase with that of our Member States through the new Team Europe Initiatives in Africa. Discussions are ongoing on the priorities that should constitute the backbone of national and regional interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa with our African partners. Derisking private investment and sovereign lending in Africa will be an essential element of our collective efforts.' (European Commission May 2021)

Between 2020 and 2021, the EU underwent some critical changes both on the institutional and on the financing side, concerning development policy and relations with Africa. On the institutional side, the EU Commission has changed the name and, partially, the structure of the main Directorate-General managing development aid and international partnerships. On 15 January 2021, the Directorate-General (DG) International Cooperation and Development (GG DEVCO) officially became Directorate-General (DG) for International Partnerships – DG INTPA (European Commission 2021). The transition started in 2019, reflecting the new geopolitical Commission's emphasis on the role of international partnership in building a stronger EU role, in the global fight against poverty and the promotion of the SDGs. The directorates under DEVCO were: Sub-Sahara Africa and horizontal ACP matters; Neighbourhood policy; Latin America and the Caribbean; Asia, Central Asia and the Pacific. The INTPA's Directorate for 'Africa' has different offices: The Strategic Partnership with Africa and with the ACP; the Regional and Multi-Country

Programmes for Africa; Western Africa; Eastern and Central Africa; Southern Africa, Indian Ocean; Finance and Contract.

On the financing instruments side, in December 2020, the EU's MFF 2021-2027 was approved, unifying most of the previous instruments for development under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) (also called 'Global Europe'). On 14 December, the EU institutions finalised the procedure for the MFF 2021-2027, following the European Council Decision on 10-11 December 2020. The overall amount agreed for MFF 2021-2027 is EUR 1.824 billion (of which EUR 750 billion is Next Generation EU)[41]. Heading 6 – Neighbourhood and the World – will receive EUR 98.4 billion, of which EUR 70.1 billion is allocated to the new instrument NDICI (92% of this can be counted as ODA)[42], whilst EUR 10.3 billion goes to humanitarian aid. The act approved in December, also contains a decision on own resources, defining how the EU budget is financed, a decision that will need to be approved by all the MS. The own resources ceiling has been raised from 1.20% to 1.40% of the sum of the EU-27 GNI, reflecting the integration into the EU budget of the EDF and addressing the withdrawal of the UK. The NDICI will allocate resources based on three main pillars: geographical preferences; specific projects in the areas of human rights and democracy, civil society, stability and peace; and a rapid response pillar to complement humanitarian aid, to be used should rapid action be needed to address foreign policy needs. The NDICI will also include a 'flexibility cushion', which will not be programmed in advance, but will be allocated based on emerging needs. In March 2021, the European Parliament and the Council endorsed the political agreement on the NDICI 'Global Europe' for the next MFF, supporting the EU's external action with an overall budget of EUR 79.5 billion (European Commission 2021c). This includes EUR 60.38 billion for geographic programmes (at least EUR 19.32 billion for the neighbourhood, at least EUR 29.18 billion for Sub-Saharan Africa, EUR 8.48 billion for Asia and the Pacific, and for the Americas and the Caribbean EUR 3.39 billion); EUR 6.36 billion for thematic programmes (Human Rights and Democracy, Civil Society Organisations, Peace, Stability and Peace Conflict Prevention and Global Challenges); and EUR 3.18 billion for rapid response actions. The 'cushion' of unallocated funds, worth EUR 9.53 billion, is provided in case of unforeseen circumstances, new needs or emerging challenges and to promote new priorities.

1.3.4 Africa-EU: from the Cairo Declaration to the new Africa-EU Strategy

The first attempt for the institutionalisation of a continent-to-continent dialogue was undertaken in 2000, with the first **Africa-EU Summit in Cairo** and the resulting **Cairo**

[41] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/mff2021-2027-ngeu-final/#main-content, consulted on 15 June 2021.
[42] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_988 consulted on 15 February 2021.

Declaration. Both continents' leaders committed to engage in a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between Africa and Europe.

The necessity to build a new partnership with a continent-to-continent perspective was partly triggered by the enhanced regional integration process in Africa. The pan-African vision, started with the institution of the **Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963)**, was strengthened during the 1990s. In 1994, the African Economic Community Treaty came into force, aimed at enforcing the already existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and establishing economic communities in regions where they were not yet constituted. In 1999, the idea to create a new continental organisation to relaunch the pan-African organisation started emerging and was cemented later in 2002, with the constitution of the African Union (AU), which included the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as key actors. In the Cairo Declaration, it is stated: '*In order to give a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between Africa and Europe for the Twenty-First Century, in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance and cooperation between our regions, We are committed to the basic objective of strengthening the already existing links of political, economic and cultural understanding through the creation of an environment and an effective framework for promoting a constructive dialogue on economic, political, social and development issues*' (Cairo Declaration II(4), 2000). From the reading of the declaration, it is evident how a completely new approach started to be shaped in the 2000s, where both continents committed to act globally in a more coherent way. **The Africa-EU partnership is an instrumental approach to enhance political dialogue and cooperation, overarching and complementing the other relationship frameworks between the EU and African countries.** In fact, the Cairo Declaration explicitly mentioned the relevance of both the Barcelona Process and ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (Cairo Declaration II (4) 2000). The existing ministerial discussion frameworks, provided by the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the Cotonou Agreement, are considered as promoting channels for the principles stated in the Cairo Declaration.

Nevertheless, a few years later, with the **Second Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007** (the first with the African Union as the actor representing African countries), the Africa-EU partnership reached a critical turning point towards a more continent-to-continent approach. There, both continents declared their willingness to move beyond a donor-recipient relationship. Jointly identifying mutual and complementary interests, they engaged in developing a new approach, which moves away from the traditional relationship, instead creating a real partnership based on equality, mutual understanding and recognition and encouraging the full inclusion of migrant communities/diasporas. The Lisbon Declaration recognised the major changes that had occurred since the first Summit in 2000. From one side, the African Union and its socio-economic agency NEPAD were evolving[43]; on the other side, the EU was growing both in membership and scope. The main political challenges stated in the Lisbon Declaration were energy, climate change, migration and gender issues. The **long-term objectives agreed in Lisbon were mainly 4:** (1) to reinforce the political partnership between the two, enabling a 'strong and sustainable continent-to-continent partnership with the AU and the EU at the centre'; (2) to strengthen the promotion of peace and security, ensuring the achievement of the MDGs by 2015; (3) to jointly foster an effective multilateralism and reform the UN system and other international institutions; (4) to promote the empowerment of non-state actors, enabling them to play a more active role[44]. With the joint strategies, since 2007 the two continents started building multiannual roadmaps and action plans. In 2007, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy set the joint commitments of the two continents to go beyond a donor-recipient relationship, jointly identifying mutual and complementary interests. **The first 'Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan'** was launched in 2008 for the 2008-2010 period, followed by others implemented for 2011-2013, then for 2014-2017, with the last one being adopted in 2018 after the 5th African-EU Summit held on 29-30 November 2017 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Whilst the core values of the strategy have remained the same over the years, the priority areas for the implementation changed, reflecting the changes to both the international and European governance landscapes. The First Action Plan 2008-2010 for the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, built on the need to enhance support for achieving MDGs, which constituted one specific partnership under the strategy. The action plan, in fact, was composed of eight main partnerships with a specific scope and relative key actions[45].

For each partnership, the action plan indicated main actors and funds. As for the funding for all the partnerships, the main sources indicated came from the 10th EDF, the European Neighbourhood Policy Instruments (ENPI) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Furthermore, depending on the themes and activities, other financial institutions and instruments are indicated[46]. The African Peace Facility (APF 2003) is the key instrument for supporting European cooperation with Africa on peace and security issues,

[43] The African Union (AU) was officially launched in 2002 as successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963-1999), with the main objective of increasing cooperation and integration of the African States for economic growth and development, going beyond decolonisation and apartheid focus. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a socio-economic development programme of the African Union, adopted in 2001, to facilitate and coordinate development and continent-wide projects, mobilising resources and engaging global communities, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Member States. In 2010, the NEPAD Secretariat became the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency.

[44] Amongst the main stakeholders which are non-state actors, there are: civil society organisations; private and business sectors; youth organisations; economic and social actors; academic institutions. See https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/our-events/2nd-eu-africa-summit

[45] See https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/index_en

[46] i.e. EIB; the Infrastructure Trust Fund Energy Facility, Thematic Programme for Environment and Natural Resources Management, including Energy – ENTRP – Fund; AU Peace Fund; Funds under UN Framework Convention on Climate Change/Kyoto Protocol-Least Developed Countries Fund, Special Climate Change Fund, Adaptation Fund – GEEREF – risk sharing and co-funding options for commercial and non-commercial investors; European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership – EDCTP – Thematic Budget Investing in People; African Science and Technology Fund.

directly funding mainly regional and sub-regional African organisations. The APF supports regional African initiatives through three components: African-led Peace Support Operation (PSOs); Capacity building in support of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); the Early Response Mechanism (ERM). As regards the indication of the main actors involved, for all the partnerships, the AU Commission and the EU Commission were key. Nevertheless, there were a lot of other state actors and non-state actors involved, depending on the partnership, including EU and AU agencies/institutions, as well as regional and international organisations, civil society organisations and think tanks.

The Second Plan, issued in 2011, (Joint Africa-EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013) stressed the need for better coordination of both actors and financial instruments and better definition of how activities are implemented at national, regional and continental levels by African and European Member States, RECs, the private sector and other actors involved in the collective commitments. Since 2010, the AU and the EU strengthened the dialogue, with frequent meetings and by preparing discussions and strategies with specific committees and commissions on both sides (see Annexe 5)

On the European Union side, in 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, with the new figures of the HR/VP and the EEAS agency, thereby strengthening the role of EU delegations in Africa. European partners committed to better coordinate efforts between capital cities and the Council working group in Brussels, enhancing coherence and coordination between bilateral initiatives and collective EU commitments, but also with working groups dealing with Africa's specific geographic areas to 'treat Africa as one'. African and European parties agreed to more actively involve the African Development Bank (ADB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) and national and regional finance institutions. Furthermore, Africa proposed to establish, jointly with Europe, an *African Integration Facility* with the precise scope of supporting the joint strategy and its action plan, with both parties agreeing to explore new financing mechanisms to better engage with the private sector and to leverage funding, skills and competences. In 2014, with the Africa-EU Roadmap 2014-2017, the **Pan-African Programme** was established, becoming one of the main instruments for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU strategy. The programme was funded by the European Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) with an allocated budget of EUR 845 million (under MFF 2014-2020). The programme's objectives followed the key areas of cooperation highlighted in Roadmap 2014-2017: (1) peace and security; (2) democracy, good governance and human rights; (3) human development; (4) sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; (5) global and cross-cutting issues. The Pan-African Programme entered a second phase after the 5th AU-EU Summit of November 2017, reducing the key areas to three: (1) political dialogue and pan-African governance; (2) education and skills, research and technology; (3) continental economic integration.

The Pan-African Programme finances cross-regional, continental and global dimension projects in different areas and works to complement the other instruments (i.e., the European Development Fund (EDF); the European Neighbourhood Instrument ENI and the Development Cooperation Instrument DCI)[47]. As already mentioned, the Pan-African Programme reflected the change in priorities that occurred during the last summit, the **5th African Union-European Union Summit in Abidjan (2017).** The 5th Summit was focused on '*Investing in youth for a sustainable future*', and recognised as new joint priorities for 2018 and beyond, the following points (**Abidjan Declaration**):

- Investing in people (education, science, technology and skills development);
- Strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance;
- Migration and mobility;
- Mobilising investment for African structural sustainable transformation.

The importance of the major changes has occurred in the international arena and in both continents' governance since 2014, shaping the new partnership's priorities. This is made clear in art. 15 of the Abidjan Declaration[48] stated as follows:

> 'We will build on the results already achieved by our partnership since 2007. We note the important policies developed since then: the **UN's 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development**, including the principle of leaving no one behind, and the sustainable development goals (SDGs), **the Addis Ababa Action Agenda**, the 2015 **Paris Agreement on climate change**, the **AU 2063 Agenda**, the **Nairobi Outcome Document on development effectiveness,** as well as **the EU's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy** and the **new European Consensus on Development**. They will all guide our future work and we express our commitment to their effective implementation. We will also build on these as well as on the principles and values of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement amongst others, in any upcoming negotiations and conclusion of a successor framework to this agreement. This is a unique opportunity to put the relationship between Africa and Europe on an enlarged footing and develop a deeper level of partnership radiating onto the global arena.'

The Joint Declaration also emphasised the importance of a reinforcement of a mutually beneficial AU-EU partnership and of AU-EU-UN trilateral cooperation. The Partnership revealed its effectiveness in reinforcing the multilateral ties amongst the AU, EU

[47] https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/financial-support-partnership-programme/pan-african-programme, consulted in September 2020.
[48] https://africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/33454-pr-final_declaration_au_eu_summit2.pdf, consulted in September 2020.

and UN, whilst criticism arose when looking at national governments' commitment, civil society engagement, and effective and transparent resource management (Pirozzi 2017).

In 2018, during the State of the Union, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, announced **a new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs,** stressing in his speech the need for Europe to stop looking at the relationship with Africa through a development aid approach, defining it 'beyond inadequate, humiliating so' (Juncker 2018).

1.3.5 Post-Cotonou era: The new comprehensive strategy 'with' Africa between the new vision of EU-ACP relations and the new Agenda for the Mediterranean

The post-Cotonou Agreement was not easy to achieve. The negotiations took more than two years; they started in September 2018 and concluded with a political deal reached between the negotiators from the European Union (EU) and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) on 3 December 2020 (the application of the Cotonou Agreement has been further extended until 30 November 2021). The European Union started setting up the basis for the EU's position towards a new post-Cotonou partnership with ACP countries in 2016. In November 2016, the EU issued a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council for a Renewed Partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (European Commission 2020a). The Joint Communication came after the 'Evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement', an external review of 111 strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO between 2000 and 2015 (European Commission 2016b). Beyond considering the strengths and weaknesses of the CPA highlighted by the evaluation[49], the joint communication takes into account the need to build the new partnership on the UN 2030 Agenda, the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign Security Policy and in coherence with the European Consensus on Development. On the other hand, in the same year (2015), the African Union and the ACP group also started an internal debate around the future of the EU-ACP partnership. The AU was only officially included among the actors of cooperation in the Cotonou Agreement after its second revision in 2010 and strongly advocated a new EU-ACP agreement that was more regionalised, after questioning the possible role of the ACP framework, not including North African countries, in hampering AU's integration and Africa's interests. The African Common Position on the future of the ACP-EU, adopted in 2018 by the African Union Executive Council. stressed the need for a continent-

[49] The evaluation is based on a review of 111 strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO between 2000 and 2015, undertaken by a consortium composed of: Ecorys, Particip, ECDPM, Mokoro, Lattanzio e Associati
Leader of the Consortium: Ecorys. See the final report here https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/cotonou-review-strategic-evaluations-final-report-april-2016_en.pdf

to-continent partnership between the AU and EU, with Africa speaking with one voice and separated from the ACP context, whilst preserving all the different bilateral or regional agreements between Africa and the EU and initiating new agreements in a South-South approach between the AU and Caribbean and Pacific states (Carbone 2018). The African Common Position was not well-received by the ACP Council of Ministers which, in the same year, adopted the ACP's mandate for the new ACP-EU partnership, denoting some divergencies between the AU and the ACP.

The Council negotiating mandate for future agreement between the EU and ACP countries (Council of the European Union 2018), stated the willingness to find the appropriate modalities through which associate North African countries could be built into the new EU-ACP agreement. The EU pinned its willingness to radically 'regionalise' the agreement's legal and political framework, suggesting an ACP common framework umbrella with defined common values and principles, whilst setting up three different regional partnerships with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, integrating other existing partnerships (i.e., JEAS), enhancing the role of the African Union and other regional and sub-regional organisations (Bossuyt et al. 2016). On the other hand, the ACP countries in their negotiations mandate confirmed the importance of the EU-ACP framework and seemed to suggest the maintenance of the Cotonou's geographical structure, based on six regions maintaining one single, legally binding framework for all (ACP 2018). The start of the negotiations was affected by the high level of tension and the considerably different visions of the AU and the ACP, with the EU in the middle (Carbone 2019).

Consultations for the **post-Cotonou Agreement officially started on 28 September 2018.** The chief negotiators were Jutta Urpilainen, the EU Commissioner for International Partnerships, and Robert Dussey, Togo's Minister for Foreign Affairs representing the ACP States. The first cycle of consultation ended in December 2018, with both the EU and ACP parties agreeing on the structure for the future agreement and on the strategic priorities. The importance of the ACP-EU cooperation in the global arena was further stressed, underlining that together they represent more than half of all UN member countries, which was a main point both for the EU and ACP negotiation directives. **In 2019, the second cycle of consultation ended without reaching an agreement** and the transitionary measures of the CPA were extended until the end of 2020. The main sources of misalignment during consultations were on irregular migrations, where the EU proposed detailed procedures for the return and readmission of irregular migrants and in the context of broader discussions on sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR), sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) (Carbone 2020a). In the meantime, in 2020, the EU published a proposal for a new strategy with Africa.

In March 2020, the President of the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced a proposal for a **new**

comprehensive strategy with Africa. The strategy laid the ground for the next Africa-EU Summit in autumn 2020, when the new 'Joint Africa-EU Strategy and action plan' was to be defined. In the 'Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council', the European Commission pointed out that the strategy reflects the vision of the African leaders' transformative initiatives. In particular, it refers to the African Union's Agenda 2063, African Visa-Free Area, Single African Digital Market, Single African Air Transport Market and the African Continental Free Trade Area (in force since May 2019). The idea of the Commission is to define a strategy composed of five partnerships:

1. a partnership for green transition and energy access;
2. a partnership for digital transformation;
3. a partnership for sustainable growth and jobs;
4. a partnership for peace and governance;
5. a partnership for migration mobility.

In the new strategy with Africa, the EU stressed the importance of strengthening the political-cultural and economic ties between the two continents in a multipolar world. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, commented that 'both countries need each other to strengthen themselves to strengthen each other and to achieve a common ambition: a better world based on a rule-based international order'. The strategy re-launched the Joint Africa-EU partnership of 2007, strengthening the political alliance between the two continents to address global challenges. In fact, the main five areas of partnership should be pursued at three distinct levels: at global level, strengthening multilateralism using the majority power that EU and African countries together represent at the UN; at bilateral level, intensifying EU-AU political cooperation; at the EU level, enhancing cooperation and coordination amongst MS and effective resource mobilisation (Carbone 2020b). The 6th AU-EU Summit was supposed to be held in 2020 but, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was postponed to 2021[50]. The Summit will be particularly important, since the new strategy will be discussed and it will occur after two key events which 'opened' 2021: the official starting of trading under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA 1 January 2021), and the political deal reached at the negotiators' level on the text of the post-Cotonou Agreement (3 December 2020).

Since the text of the post-Cotonou Agreement had to go through internal procedures, the application of the Cotonou Agreement was further extended[51]. The major frictions between the EU and MS, as well as between the AU and ACP, seemed to be resolved. Nevertheless, at the European level, Poland and Hungary advocated changing the December

[50] As of May 2021, it is still unknown when the meeting will be held.

[51] The Cotonou Agreement was initially scheduled to expire on 29 February 2020, then extended to 31 December 2020 and, finally with the last political deal, until 30 November 2021.

text, particularly concerning sexual education and migration and mobility (Chadwick 2021). The new partnership agreement presents two major changes with respect to the previous Cotonou Agreement. First, the negotiated agreement text, initialled by the EU and the OACPS' chief negotiators (published on 15 April 2021), applies the largely debated regionalisation. The new EU-OACP Partnership Agreement maintains a common foundation setting, based on six strategic priorities areas: (i) Human rights, democracy and governance in people-centred and rights-based societies (ii) Peace and security, (iii) Human and social development, (iv) Environmental sustainability and climate change, (v) Inclusive sustainable economic growth and development, and (vi) Migration and mobility. These fundamental principles are linked with the specific action-oriented regional protocols for Africa, Caribbean, Pacific respectively. The Africa-EU Protocol is based on 5 key areas of interventions which are, indeed, in line with the comprehensive strategy with Africa announced in March 2020: (1) to promote inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development; (2) to promote human capital and social development; (3) to promote and improve environment and natural resource management; (4) to promote and enhance peace and security; promote human rights, democracy and governance, particularly gender equality, rule of law, justice and financial governance; (5) to improve the partnership on migration and mobility.

The regionalisation of the strategy has been enforced by a regionalisation of the political framework under the agreement. New regional joint institutions have been set up to manage each regional protocol and to better respond to each region's needs. Indeed, in line with the Cotonou Agreement, the parties established joint institutions at the member level of the EU and OACPS (the OACPS – EU Council of Ministers, the OACPS – EU Ambassadorial Level Senior Officials Committee (ALSOC) and the OACPS – EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly). Beyond these, the new agreement also establishes some joint institutions for each of the three Regional Protocols: a Regional Council of Ministers, a Regional Joint Committee and a Regional Parliamentary Assembly (EU and ACP 2021). Furthermore, the new agreement contains a clear recognition of the importance of the AU-EU Summit and the overall continent-to-continent partnership that should be considered and recognised under the new Africa Protocol[52].

The other major change from the old CPA is related to the approval of the new MFF 2021-2027, agreeing on the **budgetisation of the EDF**. The budgetisation of the EDF was not clearly stressed as a key point in the EU's negotiating mandate (Council of the European Union 2018) and it was most probably related to the high level of disagreement amongst the

[52] Art. 3 (4,5) of the Negotiated Agreement text, initialled by the EU and OACPS chief negotiators on 15 April 2021: 'The Parties shall support the AU and regional organisations in promoting peace, security, democracy and governance in the context of regional and continental mechanisms such as the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Governance Architecture. The Parties agree to ensure coherence and complementarity between this Protocol and the continent-to-continent partnership as defined in successive AU-EU Summits and related outcome documents. In their aspiration to achieve the continental priorities as articulated in Agenda 2063, the Parties recognise the role of the AU as well as of regional economic communities on continental and cross-regional issues. In this context, they may engage in dialogue and cooperation on cross-regional and continental issues with those African countries not party to the Agreement.

different EUIs and EU MS on the issue (see the section on actorness – dimension of coherence). On the contrary, the negotiating mandate adopted by the ACP countries, emphasised the preservation of the EDF. Nevertheless, after being the main instrument for financing ACP-EU cooperation for more than 60 years, the EDF has been incorporated into the EU general budget. **ACP-EU financial cooperation will be governed by EU internal rules through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDCI) regulations**[53]. The EDF's budgetisation for ACP States could represent a setback from the previous agreement, because the predictability of funds is largely lost and aid programming and management rules are not established jointly anymore. The EDF, with its intergovernmental nature and its contractual character, made development funding predictable and with the rules agreed between the different parties. Beyond this major change in development funding, the overall financial cooperation section in the new partnership agreement is short and the EU will 'communicate at the earliest opportunity and insofar as its internal regulations and procedures allow, an indicative allocation for each of the three regions' (Boidin 2020).

The section on development is centred on the diversification of the means (different policy instruments, and different actors), including innovative financial and co-financing instruments, enhancing domestic public resources, as well as domestic and international private resources. Furthermore, art. 85 underlines the importance of debt sustainability and debt reliant initiatives. The trade dimension still relies on EPA frameworks to follow and to improve. Finally, on migration and mobility, there are several articles regulating 'irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons' (art. 77), and 'return, readmission and reintegration' (art. 78), which was one of the most contentious issues during the consultation. Beyond this 'classical' argument related to migration between the two continents, the new partnership also refers to the importance of taking into consideration the AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa, to support intra-African mobility (art. 75) and highlights the link between 'diaspora, remittances and sustainable development' (art. 76). Finally, it is worth mentioning that under the Migration chapter, art. 73 stresses that 'all the Parties shall encourage triangular cooperation between sub-Saharan, Mediterranean and European countries on migration-related issues. The Parties shall foster dialogue in addressing all migration issues and shall cooperate to foster appropriate and relevant response strategies.

Fostering sub-Saharan, Mediterranean and European countries dialogue is also stressed in the recent New Agenda for the Mediterranean. Increased cooperation with regional actors and organisations, notably the League of Arab States, the African Union and relevant sub-regional groupings, will be key. Furthermore, pragmatic initiatives, based on

[53] The MFF 2021-2027, finally approved on December 17, 2020, merges most of the existing instruments (nine) into the single NDICI.

variable geometry, should be explored to support those willing to advance further in the cooperation on **common Mediterranean goods.** The New Agenda for the Mediterranean was launched on 9 February 2021 by the EU joint communication in a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood, proposing to relaunch the cooperation and realise the untapped potential of the region after the recognised failure of the Barcelona Process. The agenda proposes five main areas of action: 1) Human development, good governance and the rule of law; 2) Strengthen resilience, build prosperity and seize the digital transition; 3) Peace and security; 4) Migration and mobility; 5) Green transition: climate resilience, energy, and environment. The new agenda launched the 'Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours' to ' help spur long- term socio-economic recovery, foster sustainable development, address the region's structural imbalances, and tap into the region's economic potential' via a strategic collaboration between international financial institutions (IFIs), in particular the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, as well as banks from the region and the private sector[54].

1.4 CONCLUSION

Global governance in development aid and relations with Africa has evolved during recent decades, both in terms of tools used and actors involved. There are some generally interesting trends outlined by this research. The first is an increasing interest towards Africa from non-traditional actors, in respect of international development and cooperation with the continent. This could be better described as actors without any historical ties linking them to the colonisation period. This trend has been triggered by another trend, the increasing South-South cooperation in the international arena. Countries from the 'Global South' find ways of cooperation with each other, which seems to be less based on conditionalities and more on the ability to understand the needs of partner countries. Another trend is represented by a tendency to move from traditional ODA to public–private financial frameworks and from development projects to investment in infrastructure development. All these trends are also followed and promoted by the EU. Nevertheless, the EU seems to be stuck between an international organisation frame of mind, which is focused on building partnerships and coordinating actors, and a sovereign state frame of mind, which protects borders and disincentivises migration. This controversial way of acting is embedded in the EU's nature, but risks compromising its capacity to act and be recognised as a unique and

[54]*https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_renewed_partnership_southern_neighbourhood.pdf*; *https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_426* *Consulted in February 2021.*

coherent actor in the international arena, at least concerning development and relations with Africa. The next section will try to assess the EU's actorness in this field.

2 EU'S ACTORNESS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the academic literature, concepts such as 'power', 'agency', 'influence' and 'legitimacy' have been used to analyse the EU's capability to act independently. The least normative of these concepts is perhaps that of actorness, which allows a separation between the description of the features of the EU's conduct and the environment in which it materialises, as well as the overall impact and effectiveness of EU action at the global level. At the same time, there has been no agreement, amongst scholars, over a shared concept and definition of actorness: some studies use the definition adopted by Sjöstedt (1977), who refers to the 'capacity to behave actively and deliberately concerning other actors in the international system'. TRIGGER consolidated existing literature contributions into a comprehensive definition of actorness, which depends on a variety of internal and external factors. Therefore, TRIGGER defined actorness as a sum of seven dimensions: three which can be considered 'internal', because they depend on the EU's factors (Authority, Autonomy, Cohesion); three 'external dimensions' which depend more on the external environment and third party actors (Recognition, Attractiveness, Opportunity/Necessity to act); furthermore, a final 'cross-cutting' dimension, which can be analysed by looking at the policy area studied from both the external and the internal perspective (Credibility).

Once the definition for each actorness dimension was provided, the TRIGGER consortium developed an agreed framework to follow, in an attempt to assess each dimension through the assignment of a 'level' ranging from 'low' to 'high'. For each 'level' a set of characteristics and factors determining the level of reference has been attributed (see Annexe 6).

The analysis of actorness has been implemented by identifying some key moments relating to the policy domain under study. In the case of EU development policy and relations with Africa, fig. 3 reports the main milestones considered to be key in the evolution of EU actorness in this policy domain. The definition of the milestones comes from the analysis of EU governance developed in the previous section.

As discussed in Section 1, the European Union and African countries have a long history of cooperation, which has been nurtured since the early stage of European integration. At the very early stage of cooperation between the two continents, joint relations were strictly linked and influenced by the tides of colonial history. Over the years, European integration on one side and African integration on the other, paved the way for a radical change in the type of relations between the two and the involvement of new actors/institutions. In fact, both in Europe and in Africa, the governance landscape has rapidly and radically changed, with increasing institutionalisation. This process led to the development of a ‘continent-to-continent’ approach amongst equals, which together helped shape global governance. Whilst the final objective does not seem to have been reached yet, the intention is clear, as actions have been taken to push forward this idea.

Figure 3 - EU actorness milestones in the Africa-EU partnership.



The first event, reported in Fig.3, is the establishment of the European Development Fund (EDF) in 1958 (active since 1959) and the 2020 timeline closure which represents, amongst other things, the last year before the budgetisation of the EDF. The EDF has been the major European instrument for financing development and the key instrument for financing cooperation with sub-Sahara African Countries. With the approval of the new MFF 2021-2027, the EDF has been budgetised and absorbed, along with other main instruments for development, under one single instrument managed by the European Union. The year 2020 represents a key moment for the EU’s actorness towards Africa, as explained in Section 1. Whilst all the moments reported in Fig.3 have been key for the development of the relationship between the two continents, in our analysis, the highlighted ones represent the turning points for EU Actorness in the EU-Africa partnership and development policy. Therefore, the three key moments for analysing changes in actorness are defined, as follows:

- **‘First partnership’ 1995-2006**, key events:

- During these years, the EU engaged itself with the north and south African countries with two legal frameworks to regulate the relations between the EU and Africa for future decades.
- The EDF was rationalised and became more co-managed between the EU and the ACP countries, through the joint institutions and committees established with the Cotonou Agreement.
- First European Consensus on Development.
- The 1st Africa-EU Summit took place, the first meeting between the EU and Africa at the continental level; start of the Africa-EU partnership began with the Cairo Declaration.

● **'Second partnership' 2007-2016**, key events:

- With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union acquired legal authority in external action.
- Africa and the EU presented the first Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES).
- The EU launched the use of delegated cooperation and blended finance for development.
- The creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the intergovernmental Euro-Mediterranean organisation which brings together all countries of the European Union and the 15 countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean.

● **'Third partnership' 2017-2020,** key events:

- Abidjan Declaration.
- More cooperation and blending instruments for Africa (External Investment Plan, EU-Africa Alliance for Sustainable Development and Jobs).
- Post-Cotonou consultation and European Proposal for a comprehensive strategy with Africa.

2.2 SUMMARY

The table below reports the results of the assessment of the EU's actorness on development policy and partnership with Africa, during the three periods considered, for each actorness dimension.

Table 1 - Overall level of EU actorness in partnership with Africa and development aid

Phase	**Partnership phase I**	**Partnership phase II**	**Partnership phase III**
Period	1995-2007	2008-2017	2017-2021
Authority			
Autonomy			
Cohesion			
Recognition			
Attractiveness			
Opportunity/Necessity to Act			
Credibility			

Legend	
Low	
Low/ medium	
Medium	
Medium/ high	
High	

The assessment of the internal dimension of actorness (authority, autonomy and cohesion) reveals an increasing trend. As for the dimension of authority, this has seen a gradual shift from a ‘moderate’ level of authority in the period from 1995 to 2006, to a ‘moderate/high’ level of authority since the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). However, in practice, the possibility for the EU to act, based on the powers and competences conferred upon it by the Member States (MS), must be assessed against strong regional interests of some Member States in parts of Africa. As regards autonomy, there has been a remarkable increase between the ‘first’ (1995-2006), ‘second’ (2007-2016) and ‘third partnership’ (2017-present) periods, with the level of autonomy today assessed as being ‘moderate/high’. This is also thanks to the budgetisation of the EDF. A high level of autonomy would be reached if the EU were to undertake further institutional reforms, such as the creation of an agency for development and a European bank for sustainable development.

Despite several initiatives to strengthen joint action and coordination on development programming, EU cohesion remains a vital bargaining constellation sending mixed signals (mixed MS and EU interests), which are particularly evident from the misalignment between MS and the EU towards the budgetisation of the EDF, amongst other elements, suggesting the willingness of the MS to maintain a certain level of autonomy in development aid and, particularly, towards Africa. EU cohesion in this domain has been assessed as ‘moderate/low’ in the ‘first’ period (1995-2006), ‘moderate’ during the ‘second’ partnership phase (2007-2016) and also ‘moderate’ in the ‘third partnership’ phase (2017-present).

The external dimensions of actorness show a decreasing trend over the period considered – except attractiveness – which kept a ‘moderate/high’ level of assessment (the EU still leads the field in Africa for trade, ODA and investment, with an increasing engagement in new investment platforms for financing development). In the analysis, the EU’s level of recognition in this domain has shifted from 'moderate' in the 'first partnership', to 'moderate/high' during the 'second partnership', because of the active participation of the EU in international forums, for its increasing institutional engagement in partnership with Africa and for being among the most significant donors for ODA (EU institutions + MS). The level assessed turned to 'moderate' in the final period observed, when the EU's development action in Africa seems to have increasingly lacked visibility (in Africa and at the international level), whilst other new actors (mainly China) are increasing their role on the continent. The levels attributed to the dimension of opportunity/necessity to act is 'moderate/high' during the 'first partnership', whilst it is only 'moderate/low' in the following period observed, given the repeated incidents in which the EU has missed an opportunity to act, as also testified by the growing presence of Turkey and China in various parts of Africa.

The level assigned to the last dimension, credibility, is 'moderate/high' for the 'first partnership', 'moderate' for the 'second partnership' and 'moderate/low' for the final period considered, denoting a decreasing trend. The primary cause of the decrease in credibility is related to significant criticism concerning the inconsistency between objective and practical action from one side and the nature of the objective for the partnerships and development programme on the other (too difficult to achieve or too being much based on EU strategy rather than development purposes). The analysis has shown a general low capacity for achieving the main results (the Barcelona Process principles, the difficulties with Economic Partnership Agreements) and a low capacity for reacting coherently to some main challenges (i.e., the EU's incapacity to make a diplomatic impact in the region after the Arab Spring; bad management of the refugee crisis, amongst others).

The preliminary analysis seems to reveal that most of the dimensions (except authority, autonomy and attractiveness) have shown a decreasing trend, particularly after 2007. It is worth noting that pre-2007 can be considered a period of very optimistic momentum for the EU internationally and in terms of cooperation, whilst post-2007 has been characterised by significant challenges, particularly for development aid and EU-Africa relations: the economic crisis, the Arab Spring and the refugee crisis, and finally the UK withdrawal, have particularly put the EU's development and cooperation strategy under stress.

Overall, the EU's actorness in development policy and its relations with Africa can be considered moderate across all dimensions. Despite the decreasing trends observed, it has also been observed that there has been increasing EU engagement in trying to regain visibility in development aid and African relations (i.e., Team Europe, the New Comprehensive Strategy with Africa, the New Agenda for the Mediterranean etc.). The 2020/2021 period also represents a crucial phase for EU-Africa regarding development aid in general and this could represent the next main turning point for actorness in this deep dive.

Finally, it is worth underlining the fact that this study represents a preliminary exercise in trying to apply a new actorness framework to a very broad and controversial issue, like the one presented. To better understand the actorness in this field, further research is needed, to include more variables in the analysis. Furthermore, since the 2020-2021 period will be crucial for the EU-Africa relationship and development aid, it will be of particular interest to further apply this framework in the coming years.

2.3 AUTHORITY: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Authority refers to both legal personality and the competence to act, as provided to the EU by the Treaty and/or secondary legislation. This element is directly related to governance arrangements in the EU and, in particular, to general constitutional aspects, as well as differentiated integration and multi-level governance in various policy areas. The analysis of the EU's authority in development policy and relations with Africa considers both primary and secondary law, with attention to the evolution during the three periods considered.

2.3.1 Primary law

The section on EU governance shows that the evolution of the EU's engagement with Africa is a process strictly linked with European integration and rooted in the decolonisation process. The European Union's engagement towards Africa is outlined in art. 8 of the TEU which states: 'the Union should develop a special relationship with neighbourhood countries aiming at establishing an area of prosperity and good neighbourhood'. The same article specifies that: 'the Foreign Affairs Council shall elaborate the Union's external action based on strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union's action is consistent. Ensuring the effectiveness and consistency of the EU's external action is the Council's central role'. Before the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the EU treaties did not provide explicit bases for EU development and cooperation competences, which was conducted through general competence for external action. Therefore, in the first partnership phase, the role of the Council and Member States, was key. Article 46 of the TEU states that: 'the Union shall have legal personality' and this included the possibility to conclude and negotiate international agreements. In particular, with the Treaty of Nice (2001), the TEU was enriched with specific legally based provisions for financial and technical cooperation with third party countries, also including non-developing countries (i.e. North African countries) (HM Government 2013).

The EU has shared competences in international cooperation and humanitarian aid (art.4 TFEU). The EU and EU Member States (EU MS) can both legislate and adopt legally binding acts in this policy area. The main purpose of the cooperation with third party countries and humanitarian aid is the eradication of poverty (TFEU, Part V, Title III) and MS still maintain competences to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude agreements communicating with the EU: 'the Union and MS shall coordinate their policies and development cooperation projects consulting each other. They may undertake joint action, and MS shall contribute, if necessary, to the implementation of Union aid programmes' (TFEU, art. 210). The treaty specifies that policies of the European institutions should not compromise the ability of MS to pursue their bilateral development policies and cooperation programmes (Furness, Mark et al. 2020). With the 'second partnership phase', the role of the European Commission in shaping development aid increased, with the creation of the VP/HR and European External Agency Service (EEAS) figures and the clear attribution of legal authority in external action to the European Union.

Partnership agreements with Africa cover development and cooperation (and other issues not considered for the actorness analysis, i.e. Trade). The competence of the European Union (at that time the European Economic Community, EEC) in development cooperation was already established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome (TEC), with the possibility for overseas countries and territories of European States to be 'associated' with the EEC and to receive its financial and technical support for development projects. The Union (the Council after a consultation with the Commission) may conclude with one or more third party countries, or international organisations, agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, collective action and particular procedures; the agreements are binding upon the institution of the Union and on its MS (art. 216 TFEU). In particular, the Cotonou Agreement was an association agreement governed by article 217 of the TFEU: 'the Union may conclude with one or more third countries or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure'.

All the shared competences, in terms of development and cooperation, as well as agreements with third party countries shall occur without prejudice for MS to do so independently. Nevertheless, they have to communicate with the Council, implying a mechanism of control from the EU. The main instrument for development aid towards African countries was established under the TEC: the European Development Fund (EDF), managed by the Commission and based on MS contributions. Following the gradual gaining of independence of many of the overseas countries and territories after the Treaty of Rome, the EEC and its MS started establishing conventions and agreements with them – from Yaoundé in 1963 to Cotonou in 2000 – maintaining the EDF as the main instrument, always managed by the Commission through MS contributions. To date, the EDF has constituted one of the largest and most important European financial instruments for development in Africa55. The intergovernmental nature of this instrument implies a low level of EU authority in the allocation of the development budget. In fact, the EDF was financed by direct voluntary contributions from EU MS, covered by its own financial and implementation rules set in the European Council's specific financial regulations, formulating the general framework for EDF programming. Furthermore, the Parliament did not have any influence over EDF expenditure.

2.3.2 Secondary law

The volume of secondary law is also an aspect which relates to authority. The figure below represents the EU's accumulated secondary legislation from 1960 to 2019. The figure is based on CEPS EurLex dataset of EU secondary law (Borrett and Laurer 2020).

Figure 4 - EUs cumulated secondary law production: Africa and development policies.



Source : https://ceps-eurlex.eu/

The graph builds on the EU's cumulative secondary legislation (regulations, directives, decisions, international agreements) weighted for 'regulatory equivalents'56. The keywords used to show up the EU's accumulated legal authority in partnership with Africa and financing for development were: Africa, Barcelona Process, African Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and European Development Fund (EDF). The figure shows a sharp increase in secondary law production in the defined area between 2000 and 2006/2007, with a slight increase between 2008 and 2015, when production started rising sharply again. Whilst this provides only a rough indicator for the EU's actual number of legal acts related to the issue, it provides a sense of the EU's legal production engagement in issues related to partnership with Africa

55 In 2021, with the new MFF 2021-2027, the EDF has been incorporated into the EU's budget with other European financial instruments for development. See Chapter 1 on Governance.

56 Directives are scored as 0.5, Decisions as 0.1 and International Agreements as 1. If a legal act is an amendment to an existing act, then its score is reduced to 20%. See http://eurlex-env.eba-pvxpmhm7.eu-west-3.elasticbeanstalk.com/

and development aid. The application counted 173 documents, amongst which were: 30 Regulations, 110 Decisions, 14 International agreements and 19 Communications.

2.3.3 Assessment table

Table 2 - Authority assessment table

Key Phases	Level	Summary
Authority 'first partnership'	Moderate	The 'first partnership' period is characterised by increasing the EU's authority with a more explicit definition of its role for development and cooperation in the treaties. The EU in the Mediterranean went beyond association agreements with single states, proposing a regional strategy for the Mediterranean. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the previous conventions with the ACP countries became a 'Partnership'. Nevertheless, the level can be assessed as 'moderate' since there are shared legal competencies, the EU defines development priorities, but MS still play a central role.
Authority 'second partnership'	Moderate-to-high	During the 'second partnership' period, treaty provisions did not change the share of competencies still held in development and cooperation with Africa. With the Treaty of Lisbon (which came into force in 2009), the EU increased its authority with the institution of the EEAS and the HR/VP, with an increased EU role in external action in general.
Authority 'third partnership'	Moderate-to-high	During the 'third partnership' period, treaty provisions did not change, and the share of competencies still held in development and cooperation with Africa. The EU maintained the same level of authority.

2.4 AUTONOMY: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Autonomy captures the availability of resources and capability to act, meaning that the actor owns the appropriate resources, both in terms of human capital and in terms of budget to pursue its scopes and purposes. The analysis of autonomy considers the institutional capacity and the budget capacity of the European Union over the three periods covered.

2.4.1 Institutions, personnel and agenda setting

During the first phase, DG DEV (Directorate-General for Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States) and AIDCO (EuropeAid Cooperation Office) were both playing a key role in European development and cooperation. DG DEV's main objective was to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty in developing countries, as well as to stimulate sustainable development, democracy, peace and security. DG AIDCO was focused on long-term assistance; it was in charge of coordinating foreign aid on behalf of the European

Commission and was responsible for all steps taken in the foreign aid process (not for humanitarian aid, since it is not tied to long-term EU development goals). The two agencies were merged in 2011 under one directorate-general, DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO), renamed in 2015 DG International Cooperation and Development. The two DGs were merged to serve as a central reference for both the making and the implementation of development policies[57]. Under DG DEVCO the 'ACP' directorate was split, suggesting the European Commission's intention to give more emphasis to Sub-Saharan Africa regional development, with its own directorate; on the other side, the 'Caribbean' group of countries falls into the 'Latin America' directorate, and the 'Pacific' one into the 'Asia' directorate, for economic, regional and political closeness (ECDPM 2011). From 2011 on, the principal role in development and cooperation has been played by DG DEVCO, in collaboration with the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS, in charge of the diplomatic service and combined foreign and defence ministry of the EU, was created with the Treaty of Lisbon (2007),but started operating in 2010. With the establishment of the EEAS, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) was also built, with responsibility for the implementation of several EU programmes in the field of external policies.

Furthermore, with DEVCO's reorganisation, the operational sections of the delegations are linked to the four geographical directorates, making the operational and other European Commission departments closer, particularly those involved in partnership with Africa for development aid, mainly DG NEAR, DG ECHO. DG DEVCO (which became INTPA in 2020, see Section 1) alone accounts for 10% of the Commission's staff (3,921 staff members)[58]. The European External Action Service is responsible for EU Delegations and offices around the world. The creation of the High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission covers a key role in defining development policies and partnership with Africa. Nevertheless, inter-ministerial meetings between European and African countries remain crucial in setting the priorities. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that, with the 9th EDF (under Cotonou Partnership Agreement, 2000) a system of rolling programming was introduced to improve the flexibility of the fund and to give ACP countries a greater responsibility. The Commission is responsible for the functioning of the EDF, but European Delegations and the partner countries set the agenda by preparing a Country Strategy Paper.

In the European Commission, there are around 32,000 permanent and contracted employees. DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and DG ECHO together account for 5,763 members[59]. Numbers for 2019 are very close to 2016's numbers, suggesting a constant human resources allocation between 'phase two' and 'phase three'. Furthermore, since its establishment in

[57] https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vkt3bc6dfgzg?ctx=vg8xdjeo1zoj&tab=2&n=7, consulted in December 2020.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.

2010, a key role has been played by the EEAS, whose staff is composed of five main categories: officials, temporary agents, contract agents, local agents and seconded national experts, who oversee or assist in the daily work of the EEAS in HQ and in Delegations. At the end of 2019, the number of people working in the EEAS was: 1,252 officials, 1,058 local agents, 497 contract agents, 461 seconded national experts and 333 temporary agents. The work of the EEAS is complemented by other support personnel, such as external staff, trainees and junior professionals. Five large EEAS departments cover different areas throughout the world (Asia-Pacific, Africa, Europe and Central Asia, the Greater Middle East and the Americas) (EEAS 2019). After 2007, the pre-Lisbon responsibilities of rotating the Presidency for local coordination and external representation of EU positions were transferred to the 139 EU delegations (of which 49 are in Africa)[60]. In terms of personnel, the EEAS has increased during recent years. In fact, in 2011, just after its institution, the EEAS included 50 units and 1,400 officials in EC Headquarters and 3,000 officials in 110 EU Delegations (ECDPM 2011). Notwithstanding the difficult budget situation, the EEAS has been able to develop the network in response to new political priorities (i.e., providing in the 2016 budget for the establishment of a permanent presence for the Delegation to Somalia in Mogadishu) (Council of the European Union 2016).

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is considered the EU's development bank and accounts for around one third of the EU's total ODA[61]. The EIB accounts for over 3,450 human resources and has been key for funding development in Africa, particularly during the last three EDFs, providing funds for loans (EIB 2020). In 2019. the EIB was active in Africa, with around 26 projects worth around EUR 832 million overall (Ibid.). Indeed, the EIB is responsible for managing the ACP Investment Facilities, which is the revolving fund legally based on the Cotonou Agreement, through which it invests in a wide range of projects in ACP countries, mainly on financing infrastructure projects and businesses in the private sector. But the EIB is also engaged with Sub-Saharan Africa SSA with its own resources, increasing the development of projects on climate action, economic resilience, fragile economies, food security, gender equality and young people, and regional integration. The EIB total investment in ACP countries in 2019 accounted for EUR 2.355 billion of which EUR 658 million was from the ACP Investment Facility (including EUR 85 million from the Impact Financing Envelope), EUR 496 million from the EIB's own resources and the ACP Infrastructure Package, and EUR 101 million invested from the EIB's own risk facilities, through the Climate Action and Environment Facility (Ibid.). Furthermore, the EIB also signed off EUR 100 million of investment in South Africa through a country-specific window of the External Lending

[60] Germany (GIZ) presents 40 agencies in Africa, France 30.
[61] https://www.eib.org/en/products/mandates-partnerships/donor-partnerships/donors/european-commission, consulted in January 2021.

Mandate of the EIB[62]. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the EIB still plays a limited role in the deployment of aid in SSA; in fact, the OECD (OECD 2018) reports that, in 2018, the EIB disbursed around 5% of EU aid to SSA, much lower than the total share of EU aid managed by the EIB (between 2013 and 2018), which accounted for almost a quarter of the total EU aid disbursed (EUR 20.6 billion out of EUR 88.1) (Jones, Alexei, Niels Keijzer, Ina Friesen and Pauline Veron 2020).

In 2019, the EU's international and cooperation policy started a process of deep transformation, beginning with the establishment of the new 'geopolitical' Commission, followed by the transformation of DG DEVCO into DG INTPA (International Partnership, see Section 1). The new DG presents a different division for what concerns the organigramme; on one side it makes clear new priorities for development (i.e., green and sustainable development) and on the other side it underlines the changed way of looking at Africa (i.e., one directorate dedicated to Africa as a whole)[63].

2.4.2 European instruments for financing development in Africa

The principal instrument used under the EU-Africa Partnership is the European Development Fund (EDF), established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. Until now, the EDF has been external from the EU budget, composed of MS direct contributions, with Germany and France being the largest contributors[64]. The Multiannual Financial Framework for the ACP-EU partnership was separated from the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and follows a different procedure. Nevertheless, particularly during recent years, discussion about EDF contributions was carried out in parallel with the one on the EU's MFF, for the sake of coordination and effectiveness of budget allocation for development. The EDF's MFF indicates the amount of resources directly provided by MS, the division between broad categories of expenditure and additional funds that the European Investment Bank can provide for the Investment Facility of the EDF. During the Monterrey Consensus (2002), the EU committed to reaching 0.7% GNI in ODA, but never reached the target (ODA has remained at of between 0.3% and 0.4% during recent years)[65]. The European Council Conclusions on the EU's MFF for 2014-20 also included decisions on the 11th EDF (Council Conclusion 2013). The EDF's MFF was adopted by the joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers, so the EDF resources

[62] The External Lending Mandate of the EIB was set up by Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, granting an EU guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses under financing operations supporting investment projects outside the Union. Amongst the potentially eligible regions and countries, Sub-Saharan African countries did not figure, with the only exception being South Africa which had a specific window. The North African countries are covered under the Neighbourhood and Partnership countries window, whilst some Caribbean and Pacific countries are included in the Asia and Latin America window.

[63] The INTPA's Directorate for 'Africa' consists of different offices: The Strategic Partnership with Africa and with the ACP; the Regional and Multi-Country Programmes for Africa; Western Africa; Eastern and Central Africa; Southern Africa, Indian Ocean; Finance and Contract. See https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/organisation-chart_en.pdf

[64] Ibid.

[65] See more at https://donortracker.org/country/eu

are discussed by MS following a proposal made by the Commission. The internal agreement must be ratified by each EU country. The MFF sets the maximum amount of resources available for financial development assistance under the ACP-EU partnership, therefore the influence of Member States is key. Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 sets the general framework for EDF programming and implementation, aimed at ensuring consistency between this and other areas of EU action (i.e., the European Consensus for Development and the Agenda for Change).

Table 3 - EDF yearly contribution and relative legal basis

EDF	Year	Legal basis	Contribution
1st	1959-64	Convention on OCTs (Annexed to the Treaty of Rome)	-
2nd	1964-70	Yaoundé I Convention	-
3rd	1970-75	Yaoundé II Convention	-
4th	1975-80	Lomé I Convention	BECU 3
5th	1980-85	Lomé II Convention	BECU 4 542
6th	1985-90	Lomé III Convention	BECU 7 440
7th	1990-95	Lomé IV Convention	ECU 10.940 million
8th	1995-2000	Lomé IV bis Convention (revised Lomé IV)	ECU 13.132 million
9th	2000-07	Cotonou Agreement	EUR 13.5 billion (+ EUR 9.9 from prev.)
10th	2008-13	Revised Cotonou Agreement (2005)	EUR 22.682 million
11th	2014-20	Revised Cotonou Agreement (2010)	EUR 30.5 billion

Source: *European Commission*

Another instrument legally based on the Cotonou Agreement was the African Peace Facility, which was funded through the EDF. Whilst the willingness of the Member States and the Council was critically important in determining budget allocation, a dialogue between stakeholders, European institutions and delegations was, nevertheless, key to setting the priorities and the budget.

Meanwhile, the legal framework for the partnership with the North African countries is mainly regulated under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) funds bilateral, multi-country and cross border cooperation programmes with neighbourhood countries[66], with an overall budget of EUR 15.433 billion[67]. The reviewed version of the ENP, edited in 2015, strengthened the link with the Union for the Mediterranean and reinforced coordinated dialogue with partners, as well as with the EU's MS. In 2016, EUR 6.7 billion of new EU commitments were coordinated through the Southern Mediterranean Investment Coordination Initiative (AMICI), co-funded by the EU and Member States. The bulk of EU support is provided by loans and equity finance (76%) (European Commission 2017c).

To enhance cooperation with European Financial Institutions (EFIs) and international financial institutions (IFIs), the EU has also undertaken closer coordination with non-EU donors. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) introduced the legal possibility for the EU to manage multi-donor funds that, until that time, was only possible for the World Bank and UN bodies; in 2013, the EU's Financial Regulation introduced the possibility for the Commission to create EU Trust Funds (Jones et al. 2020). Trust funds became a major tool for delivering rapid

[66] Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
[67] The budget reported refers to ENI 2014-2020.

support to the region, in conjunction with Member States and other donors. Launched under the Valletta Action Plan, in 2016 the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa supported six programmes in North Africa, focusing mainly on improving migration governance and management, responding to protection needs and addressing the root causes and drivers of irregular migration.

Other instruments are used for funding development projects in Africa, which were directly funded through the European budget. An important recently established programme, the Pan-African Programme, is complementing the ENI and the EDF supporting activities of a trans-regional, continental or global nature, in and with Africa. It was funded through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (EUR 845 million under DCI for 2014-2020)[68].

The EIB is also engaged in countries outside Europe, particularly in Africa. In 2016, Africa was the second beneficiary of EIB loans after the enlargement countries (EUR 2.14 billion) and the EIB invested EUR 500 million under the ACP Investment Facility (EIB 2019).

The EU is the largest donor in the world, if considered in conjunction with its MS. European institutions alone are the fifth largest donor in the world[69]. Making certain comparisons with the EU MS, Germany is the second-largest donor. Germany has two major state-owned development agencies – the GIZ and KfW Development Bank. GIZ alone accounts for 22,199 workers, of which 70% work abroad. Therefore, despite the large number of European institutions and agencies involved in development issues, the total amount of human resources remains lower than a very well-performing member country, like Germany. Accounting for the relevance of MS, in terms of contribution to the total ODA of the EU and also for human resources that countries like Germany are able to dedicate to development issues, the EU has not yet reached a high level of autonomy. In 2008, European development financing started to focus more on delegated cooperation and blending. Sustainable growth and job creation became key priorities and blending instruments were increasingly used to attract private investment. Since delegated cooperation is based on specific agreements with MS development institutions, through which the EU decides what to delegate and the modalities for monitoring, it could actually represent an increase in autonomy, since more than a pure 'delegation', realistically it works as an 'extension' of resources for development. For blending instruments, the same reasoning could be applied.

As already mentioned, the annual EU budget included the allocation decision for the total EU Institutions' ODA trend during the last two decades (Fig.5); it shows a slight increase

[68] Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The DCI was the principal funding instrument under the EU's budget Heading 4 (Global Europe) dedicated to developing countries (EUR 19.7 billion, MFF 2014-2020).
[69] See more at https://donortracker.org/country/eu

during the first decade. In 2012, ODA sharply increased to then assume a non-consistent trend and decreased during the last three years observed. It is worth noting that the sector allocation seems to maintain almost the same proportion during every year, except for Economic Infrastructure and Services[70], which appears to gain more budget allocation at the expense of Social Infrastructure and Services[71], particularly during the last 10 years.

Figure 5 - EU Institutions' ODA allocation by main sectors 2000-2018.



Source: Author's elaboration on OECD. stat data, November 2020.

Overall, in 2018, 41% of the EU institutions' budget support was received by Sub-Saharan Africa, higher than for any other region (Jones et al. 2020).

The largely debated MFF for the period 2021-2027 will restructure the European financial framework, particularly for what concerns the European External Action (Global

[70] The major heading 'Economic Infrastructure and Services' covers assistance for networks, utilities and services that facilitate economic activity. It includes, but not exclusively: Energy: production and distribution of energy, including peaceful use of nuclear energy. Transportation and Communications: essentially equipment or infrastructure for road, rail, water and air transport, and for television, radio and electronic information networks

[71] The main category 'Social Infrastructure and Services' covers efforts to develop the human resource potential and ameliorate living conditions in aid recipient countries. It includes, but not exclusively: Education: educational infrastructure, services and investment in all areas. Specialised education in particular fields, such as agriculture or energy, is reported against the sector concerned. Health and Population: assistance to hospitals and clinics, including specialised institutions, such as those for tuberculosis, maternal and childcare; other medical and dental services, including disease and epidemic control, vaccination programmes, nursing, provision of drugs, health demonstration, etc.; public health administration and medical insurance programmes; reproductive health and family planning. Water Supply, Sanitation and Sewerage: all assistance given for water supply, use and sanitation; river development, but excluding irrigation systems for agriculture.

Europe – Heading 6). The new MFF presents a modernisation of Heading 6, for which the key feature is the merging of several financial instruments into a single one, including the off-budget European Development Fund. The MFF for 2020-2027 aims to allocate EUR 98.4 billion to Heading 6, which will include the new Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) and the Humanitarian Aid Instrument. The NDICI would receive EUR 79.5 billion (European Council 2020) (under the new deal, NDICI's thematic funding also received a cut of EUR 534 million with respect to the initial European Commission's proposal) (Aidsfonds 2020). This budget envelope includes the 'global challenges' budget line, which will fund many multilateral development initiatives.

Some scholars see that the new NDICI could let the more EU self-interested use development aid, in line with other authors who highlight the increasing 'securitisation' of development aid in a 'migration-oriented' dynamic (Kugiel 2020; Holden 2020). Nevertheless, despite a decrease in budget and still limited human resources dedicated to development aid policy, the new instrument could provide a factor that might increase EU autonomy through a more flexible reallocation of resources and less influence from MS.

2.4.3 Assessment table

Table 4 - Autonomy assessment table

Key Phases	Level	Summary
Autonomy 'first partnership'	Moderate-to-low	There are DGs and funds dedicated to development under the Africa-EU partnerships, but the MS have strong influence.
Autonomy 'second partnership'	Moderate	There are DGs and funds dedicated to development under the Africa-EU partnerships, but the MS have strong influence. Nevertheless, institutional reforms and increasing European instruments for funding development under the different partnerships with Africa, increased the autonomy of the EU.
Autonomy 'third partnership'	Moderate-to-high	There are DGs and funds dedicated to development under the Africa-EU partnerships. Further institutional reforms and the budgetisation of the EDF implies an increase in EU autonomy.

2.5 COHESION: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Cohesion refers to the presence of a consistent line of argument amongst the involved nation states, a certain level of coherence between EU institutions and the Member States and amongst the European institutions, as well as between policy domain purposes and the EU's policies. To assess the overall cohesion, the analysis starts from the consideration of the main frameworks adopted by the EU to pursue this scope and some main sources of 'misalignment'.

2.5.1 Main frameworks adopted by the EU to ensure cohesion in development policy and relations with Africa

The EU has implemented many initiatives to enhance coherence between the EU's institutions and its MS, amongst different EU institutions and between external action and EU values. One of the key initiatives in that sense is embedded in the Treaty: Policy Coherence for Development (PCD, art. 208 TFEU). The PCD was already introduced in the EU's fundamental law with the Treaty of Maastricht, then reinforced with the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and reaffirmed by EU institutions and the Member States in the new European Consensus on Development (2017). The Maastricht Treaty called upon the Delegations and the Member States' diplomatic missions to 'co-operate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented', establishing for the first time explicit parallel EU MS competences in development cooperation. EU member countries are responsible for ensuring PCD in their national policies. The European Commission (EC) twice a year organises an international meeting for analysing national PCD contact points and sharing information on PCD priorities and best practices. The aim of this meeting is also to promote dialogue at the international level (via OECD) and ensure coordination between the European External Action Service, the EU delegations and other EU institutions. During this meeting, MS, the European Commission and the EEAS collaborate to provide elements to the Commission, which is in charge of preparing a report.

The role of the Council is to develop some conclusions on the guidance provided by the Commission, whilst the Parliament has a more marginal role, being involved in development and cooperation decisions mainly through its Development Committee (DEVE). Besides the PCD, in 2007 MS and the Commission committed themselves to implement certain principles in development policies, set out in the EU Code of Conduct (CoC) on complementarity and Division of Labour (Mürle Holger 2007). Nevertheless, this Code is voluntary and flexible: it sets out 11 guideline principles to guide policy and actions of MS and the Commission. It might be implemented in a country-based approach, taking into account the specific situation of the partner countries. Even so, its voluntary nature and general provision compromise its effective implementation. As for the EU's development aid agenda setting, DG DEVCO designed development policy, established thematic programmes and its geographical desks implement development initiatives. DG DEVCO and DG NEAR have staff in EU delegations for programme implementation. The EEAS is responsible for the programming of development instruments and for looking at regional strategies, with its staff in charge of the political session (Núñez-Borja et al. 2018.).

The last External Evaluation of the EU's PCD (2009-2016) highlighted that stronger coordination is needed between headquarter and political and operational staff at country level regarding areas of PCD relevance. (Núñez-Borja et al. 2018). Another issue stressed by the report is the lack of common understanding of the PCD concept and the wide range of interpretations that different stakeholders have of the PCD. Some Member States used the Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) in their country report, rather than PCD, which stems from the 2030 agenda and Addis Ababa Action Agenda. Despite the considerable efforts spent on better harmonisation in development policy and programming, there is still fragmentation. The EU accounts for 21 finalised joint documents, with joint programming strategies presented in 60 countries and the Member States are trying to follow the same strategy. Nevertheless, the evaluation shows that joint documents are not producing particularly desirable effects in the synchronisation, or in the greater ownership of the project of partner countries, underlining the need for a reinforcement of dialogue with the national government, stakeholders and civil society in partner countries. Bilateral interests still represent a constraint to cohesion in development aid and African issues. Despite the rhetoric surrounding the common EU position towards development objectives in Africa and the new engagement of the European Commission with the African Union Commission, European countries are continuing to pursue their own interests in Africa (i.e., Germany Marshall Plan for Africa, 2017). Against this backdrop, Africa accounts for the largest share of joint programming, either finalised or in draft, representing 57.5% of Global Joint Programming Countries[72]. Enhancing joint programming is at the core of the recently adopted Team Europe Approach (European Commission 2021b). Team Europe was created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the European Commission and the European Member States are working together to move the 'Team Europe initiative' beyond COVID-19 needs, as a new instrument for enhancing cooperation in long-term development policies. The package has been set up extraordinarily quickly, thanks to the use of a less formal and bureaucratic process (i.e., the EU Director-General of Development Cooperation met MS directly, bypassing the Council's working parties and other formal passages) and was rapidly agreed by Member States (Jones and Teevan 2021).

The Commission and MS committed to increase participation in joint multiannual programming, based on partner countries' development strategies and to use the EU joint programming framework as a practical tool to advance the Division of Labour principle (DoL) (Commission of the European Communities 2007). The EU also launched the FastTrack

[72] https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming-tracker/distributionregion, consulted in February 2021.

Initiative on Division of Labour (2008) and the EU Toolkit for the Implementation of Complementarity and Division of Labour (2009). Despite the large number of efforts aimed at coordinating and harmonising donor activities, fragmentation and proliferation of aid is still an issue, mainly due to the lack of cohesion. In the Agenda for Change (2011), the European Commission (EC) calls upon the EU to take a more active leadership role and put forward proposals to make EU aid more effective. The main objective of EU development cooperation, stated in Article 208 TFEU, is to reduce and, in the long term, eradicate poverty. In this context, the EU must comply with its commitments and take account of the objectives approved within the United Nations and other international organisations.

To analyse the cohesion of the EU in its relations with Africa, it is worth emphasising the difficulties that come from having many different frameworks for relations with the African continent, each one with its own objectives and a different EU role (see Section 1). The Joint Africa-EU strategy (JAES) is a multi-level and multi-actor partnership, guided by EU and AU Member States, along with several non-state actors. Together with its counterpart, the African Union Commission (AUC), the EC has a major role to play in ensuring the success of the JAES. Nevertheless, its implementation on the European side still remains a joint responsibility of the EC (through various Directorates-General) and the EU Member States (Tywuschik and Sherriff 2009). Indeed, the partnership consists of institutional meetings at various levels of African and European institutions and countries, but also involves formal stakeholders' dialogue, constituting a series of preparation meetings for the Joint Declaration. Every three years at the Summit of the European and African Unions, Heads of States and Government adopt a joint declaration, taking into account all the findings and suggestions coming from the preparation meetings. In the relationship between the EU and North Africa, an important role is played by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which represent the main cooperation and funding frameworks for European relations with the North African countries. The UfM Secretariat is the platform for putting into practice decisions taken by Member States[73] during their ministerial meeting. The Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM (formed by components from the UfM Member State parliaments) adopts resolutions or recommendations in all aspects of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation that concern the executive organs of the UfM, the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the national governments of partner countries. It represents the strongest regional engagement of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

A key element in this context is the bilateral ENP Action Plans (AP), which is mutually agreed between the EU and each partner country. The AP sets out an agenda of political and economic reforms, with short and moderate-term priorities, serving as the political

[73] As for Member States here, we refer to the 43 UfM countries, 28 EU Member States and 15 Mediterranean countries.

framework guiding the priorities for cooperation. Relations between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa are governed by the Cotonou Agreement, where African countries relate to the EU as part of the bigger ACP group of states. The major instrument for cooperation under the Cotonou Agreement, which is largely analysed in Section 1, is the EDF: an intergovernmental instrument based on direct contribution from EU Member States. The different framework for cooperation with African countries hampered the capacity of the EU to act as a unique coherent actor with Africa as a whole and, as will be stressed in the following section, represents a source of 'misalignment' between European Member States and EU institutions.

Finally, it is worth considering the cohesion between EU institutions, EU Member States and EU Delegations. Delegations have established procedures for regular meetings of EU Heads of Mission, as well as meetings at other levels and reporting is generally exchanged with Member States. EU Delegations and MS missions and embassies are working together on public diplomacy, joint visits and other collective activities that reinforce the coherence, visibility and effectiveness of the EU. Member States have also agreed to the creation of a number of specific posts in key delegations for security/counter-terrorism specialists and, more recently, additional staff to deal with migration issues (in both cases, on the basis of seconded national experts). There has also been good progress on practical cooperation between EU delegations with national embassies of Member States and the offices/representatives of EU institutions/bodies in third party countries (Council of the European Union, 2016).

A very recent initiative is worth considering – the Team Europe package[74] – representing an outstanding example of cohesion between European institutions, Member States and their respective financial institutions and implementing agencies, together with EU development financing institutions, which collected their resources for financing the pandemic's recovery programme globally. As already metnioned, it was set up extraordinarily quickly, thanks to the use of a less formal and bureaucratic process (i.e., the EU Director-General of Development Cooperation met MS directly, bypassing the Council's working parties and other formal passages) and was rapidly agreed amongst the EU Member States (Jones and Teevan 2021). Through Team Europe, the EU mobilised around EUR 2.2 billion for the COVAX initiative, another initiative that has seen strong collaboration and engagement between EU institutions and Member States; nevertheless, only 16 European countries figure as donors for the COVAX facility[75]. Whether the 'Team Europe Approach' could be

[74] Team Europe was created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the European Commission and the European Member States are working together to move the 'Team Europe Initiative' beyond COVID-19 needs, as a new instrument for enhancing cooperation for long-term development policies. The package combined resources from the EU, its Member States and the EIB and the EBRD mobilised EUR 38.5 billion for sustainable recovery in partner countries (as for November 2020, in April a EUR 20 billion package was initially pledged).

[75] The list of COVAX donors (as of February 23rd) is available at https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-AMC-Donors-Table.pdf

implemented further, with a scope that goes beyond the urgency of the pandemic, is not yet clear.

2.5.2 Some sources of 'misalignment'

As already mentioned in previous sections, the European Development Fund (EDF) was the main instrument financing the EU-Africa partnership and the role of Member States was crucial in determining the budget allocation under this fund, due to its intergovernmental nature. Over the years, the European Commission, supported by the European Parliament, has advanced several proposals for a *budgetisation* of the instrument, in order to include it under the EU budget. The Commission and the Parliament thought that a budgetisation of the EDF would have led to an increase in the effectiveness of EU development aid, but Member States seemed to be sceptical about it. To be specific, an in-depth analysis by the European Parliamentary Research Service on the issue (D'Alfonso 2014) stresses the idea that European MS feared that a budgetisation of the fund could have led to an increase (or decrease) in respective financial contributions and, therefore, could change their levels of commitment and influence in developing countries.

Another important aspect to consider is the coexistence of the ACP-EU partnership and the other Africa-EU frameworks, leading to diverging ideas amongst European Member States and European institutions about continuing with the EU-ACP framework or adopting a new regional differentiated cooperation approach. The debate on a post-Cotonou regional framework for cooperation started in the Council in 2015. A number of the EU MS (i.e., Germany, the Nordic Countries and Eastern countries) were in favour of having separate agreements with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific regions outside of the ACP framework. Germany, through the German Agency for International cooperation (GIZ), stated that the future of the partnership could only be regional, in the form of a partnership with continental Africa. Other MS (i.e., France, Spain and the UK) expressed the preference to keep the ACP structure, moving as a main reason the strong collaboration of the ACP group during international negotiation agreements (i.e., the Paris Agreement) (Schefer 2019). Furthermore, the EU-Africa partnership coherence is also a conflictual relationship between the ACP and AU (Carbone 2018). Finally, in EU-Africa partnership and cooperation there is a complicated network of regional organisations and individual states forming one side, with regional VS continental agreements on the other, which are undermining overall EU coherence. Nevertheless, as a whole, the post-Lisbon EU foreign policy architecture contributed to increasing coherence and complementarities between the EU and its Member States, particularly with the use of delegated cooperation, the expansion of blending facilities and the joint programming with Member States.

During the last 'partnership phase', the final decision to establish a unique instrument under the EU budget for development and cooperation, thereby eliminating the EDF, suggests an alignment towards a willingness to present the EU as a stronger unique actor for development in the global arena. On the other hand, the post-Cotonou consultations revealed that there are still some misalignments on development and cooperation issues amongst EU countries. Whilst a political deal on the text for the post-Cotonou partnership was finally reached in December 2020, the final text was criticised by certain MS (i.e., Poland and Hungary) saying that the final text is far from the 2018 negotiation mandate (Chadwick 2021). Nevertheless, during the 'third partnership' phase, cohesion seems to have maintained an overall moderate level.

2.5.3 Assessment table

Table 5 - Cohesion assessment table

Key Phases	Level	Summary
Cohesion 'first partnership'	Moderate-to-low	In this phase, cohesion between EU institutions, MS and partner countries and organisations is low. There are joint EU interests and initiatives, but there are still disagreements between MS and EUIs. Furthermore, despite the willingness to establish a continent-to-continent partnership with Africa, EU cooperation and development with North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa is governed by distinct instruments and policy frameworks.
Cohesion 'second partnership'	Moderate	In this phase, cohesion between EU institutions, MS and partner countries and organisations increased, with many initiatives to better coordinate development strategy in Africa. The differentiated regional approach towards Africa remains and there is still a bargaining constellation sending out a mixed signal.
Cohesion 'third partnership'	Moderate	In this phase, cohesion between EU institutions, MS and partner countries and organisations remained moderate.

2.6 RECOGNITION: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Recognition refers to the fact of being recognised as an actor and a legitimate negotiation partner by other actors within the international system. The analysis considers both formal and informal recognition. While the first looks at the institutional frameworks in which the EU is operating and is recognised both in development aid policy and Africa relations, the second tries to understand the 'perceived' recognition by the actors involved in development policy and in cooperation with Africa.

2.6.1 Formal recognition

During recent decades, the EU has shaped international aid in development and cooperation in general. Of particular interest, is the Monterrey Conference where the EU has increased its aid contribution and pushed MS and third-party countries to commit to doing the same (Carbone 2012). Furthermore, the European Policy on Coherence for Development (PCD) and the European Consensus on Development are explicitly mentioned by the OECD as guidance for the promotion of Policy Coherence on Sustainable Development (PCSD). The OECD thanked the EU for having facilitated several developing countries to join the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, in order to combat illicit financial flows (OECD 2018). The EU is recognised as a crucial actor for development aid in the international arena, being with its MS, the largest donor worldwide.

The EU has been part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) since 1961, together with 23 other nations also including some European countries[76]. Like all the other Member States, the EU maintains a Permanent Delegation to the OECD, contributing to the formulation of programming work and monitoring the Secretariat; nevertheless, the EU's representatives are not entitled to vote on the OECD's Council decisions. The EU is the only multilateral organisation taking part in DAC, showing that the EU has been able to position itself as a recognised actor on the development scene. The EU, as a development aid actor, is also highly recognised at the regional level, participating in various multilateral forums and institutional frameworks with other regional organisations, with a mix of trilateral/bilateral cooperative agreements (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2006). The one with ACP States represents one of the largest EU cooperation agreements, but the EU is also engaged with ASEAN, SAARC and other regional organisations, and has participated in all the High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness (Rome, 2002; Paris, 2005; Accra, 2008; Busan, 2011). The EU has had 'permanent observer' status at the United Nations since 1974 and has 'observer' status in most of the UN specialised agencies. Thanks to its enhanced participation since 2011, the EU has obtained the right to speak early amongst other major groups on behalf of the EU Member States and was invited to intervene in the general debate at the opening of the General Assembly[77]. Most of all, the EU has obtained the right to orally present proposals and amendments, the only 'observer' at UNGA to have this right.

To analyse the recognition of the EU in development aid and cooperation with Africa, it is worth considering the recognition of its bank - The European Investment Bank (EIB). The EIB provides a large part of the EU's total aid and is amongst the major multilateral

[76] Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.
[77] See more at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/unga/

development banks in the world, with total assets of USD 606.5 billion. The EIB participates in the annual general meeting of the World Bank and at the annual Multilateral Development Banks' Heads of Procurement. Back in 2005, the European Commission and the EIB signed a memorandum of understanding on an enhanced strategic partnership for cooperation with African Countries with the African Development Bank. In 2018, a new agreement was signed between the EIB and the African Development Bank to improve the impact of joint projects in Africa (EIB 2018). The EIB also led the Working Group on joint co-financing agreements in project procurement under the Heads of Procurement of Multilateral Development Banks Group. Its first Procedural Framework on Procurement was agreed with the EBRD in 2015 and constituted the beginning of a trend that is currently being followed by other MDBs.

With the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), the EU and ACP States agreed on strong institutional cooperation and political dialogue (art. 8 CPA). The agreement defined some key joint institutions (art. 15 CPA): the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors (monitoring body), the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (consultative body), composed of ACP countries and EU representatives. The Joint institutions meet regularly. With the establishment of the Africa-EU partnership, the level of institutional cooperation between the EU and Africa became more intense, both in terms of the number of institutions involved and the regularity and plurality of meetings between them. The pre-Lisbon responsibilities of the rotating Presidency for local coordination and external representation of EU positions have been fully and successfully transferred to the 139 EU delegations, 49 of which are in Africa (See Annexe 7). The European Union has established a Delegation to the African Union, set up in 2008 to enhance the EU-AU partnership[78].

Finally, formal recognition seems to be moderate-to-high in Africa. However, many stakeholders consider the EU is still too focused on cooperation with governments, despite the principle of involvement of other actors enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement (D'Alfonso 2014). Major criticism is related to the fact that the EU is still perceived to focus more on government interests and less on people, risking the creation of more inequality (e.g., in technological divide, access to education) with the new strategy recently proposed by the EC (Ibid.). Furthermore, the EIB has offices in Africa (Rabat, Dakar, Tunis, Cairo, Addis Ababa, Abidjan, Yaoundé, Nairobi, Pretoria. See Annexe 7).

2.6.2 Informal recognition

For the last 20 years, the European Development Fund (EDF) seems to have contributed substantially to the recognition of the EU as an outstanding actor in development (mainly with ACP countries). Being a long-term programming instrument, it allowed for high

[78] EU Delegations are also operating with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the UN in Geneva, UN in New York, UN in Rome, the World Trade Organisation, the OECD and UN in Paris, the Council of Europe and the International Organisation in Vienna.

predictability, appreciated both by donor and recipient countries. According to Negre et al. (2013), most of the ACP stakeholders agree that the EDF played a positive role in development cooperation. Indeed, one of the most appreciated features of the Fund is its predictability. Whilst funding from other donors is subject to annual negotiations, the multiannual framework of the EDF allowed stakeholders to plan their development actions in the moderate term, which is said to contribute to the effectiveness of relevant programmes. The EU is recognised as an important actor for development and cooperation, particularly when it comes to Africa, backed by a good performance in terms of aid delivery: more than 70% of the past EDFs were dedicated to SSA, 37% of European gross bilateral ODA in 2018 went to Africa, and Africa was also the main regional recipient of the EU institutions' earmarked contributions to multilateral organisations (OECD 2019b). The EU is widely recognised as an example of regional integration, inspiring similar projects in Africa (e.g. the East African Community, or the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) (Bachmann 2013; Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2006). Nevertheless, a recent study from the Afrobarometer reveals that, for Africans, China ranks second after the US as a development model, and second only to the former colonial power for external influence (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Selormey, 2020).

Furthermore, the EU is often criticised for maintaining a post-colonial approach in some African countries; being too bureaucratic in providing access to funding and interfering with national affairs; these critics contributed to allowing China, and South-South cooperation in general, to become increasingly more visible and appreciated by partners of developing historical European countries. (Bachmann 2013). Indeed, when it comes to development policies, the EU is widely criticised for having too much bureaucracy for accessing funds and interferes too much in national affairs. In particular, the latter criticism is the one that more challenges the EU's role in development aid with respect to new actors, particularly China, providing an alternative development model that is less paternalistic and with less conditionality, pursuing a 'non-interference' approach that seems to be particularly appreciated. The recognition in the global arena of new development actors and approaches (i.e., the Chinese one) puts pressure on the EU, particularly in Africa, where it is trying to maintain its development role by increasing the dialogue for setting development priorities and enhancing commission-to-commission relations (European Commission and African Union's Commission). By talking directly with African institutions and regional organisations more than with single states and presenting itself as a single institution and less as a collective voice of different European States, the EU is pursuing a strategy that could increase the recognition of the EU as supranational actor in development, particularly in the African context.

A study on the EU's perception, conducted in 2015 (PPMI, NCRE, NFG, 2015), reveals that the visibility of the European Union in the area of international development is low; even if considered an active actor, other actors (the USA and UN) are together considered more relevant. Team Europe aims precisely at enhancing the EU's recognition in partner countries, with a huge amount of resources mobilised to third party countries and via the development of the 'Team Europe Approach' concept for branding the EU's collective global efforts. 'Team Europe' became a brand sponsoring the EU (and its MS) engagement in helping partner countries; it was used mostly through social media sharing all the 'good practices' developed under the hashtag #TeamEurope or #StrongerTogether (Jones and Teevan 2021). If the 'Team Europe Approach' can consistently develop under the auspices of the European Commission, more efforts could be spent on strengthening the Approach's branding capacity, in order to improve the EU's visibility.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that EU citizens seem to widely recognise the importance of development and cooperation with Africa and the key role of the EU. A specific Eurobarometer on the development and cooperation of citizens' perceptions reveals that most Europeans believe that helping people in developing countries is important, benefiting both the EU and recipient countries (European Commission 2019a). In particular reference to Africa, the large majority support the increase in investment and the strengthening of the EU's cooperation with the African continent. Respondents also seem to agree on the importance of the private sector's role in enhancing sustainable development of developing countries, which is one of the main key objectives agreed by the EU and MS in the new European Consensus on Development (Ibid.).

2.6.3 Assessment table

Table 6 - Recognition assessment table

Key Phases	Level	Summary
Recognition 'first partnership'	Moderate	The EU (with its MS) represents the most significant donor for Africa. The EU is formally recognised as an actor for development aid, sitting on international organisations and forums. Although it has no voting rights in most cases, it retains a significant role in providing opinions. The EU built a robust framework of 'joint institutions' with African partners, implying a solid reciprocal recognition between EU institutions and African institutions.
Recognition 'second partnership'	Moderate/ high	The EU (with its MS) represents the most significant donor for Africa. The EU is formally recognised as an actor for development aid, sitting on international organisations and forums. However, whilst it has no voting rights, it retains a significant role in providing opinions. The EU built a robust framework of 'joint institutions' with African partners, implying a robust reciprocal recognition between EU institutions and African institutions. In this second phase, the institution of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the EEAS agency, strengthened the role of EU delegations in Africa. At the same time, the political alliance between the two continents was strengthened.
Recognition 'third partnership'	Moderate	The EU still represents the most significant donor for Africa and is still formally recognised at the international level as an actor for development aid in Africa. Nevertheless, the EU's development action in Africa seems to lack visibility in Africa and at the international level, and other new actors (mainly China) are increasing their role in the continent.

2.7 ATTRACTIVENESS: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Attractiveness refers to the willingness of other parties to cooperate with the selected actor. The sheer size of the Single Market (still the largest integrated economy in the world), the 'Brussels effect' in global norm-setting and Europe's ability to stand behind its values and principles, all increase the attractiveness of the Union from an external perspective. One could also add that the ability of the EU to forge international coalitions and networks of like-minded countries, further increases the attractiveness of the EU in the eyes of other international actors. This session will start from the analysis of the EU's development policy in the international context, to then focus on cooperation with Africa.

2.7.1 International scene and development aid

Overall, it seems that the EU has contributed to shaping international aid on the development scene. Of particular interest is the Monterrey Conference, where an increase in the EU's aid contribution pushed MS and other third-party countries towards doing the same (Carbone 2013). Furthermore, Carbone (2013) sees the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development as a crucial turning point in the approach to development cooperation by the international community. The international conference on financing for development, held in Monterrey (Mexico) from 18 to 22 March 2002, led to a consensus on the financing of world development in developing countries. The EU, which has received over 50% in global official development aid, played a significant role in the success of this conference. The EU defined its contribution to the Monterrey conference at the Barcelona European Council in March 2002 (European Union 2002). In Monterrey, the European Union committed to increasing its collective volume of aid from 0.33%, at the time of the Monterrey Consensus, to 0.39% of GNI by 2006. The EU was able to influence the behaviour of other donors that boosted their contributions, in an area in which national sensitivities had always prevailed. Furthermore, the increase in the quantity of aid made the issue of quality of aid more urgent (Carbone 2013). Financing for development started to be firmly placed on the global agenda with the Paris Declaration (it was the first United Nations-sponsored summit-level meeting to address key financial and related issues about global development). Furthermore, the European Policy on Coherence for Development (PCD) and the European Consensus on Development are explicitly mentioned as a guide for the development of Policy Coherence on Sustainable Development (PCSD), promoted by the OECD (Núñez-Borja, Baudelet, Picarello 2018). The EU development discourse significantly influenced the international debate and action towards development aid policies.

2.7.2 Development and cooperation with Africa

Despite the international attractiveness of the EU's approach to development (as set out in the previous paragraph), more recently amongst African states and organisations there has been evidence of opposition. The AU-EU partnership is currently the only one where the AU Commission also has a critical agenda-setting role, which since 2015, at the start of the consultation process of preparation for a post-Cotonou Agreement, even led to the raising of concerns amongst some AU Member States about the relevance of maintaining the ACP group as a channel for securing African interests, vis-à-vis the EU (Medinilla and Bossuyt 2019). Furthermore, European and African interests are not necessarily the same at the UN and at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). African states vote with the G77+China, more often than with the EU (Medinilla et al. 2019). To develop a strong partnership with Africa, the EU will need to be prepared to support a greater number of African resolutions at UNGA (Medinilla and Teevan 2020).

On the other hand, the EU multilateral engagement denotes a strong attractiveness for collaboration in terms of development, even if it is not with all the big players in the international arena. The EU is engaged in the innovative AU-EU-UN trilateral partnership (September 2017) that was an unprecedented experiment of multilateralism, focused on peace and security investment for young people, climate change and human rights. It also put in place a joint task force to evacuate thousands of people from detention centres in Libya[79]. If a trilateral cooperation with the EU was attractive for the AU and UN, it does not seem to be the case when it comes to a trilateral partnership with the AU and China. China is engaging in Africa with no political conditionalities. Since the fifth FOCAC in 2013, with the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and relative action plan, China started building a new type of China-Africa partnership, including key objectives like: strengthening political consultation and strategic dialogue, making Africa's Peace and Security Architecture operational, strengthening China's cooperation with the AU and sub-regional organisations in Africa and taking joint measures to promote Africa's unity and regional integration, amongst others (Manrique 2015). Therefore, China is increasingly involved in Africa, not only economically but also in political and security issues and seems to do it by using a similar framework as the EU, with the difference that it does not impose conditionalities. Back in 2008, the European Commission called for a cooperative three-way agenda with African and Chinese partners in different areas, where there would have been maximum synergies and mutual benefits. The African Union and its member states rejected the proposal, whilst the Chinese authorities did not seem to be interested (Bertucci and Locatelli 2020). Nevertheless, China is currently engaged in bilateral dialogue and bilateral partnerships with African countries, whilst some European Member States are involved in trilateral cooperation ventures with Chinese and African companies. Certainly, the increasing influence of the BRICS (especially China) in Africa has led to a relative decline in the EU's influence in the region, including the attractiveness of the values promoted by the EU (Hackenesch 2018). What some scholars called the 'European' or 'Brussels' Consensus, as opposed to the Washington Consensus (Carbone 2013; Bachmann 2013), seems to be perceived as being too paternalistic by African countries, whereas they see the Chinese approach, with no conditionality attached, as being more attractive because it is less neo-imperial than the European approach (and the American) one (Bachmann 2013). Therefore, whilst the EU's development strategy is mainly based on budget support remaining attractive for developing countries, the heavy bureaucracy and policy conditionalities linked to the disbursement of funds are seen as important obstacles (Ibid.).

During the last decade, the EU has also tried to push for the extensive use of blended finance operations for development, using grant contributions for attracting investment projects in developing countries. As is better explained in the section on Governance, the EU started using blended finance as long ago as 2007, with some investment facility programmes. After 2016, the EU launched several initiatives for blending, attracting several actors that are currently involved, often where Africa is the key geographical scope. The EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation (EUBEC 2012) is a platform aimed at improving the quality

[79] EEAS (2019). The European Union's Global Strategy. Three years on, looking forward.

and the efficiency of EU development and external cooperation blending mechanisms, and promoting cooperation and coordination between the EU, EIB and other FIs and stakeholders.

The main institutions participating in blending are: the Development Bank of Austria (OeEB), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the German Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KFW), the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), the World Bank (WB), the Portuguese financial credit institution (SOFI), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB); the China Development Bank (CDB); the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB); the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG); the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF); the aid and development agency of the government of Luxembourg (LUXDEV); the Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation (FINNFUND); Compañía Española de Financiación del Desarrollo (COFIDES); the Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries (BIO); the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI); the Italian development finance institutions (CDP and SIMEST); the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); other local and European businesses and non-governmental organisations and governments.

In 2016, the European Commission launched the ambitious External Investment Plan (EIP), specifically encouraging investments in Africa and the EU Neighbourhood region and, in 2018, during the State of Europe, Commission President Juncker announced a new Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs between Europe and Africa. Both plans involved other development banks and financial institutions participating in the initiative. The External Investment Plan (EIP) aims to mobilise private investors in Africa and the European neighbourhood countries, investing nearly EUR 1.3 billion in 52 blending projects. The increasing reliance on blending finance seems to be part of a general EU strategy aimed at regaining attractiveness through private sector engagement.

Against this backdrop, the EU continues to hold the highest total stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. Total investment stock held by EU Member States in Africa totalled EUR 261 billion in 2017 (Hurt 2020). It seems that, overall, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) has positively contributed to improving the investment climate. For some, the CPA has been effective in contributing towards an increase in agricultural development and trade, particularly thanks to the European Development Fund (EDF). This has led to increased crop productivity and access to water for low-income rural populations, agricultural research and extension services, and engagement with low-income rural populations (European Commission and EEAS 2016). Nevertheless, a smaller group believes that the CPA has not contributed, since it has resulted in increased levels of exports (Ibid.).

In fact, the EU has not been able to change the nature of its trade relationship with Africa, since data for 2018 highlighted that a broadly neo-colonial pattern persists with the majority of EU exports being manufacturing (65%) and the majority of imports from Africa (ACP) primary goods (73.3%) (Hurt 2020). Nevertheless, the EU has been the main trade partner for Africa since 2000. In fact, between 2000-2007, on average, African imports from Europe accounts for 31%, followed by China (17%), United States (8%) and, lastly, Africa (8%) (UN et al. 2019). For African exports (average export trade in the 2010-2017 period) figures are similar to those observed for imports: 31% to the European Union, 13% to China, 8% to United States and 7% to Africa (Ibid.). The EU is also leading the FDI stock scene in Africa, with EUR 222 billion in 2017, followed by the United States (EUR 42 billion) and China (EUR 38 billion) (European Commission 2020). Overall, the EU seems to preserve a 'moderate/high' level of attractiveness in development policy and relations with Africa, even if it may also lead to a future decline, unless the EU manages to forge a new cooperation between peers, abandoning the patchwork of interests that has driven the relationship between the two continents until now.

2.7.3 Assessment table

Table 7 - Attractiveness assessment table

Key Phases	Level	Summary
Attractiveness 'first partnership'	Moderate-to-high	The EU is an attractive actor for Africa and the International Community for development and cooperation, engaging Africa in a comprehensive, extensive and innovative partnership.
Attractiveness 'second partnership'	Moderate-to-high	The innovative North-South cooperation implemented with Cotonou seems to be at risk because of new South-South engagement, particularly from China, increasingly engaging with Africa with an innovative partnership that seems to follow the EU model (in the intensity of political engagement between the parties). The latter consideration could have a double effect on attractiveness. Whilst it could represent a threat to the EU's attractiveness compared to other actors, it can also be seen as an element of attractiveness, in the sense that the European way of building 'partnership' is 'emulated' by other actors. Nevertheless, the EU still leads the way in Africa for trade, ODA and investment, with increasing engagement in a new investment platform for financing development and various actors.
Attractiveness 'third partnership'	Moderate-to-high	The attractiveness in recent years seems to have maintained the same moderate-to-high level.

2.8 OPPORTUNITY/NECESSITY TO ACT: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Opportunity or necessity to act refers to the degree to which the EU can or cannot take the opportunity to be an actor amongst the various developments and constellations in the international arena (it includes both options and threats). To assess the level of opportunity / necessity to add a dimension over the years, this session will highlight some issues which constituted a source of opportunities or threats for the EU, as an actor for development policy and relations with Africa.

2.8.1 Human Rights

Amongst **opportunities** taken by the European Union at the **early stages of the partnership with Africa, there is the promotion of Human Rights.** The Vienna Convention (1969) started a general movement for the introduction of clauses respecting human rights into international treaties. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law are part of the fundamental values of the EU, and these values are reflected in the EU's external action, particularly after the Lomé IV Convention. During the 1970s, the EU lacked legal instruments allowing the suspension of development aid payments to partner countries where bloody dictatorships were committing atrocities (i.e., Uganda). The Lomé IV Convention for the first time introduced a reference to human rights and their importance in achieving development (1989). From that moment, the human rights protection clause became a standard clause for all EU agreements (bilateral and multilateral) but with different strengths. In 2000, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA, art.9) included a human rights clause stating that respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, which underpin the CPA, constitute essential elements of the agreement and shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the parties. The CPA provided an opportunity for the EU to introduce certain legal procedures, allowing its eventual suspension of the agreement with a country found to be violating human rights or the rule of law. Art. 96 of the CPA provides for a consultation procedure and 'appropriate measures' as regards human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. Whilst art. 96 was a potentially positive instrument for enforcing these principles, ACP countries saw this article as a sanctioning instrument (Hazelzet 2005). During the last 20 years the 'appropriate measures' described in article 96, that have been taken in response to breaches of the Human Rights Clause, have mainly consisted of the suspension of development aid and cooperation by the EU. Trade preferences have not been suspended, denoting a general reluctance of the EU to apply a clause in relation to trade (Zamfir 2019). Furthermore, conditionality is normally not activated when human rights violations occur in isolation, without a coup d'état followed by flawed elections (Ibid.). Therefore, the EU has taken many steps towards the promotion of human rights; **it takes the opportunities given by signing new agreements with the continent to enforce the provision of human rights respect clauses,** but at the same time, **it missed many opportunities to concretely apply those rules.**

In recent years, the **Arab Spring provided a major missed opportunity for the EU** to enhance human rights and good governance, as stressed by the European Parliament in its resolution of 27 March 2019, 'Post-Arab Spring: way forward for the MENA region' (European Parliament 2019). The document criticises the incapacity of the European Union to act in a coherent and decisive way in Africa, particularly in the Mediterranean. This was after years of strong European engagement in the Mediterranean, particularly after the Barcelona Process in 1995 and with the European Neighbourhood Policy (2008, renewed in 2015, taking into account consequences of the Arab Spring). The Arab Spring in the Mediterranean area was, in fact, an opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its capacity to ensure the protection of human rights, by establishing and encouraging democratic and transparent institutions. Despite continued MS and EU efforts and despite a 15-year policy focus on Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, renewed policy efforts and increased budgetary resources in the wake of the Arab Spring (or Arab Springs), the EU's goals and policies have not yet been achieved to the extent needed (and in some instances the situation has become worse). Consequently, a real process of socio-economic inclusion has yet to begin; the external action of the EU, vis-à-vis post-Arab Spring countries, did not factor in the realities on the ground, nor did it adapt policy strategies and their implementation accordingly. The Mediterranean area constituted an important arena for the EU, considering its historically tight relations. The EU leadership and initiative in working towards the resolution of protracted conflicts can be considered insufficient and this has weakened the EU's capacity to make a diplomatic impact in the region (European Parliament 2019).

The so-called refugee crises (2015) posed new challenges for the EU's integrity and coherence in terms of respect of human rights. By 2014, with the Juncker Commission, migration started to be a key priority for the EU (European Commission 2015b). Nevertheless, instead of focusing initiatives towards a better management of human mobility, the EU response to the refugee crisis was mainly to try to relocate refugees inside Europe and increase border security, particularly engaging with Libya and Turkey (Chakrabarti, Suma and Obiageli Ezekwesili 2021). In this case, the EU missed an opportunity to play an outstanding role in proposing a new approach to migration, more in line with EU principles and fully benefiting from the economic and social potential of migration, through the development of humanitarian visas, new procedures enabling asylum seekers to apply more easily for labour, student or family visas. In particular, the EU's action in relation to the Sahel and Maghreb regions seems to rely excessively on an ideology of short-term stability' (European Parliament

2019), with a security-focused perspective on migration and on the challenge of terrorism (Chakrabarti and Ezekwesili 2021).

2.8.2 EU enlargement

Some sources of **opportunities and challenges** for the EU's development policy and relations with Africa came from the **EU enlargement**. Development policies are, in fact, strictly linked to each nations' internal policies. As discussed within the dimension of Authority, development policy falls under shared competences and, therefore, each MS will bring its own policies and objectives for development to the EU level. As has been discussed in Section 1, at the early stage of EU integration, France and the UK played a crucial role in the definition of development policies, both in terms of quantity of aid and in terms of the selected recipient countries selected. As described in Section 1, the colonial ties between European countries and African countries were extremely important in shaping overall Africa-EU relations. After the Cold War, the EU expanded from 12 to 25 countries, also including East Germany. In fact, the end of the Cold War represented a key turning point for the EU, as it also did for the international development and aid landscape. Whilst it represented the end of bipolarism and, as a consequence, an opportunity for the European Union to play a bigger role on the international stage, with the end of the Soviet bloc, Eastern European countries applied to enter the European Union (the European Community at that time). The major change occurred in global governance, resulting in a critical change also for development policy worldwide. Aid during the 1980s was largely considered as an instrument for the maintenance of bipolar influences. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the world started to become multipolar and new poor countries in Central and Eastern Europe began to need assistance, since they were struggling to cope with both poverty and political and economic instability. Therefore, the EU (the EC at that time) took the opportunity to gradually include more countries from the East of Europe and to strengthen trade and commercial relations with eastern countries. Eastern European countries were not able to move a high level of funds towards development aid for other countries; in fact, their initial contribution was very low. Furthermore, Western European and Northern European countries did not have a history of strong development aid policies, therefore it was difficult to pretend that there would be large contributions to a European development policy (and to the EDF).

Both Northern and Eastern European countries were not particularly interested in Africa. In parallel, there was the risk that the increasing interest in Eastern neighbourhood countries would have overshadowed traditional European interests towards the Southern Neighbourhood region. Despite all these concerns, the EU was able to push forward its partnership with North Africa and the Middle East through the Barcelona Process (1995) and with Sub-Sahara African with the Cotonou Agreement (2000), renewing and highlighting the willingness of the EU to cooperate strongly with Africa (Cairo Declaration 2000). Particularly with the Cotonou Agreement, the EU took the opportunity to improve the shape of development aid policies, rationalising the European Development Fund (EDF), which was co-managed by the European Union Member States and by the ACP countries. Cotonou helped strengthen political ties between the EU and MS institutions and ACP State institutions. With the Cotonou Agreement, the EU has taken the opportunity to formalise requests coming from the African countries, since it has taken many years to break the hierarchical, neo-colonial model of cooperation based on bilateral economic ties and pure development assistance, by embracing a framework of more post-colonial cooperation, with an inclusive and global orientation (Farrell 2010).

2.8.3 Aid effectiveness

During the same period (early 2000s), the EU was very active in the international debate around **aid effectiveness**. Despite the low level of engagement in development policies and aid delivery, during the Monterrey Conference the EU played a crucial role in pushing countries to commit to dedicating 0.7% GNI to development aid. Therefore, it is possible to state that, after the end of the Cold War until the early 2000s, the EU was able **to transform challenges coming from having more heterogeneous countries in the decision-making institutions, in order to enhance the role of the EU as a unique actor for development in Africa.** The European Union and Member States took the opportunity raised by the international context around the issue of aid effectiveness, by taking part in several international initiatives to enhance and improve aid effectiveness during the early 2000s (i.e., the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness - 2005, the High-Level Forums in Accra resulting in the Accra Agenda for Action – 2008, and in Busan, resulting in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation – 2011). The EU's Financial Regulation 2002 provided the opportunity for the EU to engage with Member States and other development actors in delegated cooperation through Delegation Agreements (DAs) (European Commission 2016c). Delegated cooperation strives for better coordinated development action on the ground, by delegating the implementation of a programme or the management of aid on the ground to a Member State, or another actor that has some comparable advantage in the recipient countries, or with the objectives pursued through such an aid programme. Delegated cooperation is linked to the European Union's effort to enhance the concept of aid effectiveness, which is strictly related to the concept of division of labour (see Section 1 on governance, and the cohesion dimension of actorness in this section).

2.8.4 Brexit and COVID-19

More recently, **Brexit and COVID-19** represented two major **sources of challenges and opportunities** for the European Union. The UK withdrawal creates a big challenge, since it deprives the EU of a player that, together with France and Germany, represented 60% of the EU's total development assistance in 2014 (Szynol 2020) and was the country that spent more in least developed countries (LDCs). The UK's withdrawal has been seen as a big challenge for the EU's capacity to finance external action in general and development policy in particular. The UK alone accounted for around 15% of the European Development Fund (EDF) budget between 2014 and 2016 and, in 2018, was the only EU MS that met the international target of dedicating 0.7% GNI to aid (Parliamentary questions 2020). Nevertheless, in November 2020, the UK government stated that the development aid spending target of 0.7% GNI will not be met in 2021, announcing a general aid budget cut (-30% with respect to 2019) (BBC 2020; Worley 2021). The cut in bilateral aid to Africa by the UK is particularly large: around a 66% cut (from more than GBP 2.2 billion in 2020 to GBP 760 million in 2021) (Wintour 2021). The UK declaration worried the international community, being one of the few countries that reached the international target for development aid of 0.7% GNI and amongst the largest DAC donors – the fourth largest DAC donor after EUIs, France and Germany (Hackenesch and Keijzer 2019). As already mentioned in Section 1 on the analysis of governance, the UK has been fundamental in the formation of the OACP (former ACP) group of countries. Meanwhile, beyond the risks of a reduction in the overall EU development aid budget, another source of concern related to Brexit was the possibility that this would undermine the capacity to renew the Cotonou Agreement.

Back in 2018, the Juncker Commission issued a Communication titled 'A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union' (European Commission 2018c). in which it is recognised that the withdrawal of the UK would have implied the loss of a significant contributor to EU funds for policies and programmes, implying the need for the EU to carefully design the EU budget in an efficient and modernising way. An attempt to modernise the EU budget has been effectively made with the new MFF 2021-2027, with a particular impact on the budget dedicated to development policy in Africa. In the context of the expiring of both the MFF (2014-2020) and the Cotonou Agreement (December 2020), with MFF 2021-2027, the EDF has now been budgetised, aggregating most of the instruments for financing development under the EU budget into a single instrument called the 'Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument' (NDICI). With this new architecture, the EU took the opportunity to better focus on its strategic priorities both geographically and thematically, for which Africa plays a key role (Immenkamp 2021).

The NDICI will also include a 'flexibility cushion', which will not be programmed in advance, but will be allocated based on emerging needs (a rapid response pillar to complement humanitarian aid, to be used if rapid action is needed to address foreign policy needs), enabling the Commission to easily move funding where needed during the seven-year financial framework period. Under the NDICI, (EUR 79.5 billion overall budget) EUR 60.38 billion should be allocated for geographic programmes, within which at least EUR 19.32 billion should be dedicated to the Neighbourhood, whilst at least EUR 29.18 billion should be allocated for Sub-Saharan Africa (EUR 8.48 billion for Asia and the Pacific, and EUR 3.39 billion for the Americas and the Caribbean) (European Commission 2021b). These changes are expected to positively affect EU actorness in development aid. With the budgetisation of the EDF, the EU will shape the budget allocation for development in the ACP region and the Parliament will be involved in the decision-making process (the Parliament was previously excluded from decisions related to the EDF). Furthermore, the unique instrument for financing development will allow the EU to more easily move funds amongst different thematic/geographic sectors and ease the complicated framework for aid allocation, thereby potentially increasing effectiveness.

The **extraordinary event of the pandemic created an opportunity for the EU to enhance the level of coordination and collaboration between its institutions, with its Member States, private donors and international financing institutions though the Team Europe initiative**[80]; Team Europe was also a means for the European Union to enhance its visibility, whilst supporting the neighbourhood and African countries during the COVID-19 crisis. Besides Team Europe, COVAX also provided another opportunity created by the pandemic to reinforce the EU's role as an actor, helping the neighbourhood countries and Africa (as of 24 February 2021, the European countries, under the Team Europe umbrella, contribute USD 2 billion to COVAX AMC)[81]. Since its inception during the first phase of the pandemic, the debate around nationalistic approaches towards the pandemic responses have been quite contained. The scramble for vaccines highlighted two distinct behaviours, called 'vaccine nationalism' and 'vaccine diplomacy', that also applied to the provision of general medical equipment from the very beginning of the pandemic.

[80] Team Europe was created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the European Commission and the European Member States are working together to move the 'Team Europe Initiative' beyond COVID-19 needs, as a new instrument for enhancing cooperation for long-term development policies. The package combined resources from the EU, its Member States and the EIB and EBRD, mobilising EUR 38.5 billion for sustainable recovery in partner countries (as for November 2020 and in April a EUR 20 billion package was initially pledged).

[81] Team Europe was created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the European Commission and the European Member States are working together to move the 'Team Europe Initiative' beyond COVID-19 needs, as a new instrument for enhancing cooperation for long-term development policies. The package combined resources from the EU, its Member States and the EIB and EBRD, mobilising EUR 38.5 billion for a sustainable recovery in partner countries (as for November 2020 and in April a EUR 20 billion package was initially pledged). See https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-AMC-Donors-Table.pdf

Despite the capacity of China to deliver millions of masks and test kits to Africa, during the first and second waves of the pandemic, the EU - through Team Europe - has also shown the capacity to be engaged in helping neighbourhood countries (particularly North African countries and Eastern European countries). Things have changed with the vaccines' phase, where the EU missed the opportunity to play a crucial role in Africa and in the LDCs. In fact, despite the important investment made by the EU in the COVAX platform, the delay of vaccine delivery to Africa, allowed actors like China and Turkey to use the deployment of vaccines to increase their visibility in the continent. Despite the good intentions declared since the beginning of the pandemic regarding the importance of the fair distribution of vaccines globally, the EU adopted a behaviour similar to other wealthy nations ensuring, via pre-purchase agreements, various doses of vaccine for European countries – well above the countries' needs – jeopardising the already precarious capacity of LDCs to access vaccines (Toulemonde 2021; WHO Africa 2021; Murphy 2021; European Commission 2021c; 'The Battle For Shoulders – Which Vaccine Should Be Injected?' 2021).

The extremely unequal distribution of vaccines has forced LDCs to call upon wealthy countries for the waiver of patents for vaccines and medicines used for the prevention and treatment of COVID-19. South Africa and India, backed by many LDCs, proposed patent waivers at the TRIPS session at the WTO. The EU Commission positioned itself against this proposal, missing the opportunity to demonstrate its role in promoting the needs of LDCs, particularly in Africa. Whatever decisions will follow in open debate around the issue, the EU Commission's decision in the first instance could compromise the EU-ACP commitment to work more closely together in multilateral forums. In this regard, the adoption of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy in 2016 (hereafter the Global strategy) and the new European Consensus on Development in 2017, constituted important progress in the EU's efforts to coordinate external action and the EU became an important influential network in the multilateral negotiation, particularly as regards climate policies.

In tackling global challenges in recent decades, ACP countries chose to cooperate with groups other than the EU, i.e., G77, which may have been perceived as better able to articulate their interests (European Commission – Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – and European External Action Service (EEAS) 2016). Nevertheless, the EU played a decisive role in reaching an accord on the Paris Climate Agreement, through its work in establishing the High Ambition Coalition (a group consisting of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the United States and all EU Member States), which forged a strategic alliance amongst developed and developing countries (Schneider 2017). This represented a great opportunity for the European Union to shape climate policies and it was also possible thanks to its development policy, which created a strong relation and capacity to co-act in the international arena between the EU MS and the

ACP countries. The Coalition of High Ambition is an example of what could be replicated in the future, strengthening the partnership with the ACP group, to better tackle global challenges. On the other hand, generally speaking, the EU is missing opportunities to play a crucial and coherent role in the international arena, particularly in 2020.

The EU saw itself eclipsed by other powers in early 2020, due to its continued inability to present a united front in response to crises in its neighbourhood, notably in Libya (Medinilla and Teevan 2020). Whilst the EU has tried to engage more in a trilateral partnership with the AU and China in recent years, this has not met with major success. The recent re-engagement of the US in the international process (with the election of Biden in 2020), in contraposition to China's influence, could represent an opportunity for the EU to build a new strategic partnership in Africa, within a new multilateral post-COVID-19 framework (Chakrabarti and Ezekwesili 2021). Nevertheless, China seems to have maintained an important role in African countries and, therefore, the competition between China and the US could represent a challenge in shaping multilateral relations with Africa.

2.8.5 Assessment table

Table 8 - Opportunity/necessity assessment table

Key Phases	Level	Summary
Opportunity/necessity 'first partnership'	Moderate / high	The EU created a strong partnership with African countries and played a critical role in the Aid Effectiveness debate.
Opportunity/necessity 'second partnership'	Moderate/ low	The EU demonstrated a moderate/little reaction to the unexpected crisis and missed various opportunities to better engage in furthering EU values in its partnership with Africa.
Opportunity/necessity 'third partnership'	Moderate/ low	The EU has repeatedly missed opportunities to act in the African continent development area, as also testified by the growing presence of Turkey and China in many African countries.

2.9 CREDIBILITY: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Credibility refers to the capacity to strive for goals and be reliable and trustworthy when it comes to agreements.

Credibility is a cross-cutting dimension, strongly linked with all the previously mentioned ones, both internal and external. Whilst the core EU values and goals are largely recognised as legitimate and desirable, the difficulties for the EU to coherently and effectively realise them on the ground partly undermines its credibility which, overall, is around a moderate level. The fact that PCD results are modest because of the limited political will of the EU MS and the bureaucratic obstacles within EU institutions (Langan 2020), are amongst other factors contributing to an ongoing incoherence which, it is argued, severely reduce the EU's international credibility (Carbone 2013).

The EU development policy, with increasing attention to migration and securitisation issues, reduced trust in the EU amongst developing countries. The EU strategy towards the use of more blending finance instruments represents an attempt by Europe to be more impactful in creating jobs and infrastructure in developing countries and in earmarking funds to meet SDG targets. Nevertheless, recent research shows that, particularly for low-income countries, the actual leverage ratio is very low. It is unlikely, therefore, that blended finance will end up bridging the SDG financing gap (CONCORD 2019). Other research contributions highlight the risk that investing in blended finance diverts attention from the eradication of poverty in the poorest countries (Attridge and Engen 2019). Generally, the EU's credibility seems to be hampered by some criticism related to its reliance on a post-Washington consensus approach, mainly focused on aid for trade, particularly in Africa (Hurt 2020). As already mentioned, in section 6 of this section, Zamfir (2019) notes that human rights conditionality tends to be activated only when the situation in a country suddenly deteriorates (i.e., a coup d'état, flawed elections) and the EU seems to be generally reluctant to apply suspension of development aid and cooperation, when the agreement featured a strong trade dimension. Whilst trade is considered an important tool for development, the EU's credibility in this area in Africa seems to follow a declining trend. Looking at the European Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries, most of them failed to be signed by African countries, after long and difficult negotiations. With the new joint strategy (March 2020), the EC started trying to rebuild trust with African countries, proposing a peer-discussion on priorities for the future of the partnership. Major criticism concerns the inconsistency between objective and practical action on one side and the nature of the objective for the partnerships and development programmes on the other (too difficult to achieve or too much, based on EU strategy rather than development purposes). These major criticisms resulted in the EU being less credible. Generally, there is a perception from partners that nothing has been achieved and there is incoherence (linked with opportunities, the failure of the Barcelona Process and countries reluctant to sign EPAs).

More recently, former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker launched the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs. But whilst the Alliance's focus on moving from an aid-focused approach to an investment-focused one was certainly in keeping with what a growing number of African leaders are asking for, that particular initiative lacked prior consultation with African stakeholders. It also involved quite a bit of repackaging of existing EU initiatives (Medinilla and Teevan 2020).

Against this backdrop, it is important to note that the European Union seems to be seen as a fairly credible actor for other multilateral institutions, like the African Union. The fact that some Member States have a strong and controversial colonial past seems to make the European Union a more desirable interlocutor (Bachman 2013). Furthermore, being a multilateral institution, the EU, in some cases, seems to be perceived as a more credible actor than Member States and when also compared to major powers, like the US and China (Ibid.).

Moreover, the EU strategy towards more blended financing instruments for development outlines the EU's willingness to be more impactful in creating jobs and infrastructure in developing countries and in earmarking funds to meet SDG targets. Nevertheless, recent research shows that, particularly for low-income countries, the actual leverage ratio is very low; it is unlikely, therefore, that blended finance will end up bridging the SDG financing gap (CONCORD 2019). Other research contributions highlight the risk that investing in blended finance diverts attention from the eradication of poverty in the poorest countries (Attridge and Engen 2019). Furthermore, whilst poverty eradication should be the primary objective for European development assistance, the largest share of the EU's ODA is allocated to upper-middle-income countries (OECD 2018). Only 27% of EU ODA goes to the least developed countries (the average for DAC countries is 49%). Furthermore, CONCORD (2019) estimates that, at the actual rate, the 0.7% ODA/GNI target will not be met until 2061.

2.9.1 Assessment table

Table 9 - Credibility assessment table

Key Phases	Level	Summary
Credibility 'first partnership'	Moderate-to-high	During the 'first partnership,' the EU can be considered an actor with moderate-to-high credibility in development policy in Africa. Its strong engagement in enhancing the partnership with the continent, through a partnership approach, corresponds to a high level of response, in terms of engagement from the African side, suggesting a relatively moderate to high level of credibility.
Credibility 'second partnership'	Moderate	During the 'second partnership' a decline in credibility is observed due to the difficulty of the EU in facing many and increasing challenges, partially coming from revolutions and migration issues (as seen in the previous dimension). The EU started receiving some criticism over inconsistency between objective and practical actions.
Credibility 'third partnership'	Moderate-to-low	During the 'third partnership', a further decline in credibility is observed. The decrease could be related to the growing role of third- party actors in the continent and the higher standards the EU aims to achieve in line with SDGs, highlighting some inconsistency between objective and practical actions.

3 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ACTOR IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The relations between the European Union and Africa have been historically built on differentiated and often overlapping approaches and partnerships, involving different regional actors. The EU approach towards Africa is, therefore, fragmented and could be considered as detrimental to the effectiveness and harmony of the more comprehensive Joint African European strategy (Kouassi 2017). The analysis will highlight that the EU has maintained similar objectives in its cooperation with Africa over recent decades, with different aligned but also overlapping frameworks. The aim of this section is to explore the effectiveness of the EU as an actor for development in Africa, specifically looking at its relationship with the Sub-Saharan Africa region under the Cotonou Agreement (CPA) and the post-Cotonou agreement. Whilst the official evaluation of the CPA suggested that the partnership contributed to the eradication of poverty (one of the principal goals) and improving access to basic services (European Commission, 2016b), at the same time, the EU has also demonstrated itself as moving towards a more interest-driven international and development cooperation, widely reflected in its priorities with Africa (Jones, Alexei, et al. 2020). This approach has been sustained by new modalities and instruments for financing development objectives (i.e., EU trust funds) and the use of development aid to ensure cooperation, for example, on migration - mainly on readmission and return (Idem).

During recent decades leveraged private investment for development has been key in the international scene, particularly in order to achieve the SDGs. As already discussed in the previous sections, the EU has progressively changed its development finance strategy, particularly with Africa, using amongst other instruments, blending. On the other hand, the EU's strategic interests in migration issues have grown and been placed even more at the centre of its development strategy. These two tendencies are particularly evident with the new EU-OACP agreement (text agreed on 15 April 2021), which will be analysed in the last part of this section.

TRIGGER aims at exploring the effectiveness of the EU in the different policy domains analysed, considering that 'an effective actor achieves its goals, irrespective of whether such goals are desirable or not from an external viewpoint'. This definition implies looking at the external effectiveness of the EU as an actor and as a negotiator. In fact, as for the TRIGGER definition, the effectiveness comes from the capacity to achieve, or pursue, the key stated goals, which is something visible from the negotiation processes.

The section will start from the identification of what TRIGGER defined as 'meso-goals' of the EU in development policy, with a particular focus on the EU-Africa partnership, highlighting and comparing the objectives set in the different frameworks for cooperation between the two continents. Given the alignment amongst the different frameworks for cooperation with Africa, we decided to focus the analysis of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in the following section, by looking at the evolution of the goals during the two revisions of the agreement, to then analyse meso-goals under the new EU-ACP agreement. The last section will focus on the negotiation process for the new EU-ACP agreement, looking mainly at two of the most debated points as case studies: the mobilisation of financial resources for Africa and aid effectiveness, and the migration issues between the two continents.

3.2 IDENTIFICATION OF THE EU GOALS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP CONTEXT

3.2.1 Meso-goal dimension

TRIGGER defined 'meso-goals' as those goals which are specific for an individual policy domain.

Looking at the European Union's goals in the development policy domain, with a specific focus on the EU-Africa partnership, and from a meso-perspective, implies analysing different layers of primary and secondary legislation.

The overarching meso-goal of the EU's development policy is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty, as stated in art. 208 TFEU. The primary aim of eradicating poverty is also stressed in art. 21(d) TEU, within the European External Action objectives. In this context, the EU must comply with its commitments and take account of the objectives approved within the United Nations and other international organisations. Moreover, since 2015, development and cooperation issues are strictly related to SDGs, thus broadening the scope for development.

In line with the objectives set out in Article 21(2) TEU, development policy also contributes to:

- supporting democracy;
- promoting the rule of law and human rights;
- preserving peace and preventing conflict;
- improving the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources;
- assisting populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters;
- promoting an international system, based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance (EU 2017).

By the beginning of the 2000s, the Commission's six priorities of EU development aid had already been launched**: (1) the link between trade and development; (2) support for regional integration and cooperation; (3) support for macroeconomic policies; (4) transport; (5) food security and sustainable rural development; (6) institutional capacity building (good governance and rule of law)** (European Commission, 2000; European Commission, 2016a). Driven by these principles, the Agenda for Change (2011), and particularly the European Consensus on Development (the new Consensus published in 2017), can be considered as the two key documents shaping the EU's objectives on development and external action. Both the consensus and the Agenda for Change renewed the need for the EU's development policies to prioritise least developed countries and low-income countries in the fight against poverty, with particular attention on the EU's neighbourhood and Africa. The prioritisation of Africa is confirmed by the EU's ODA allocation in the region. In fact, in 2019, 35% of total EU-27 collective ODA (around EUR 19.9 billion) went to Africa[82]. Nevertheless, the New EU Consensus on Development does not set any specific objective for Africa; whilst it recognises the importance of targeting ODA to the African continent, it does not mention what was suggested in the previous version of the consensus (2005), when the EU and its MS engaged in dedicating to Africa at least half of the planned increase in ODA (Jones, Alexei, et al. 2020).

The previous sectionss underlined the existence of different European frameworks for its relations with Africa. Since the 2000s, the EU has increased efforts to establish development policy and relations with Africa, under a unique umbrella with a continent-to-continent approach. Nevertheless, relations with Africa and the relative development objectives are set out under different frameworks, renewed in the last couple of years (2020-2021). The table below reports the EU's key meso-goals stated under the three different frameworks with Africa[83] and puts them in a 'thematic' comparison with the European Consensus on Development (2017). The new European Consensus on Development (2017) emphasises the alignment of the EU's development objectives with the SDGs, proposing a common framework reflecting agenda 2030's five 'Ps': People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership.

The table comprises different colours, which refer to the relative 'p' of the Consensus, in order to make a visual comparison between the European Consensus on Development (2017) and the three most recent EU frameworks for cooperation with Africa: the New Comprehensive Strategy with Africa, targeting the overall African continent; the New Agenda for the Mediterranean, targeting the North African countries; and the most recent one, the

[82] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_1704; see also Chapter 1 on EU Governance.
[83] For each area there are several actions that the EU is planning to enhance to achieve the major objectives.

new post-Cotonou Partnership Agreement, more specifically the Africa Protocol, constituting the legal framework for cooperation with the Sub-Sahara Africa region. The three frameworks reported in the table are strongly aligned with each other and with the Consensus.

Whilst the full comparison of the different frameworks goes beyond the scope of this study, it is important to underline that the dimension of partnership can be considered as an objective that crosscuts all the frameworks for cooperation with Africa. Apparently only highlighted in the consensus, it can be considered embedded in all the three frameworks, since each of them are proposing or establishing partnership schemes. Furthermore, building partnerships with other partners in the international arena is a core objective in all the three frameworks under consideration. Part III of the Negotiated Agreement between the EU and the OACPS is titled 'Global Alliances and International cooperation'. There, the parties engage in strengthening multilateralism and reinforcing global alliances. In particular, the Africa Regional Protocol of the agreement promotes the support of regional and continental integration in Africa (art.3, Regional Protocol, Part I, Ch.1).

Table 10 - Comparison between the European Consensus on Development and the three main frameworks for cooperation with the African continent

European Consensus on Development (2017)	New comprehensive strategy with Africa (2020)	New Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021)	Africa-EU Protocol (New EU-OACP, 2021)
People - human development and dignity - migration	Build a partnership for the green transition and energy access	Improve human development, good governance and rule of law	Promote inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development
Planet - protecting the environment, managing natural resources and tackling climate change	Build a partnership for digital transformation	Strengthen resilience, build prosperity and seize the digital transition	Promote human capital and social development - Improve the partnership on migration and mobility
Prosperity – inclusive and sustainable growth and jobs	Build a partnership for sustainable growth and jobs	Promote peace and security	Promote and improve environment and natural resource management

Peace - peaceful and inclusive societies, democracy, effective and accountable institutions, rule of law and human rights for all	Build a partnership for peace and governance	Enhance partnerships on migration and mobility	Promote and enhance peace and security
Partnership - EU – Member States – Multilateral Institutions and Partner countries	Build a partnership on migration and mobility	Green transition – climate change resilience, energy and environment	Promote human rights, democracy and governance, particularly gender equality, rule of law, justice and financial governance

Source*: Author's elaboration based on official documents*

Furthermore, the parties engage in ensuring complementarity and coherence between the regional protocol and the continent-to-continent framework, recognising the important role of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) for both continental and cross-regional issues. The new comprehensive strategy with Africa stressed that both the African Union and the EU are strongly committed to the international rule-based order and multilateral system, recalling the African Union's Agenda 2063, the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy and the European Consensus on Development. Of great interest in the document, it is stated: 'Together, Africa and Europe form the largest voting bloc in the UN. By pooling forces, we have brought about key international agreements such as the 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development and its sustainable development goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change and are committed to their implementation. This approach should also be pursued in the various specialised UN agencies. Africa and the EU should seize every opportunity to continue to act together effectively in all strategic areas of mutual interest across the three pillars of the UN and ensure cooperation and alignment of positions whenever relevant. We should also partner and seek alignment in all other multilateral forums, such as the G20 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO)' (European Commission, 2020a).

In the strategy, both the African continent and OACPS are taken as examples of cooperation frameworks with a clear commitment to enhancing multilateralism. The new agenda for the Mediterranean stresses the need to increase cooperation between North and Sub-Saharan Africa 'also as triangular cooperation with the EU' and coherence between what the EU does with the Northern African partners and the rest of the African continent. The same paragraph also highlights the need to increase cooperation with other regional actors and organisations, mainly the Gulf and Red Sea region, the League of Arab States and the African Union. The document highlights the need to advance cooperation on common

Mediterranean goods and to scale up climate and energy diplomacy, both at bilateral and regional level (European Commission, 2021). In the Investment Plan accompanying the New Agenda, it is stated that 'the EU will be ready to explore further regional, sub-regional or trilateral cooperation and joint initiatives between partner countries across the board, including in light of the recent normalisation of relations between Israel and a number of Arab countries' outreaching to partner countries, civil society, private and financial institutions, and all other possible relevant stakeholders (Ibid.).

Given the alignment amongst the different frameworks for cooperation with Africa, we decided to focus the analysis on the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). This choice is driven by several considerations that matured during the drafting of the governance section. First, the CPA represents the EU's partnership agreement with the states' largest partner group. Secondly, the CPA has governed development and cooperation between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa for more than 20 years. Notably, in SSA, most countries are low-income or less developed and development aid has played a critical role. Thirdly, the European Development Fund has been the financial arm of the CPA and was one of the most prominent European instruments for financing development. Since the Lomé conventions in the 1970s, the EU-ACP agreement has represented the core element of the common European development policy (Tröster, Bernhard 2019). Finally, as already mentioned in the previous sections, 2020-2021 represented a turning point for the CPA and the relative development financing instrument, making the study of the evolution of objectives under the partnership and the EU's effectiveness as an actor under this framework even more appealing.

3.2.2 Key meso-goals under Cotonou Agreement and their evolution

The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, outlines certain objectives typically characterising the cooperation with ACP countries that are already ingrained in previous conventions: **(1) reduce poverty, aiming at its eradication; (2) support sustainable economic, cultural and social development; (3) help partner countries' economies to progressively integrate into the world economy.** Article 1 clearly states that the key objective of the overall partnership is the reduction and eventually the eradication of poverty, adding that this is 'consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries in the world economy'. The centrality of the reduction of poverty is further stressed in art. 19 (1) of the CPA, in which the statement of article 1, previously mentioned, is repeated, adding; 'cooperation framework and orientations shall be tailored to the individual circumstances of each ACP country, shall promote local ownership of economic and social reforms and the integration of the private sector and civil society actors into the development process'. The core of the development objectives has also remained the same with the two Cotonou revisions in 2005 and 2010, which had nevertheless brought some changes.

The first EDF included in the CPA (the 9th EDF) was aligned with the Commission's six priorities of EU development aid (see section 1.1). With the first revision (2005), the development and security links were particularly strengthened. In the preamble, the importance of ensuring the prosecution of serious crimes of concern to the international community was stressed, calling upon the enhancement of a global collaboration on the issue. Furthermore, in Article 11 on peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution, a paragraph has been added on the 'fight against terrorism' (the development and security links were further strengthened with the second revision). Article 11 on 'Peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution' added into the title: 'response to situation of fragility' introducing a quite new concept to the developed literature at that time, which generally referred to a combination of several characteristics, amongst which are the unstable and weak governance and high propensity to conflict and civil war (Bertocchi, Graziella 2010).

The last review in 2010 introduced, for the first time, the reference to the aid effectiveness concept. Aid effectiveness principles have to be considered as overarching principles. In the 2010 preamble, the wording, 'subscribing to the aid effectiveness agenda started in Rome, pursued in Paris and further developed in the Accra agenda for Action', has been added. In art. 2 about fundamental principles, the following wording has been added: 'the agreement shall be guided by the internationally agreed aid effectiveness agenda regarding ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results-oriented aid management and mutual accountability' and 'cooperation in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction'.

Migration under the CPA was regulated by art. 13. The article stressed the importance of the respect of human rights and the elimination of all forms of discrimination 'based particularly on origin, sex, race, language and religion', with particular reference to workers. With regards to workers, the article also highlighted that, 'the Community shall support, through national and regional cooperation programmes, the training of ACP nationals in their country of origin, in another ACP country or in a Member State of the European Union. As regards training in a Member State, the Parties shall ensure that such action is geared towards the vocational integration of ACP nationals in their countries of origin', and both parties should facilitate access of students from ACP States to education. The second part of the article focused on illegal migration and readmission, stating that each Member State (both ACP and EU) 'shall accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of a Member State – of the other party – at that Member State's request and without further formalities' (13 (c) (i) CPA). Although during the first revision of the CPA (2005) art. 13 on Migration was not touched upon, critically it was changed during the second revision (2010). Already before the review, the EU Parliament had suggested to both the EU and ACP Commissions 'to include in Article 13 of the ACP-EU Agreement, on migration, the principle of circular migration and its facilitation by issuing circular visas; stresses that this article insists on respect for human rights and the fair treatment of citizens of ACP countries, but that the scope of these principles is seriously compromised by bilateral readmission agreements – concluded with transit countries in a context of outsourcing by Europe of the management of migratory flows – which do not guarantee respect for the rights of migrants and can lead to 'cascade' readmissions that jeopardise their safety and their lives' (Parlamento Europeo 20s10, art. 32). The revision of the CPA, carried out in 2010, added a Joint Declaration on Migration and Development (art. 13) where the parties committed to strengthen their dialogue on migration via a comprehensive and balanced approach, based on three pillars: 1) migration and development, including issues relating to diasporas, brain drain and remittances; 2) legal migration including admission, mobility and movement of skills and services; 3) illegal migration, including smuggling and trafficking of human beings and border management, as well as readmission. Thus, illegal migration remains of crucial interest to the EU, which is also at the centre of the main initiatives undertaken in the 2000s.

Generally, the EU's development policy objectives, particularly in the context of the EU-Africa partnership, have evolved over recent decades, following three main changes:

1) **The alignment with a new comprehensive and universal concept of sustainable development policy**
2) **An increasing prioritisation of questions related to border security and migration (particularly illegal)**
3) **The increasing attention to new mechanisms for financing development and the involvement of the private sector**

The next paragraph will analyse the meso-goals in the new post-Cotonou Agreement.

3.2.3 Meso-goals in the post-Cotonou Agreement

The first article of the CPA (CPA 2000, 2010 consolidated version) stated that the principal partnerships' objective is the reduction and, finally, the elimination of poverty, promoting and accelerating the economic, cultural and social development of ACP States, which is seen as the key driver for political stability and democracy in the continent. The new Cotonou Partnership Agreement maintained a common foundation, based on six strategic priorities areas: **(1) Human Rights, Democracy, and Governance in People-Centred and Rights-Based Societies; (2) Peace and Security; (3) Human and Social Development; (4) Environmental Sustainability and climate change; (5) Inclusive Sustainable Economic**

Growth and Development; and (6) Migration and Mobility. These fundamental meso-goals are linked to the specific goals stated in the regional protocols for Africa, Caribbean and Pacific.

Art. 7 of the new agreement states cross-cutting themes, which will be taken into consideration for all the areas of cooperation, and are: **human rights, democracy, gender equality, peace and security, environmental protection, the fight against climate change, culture and youth.** Interestingly, art. 7 seems to be inspired by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, placing emphasis on the importance of promoting the exchange of best practices and knowledge transfer and on strengthening the resilience of each country, with respect to environmental and climate change-related challenges, economic shocks, conflicts and political crises, epidemics and pandemics. Title III, titled 'Human Development and Social Development', reaffirms poverty eradication in all its forms as a key objective, with particular attention to women, young people and the vulnerable population. These categories are also stressed as those that are at the centre of socio-economic empowerment, which is at the core of Title IV '**Inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development'.** Under the same title, the importance of supporting the private sector to attract and retain domestic and foreign investment, public–private partnership dialogue and sustainable trade, is stressed.

Part IV is dedicated to the 'Means of Cooperation and Implementation'. In this section, art. 81 stresses the importance of financing development as key for the implementation of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development and the Paris Agreement and the commitment to the development effectiveness principles. Art. 82 specifically addresses the issue of international development and cooperation, for which the EU reaffirms the commitment to '**enhance development cooperation resources with a view to achieving sustainable development, particularly by eradicating poverty and combating environmental degradation and climate change**'. Here is where one of the major changes from the previous agreements comes out. In fact, since the EDF no longer exists, **the EU 'commits to making available the appropriate level of financial resources in line with its internal regulations and procedures'** and that both the EU and more advanced OACP countries shall **'undertake to develop new forms of engagement, including innovative financial instruments and co-financing'**. In line with the principles of aid effectiveness, both the parties engage in promoting aid predictability and security of resource flows, to base the programming on 'early, continuous and inclusive dialogue between the parties, also with national and local authorities, regional, continental and international organisations and involving parliaments, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders.

As for the specific Africa Regional Protocol, the meso-goals are those that are reported in the table 11.

It is important to note that, in the protocol for Africa, it is underlined that 'the Parties agree to ensure coherence and complementarity between this Protocol and the continent-to-continent partnership as defined in successive AU-EU Summits and related outcome documents. In their aspiration to achieve the continental priorities as articulated in Agenda 2063, that recognise the role of the AU, as well as of regional economic communities on continental and cross-regional issues. In this context, they may engage in dialogue and cooperation on cross-regional and continental issues with those African countries not party to the Agreement'.

Table 11 - Africa-EU protocol under the new EU-OACP agreement: meso-goals and sub-meso-goals

Meso-goals	Sub-meso-goals	
Promote inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development	1. Economic governance 2. Human capital and skills 3. Business and investment climate 4. Infrastructure 5. Intellectual property 6. Investment 7. Industrialisation 8. Private sector development 9. Trade cooperation 10. Agriculture 11. Livestock and leather 12. Blue economy and fisheries 13. Extractive industries and processing	14. Manufacturing 15. Transport 16. Sustainable energy 17. Information and communication technologies and digital economy 18. Tourism 19. Science and technology development 20. Research and innovation 21. Space and geospatial technology
Promote human capital and social development	22. Education 23. Health 24. Water, sanitation and housing 25. Food security and improved nutrition 26. Inequality and social protection 27. Decent work 28. Persons with disabilities	29. Culture, sport and people-to-people contact 30. Demography 31. Gender equality and empowerment of women 32. Youth 33. Sustainable urbanisation and rural development
Promote and improve environment and natural resource management	34. Biodiversity and ecosystems 35. Circular economy 36. Ocean governance 37. Land management and land degradation 38. Forests	39. Wildlife 40. Water and freshwater management 41. Climate action 42. Drought and desertification 43. Resilience to natural disasters
Promote and enhance peace and security	44. Regional and multilateral cooperation 45. Conflicts and crisis 46. Terrorism violent extremism and radicalisation 47. Organised crime	48. Small arms and light weapons 49. Cybersecurity and cybercrime 50. Illicit drugs 51. Maritime security 52. Law enforcement cooperation

Promote human rights, democracy and governance, particularly gender equality, rule of law, justice and financial governance + Improve the partnership on migration and mobility	53. Human rights 54. Gender equality 55. Democracy 56. Rule of law and justice 57. Good governance 58. Public administration, statistics and personal data 59. Corruption 60. Financial governance 61. Legal migration and mobility	62. Intra-Africa mobility 63. Diaspora, remittances and sustainable development 64. Irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons 65. Returns readmission and reintegration 66. Protection and asylum

***Source**: Author's Elaboration based on official documents*

***Note**: The colours represent the relative main objectives stated in the European Consensus on Development, as for Table 1.*

As better explained in Section 1 and as will be recalled later in the next sections, the negotiations for a post-Cotonou Agreement took more than two years. The post-Cotonou negotiations started in September 2018 and concluded with a political deal reached between the negotiators from the European Union (EU) and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) on 3 December 2020

3.3 HOW HAS THE EU SOUGHT TO ATTAIN ITS GOALS OVER TIME?

This section aims at providing a brief overview of the main methods and instruments for governance that the European Union has used to pursue development objectives, in general, but particularly regarding its relationship with Africa. In this respect, we have identified some key strategies: strategic and partnership agreement, trade strategy, cooperation with other regional organisations and institutions and with international governmental organisations. In the context of development policy and relations with Africa, partnership agreements are the key instruments used by the EU to set the goals and the instruments through which these goals are achieved. As largely explored in the governance section, the EU has engaged with Africa since the early stage of the decolonisation process, setting up a framework for cooperation increasingly aimed at creating 'partnership amongst equals'. Furthermore, the EU's partnership strategy, in the case of the one with Africa, presents a strong political engagement with the creation of joint institutions. Partnership agreements have been accompanied by cooperation with international governmental organisations, other regional organisations and institutions. One example, amongst others, is the cooperation with the African Union that, as explained in the Governance section, has been strengthened over the years. Whilst intensifying its cooperation with the African continent and the African institutions, the EU has also increasingly been looking for multilateral frameworks with the African Union and other international actors. As seen in the Governance section and in the previous section of this section, the EU aims at cooperating more closely with Africa in the international arena, setting up trilateral cooperation frameworks. One example is the AU-EU-UN taskforce, to save and protect the lives of migrants and refugees along the routes and, in particular, inside Libya (the taskforce was put in place following the 5th AU-EU Summit, in 2018). Beyond trilateral cooperation with multilateral international institutions like the UN, the EU also tried to engage in trilateral cooperation with states, such as China. While the trilateral cooperation with the UN and the AU has been renewed and reinforced over the years, the one with China has never been implemented (since the first attempt from the EU side in 2008). Finally, one of the most important modalities for engagement in cooperation with Africa has been trade. Trade has been used as an instrument for economic development, seen as capable of boosting economic growth and reducing poverty. At the international level, the UN has emphasised the key role of trade in reaching firstly, the Millennium Development Goals (2000) and then the Sustainable Development Goals (2015). The EU, particularly in its cooperation with Africa, has always put trade at the centre, with the bilateral association agreements, then the EPAs with Sub-Saharan Countries (see section on Governance) and with aid for trade projects in the ODA context. With the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) in particular, the EU clearly called for trade policy to be meant as an instrument to defend European values, which are regarded as part of the varied EU tools (i.e., initiatives, policies, institutional frameworks) to achieve non-trade objectives, amongst which are development objectives for the African partners (Bilal, Hoekman and Njinkeu 2020).

3.4 EU IN ACTION: FINANCING DEVELOPMENT AND MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE NEW PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WITH OACP COUNTRIES

After the exploration of the EU's main meso-goals in development policies and relations with Africa, this section aims at analysing how effective the EU has been at attaining its goals. To do that, we have highlighted the case of the negotiation process for a post-Cotonou partnership agreement, looking at the micro-goals related to financing development and regulating migration between the two continents.

By 2015, the partnership had already started to be included in the European Commission's annual work programmes, putting the completion of the negotiations amongst the priorities for 2020 (year of the CPA expiring). In 2016, a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on a renewed partnership with the countries of Africa (European Commission, 2016a), the Caribbean and the Pacific already outlined their vision for the future partnership, after a joint evaluation of the Cotonou Agreement (European Commission, 2016b). Amongst the 'strong features' coming out from the CPA evaluation, there are the following (Pichon 2021; European Commission 2016b):

- Positive contribution of the EU in eradicating poverty, improving food security and social protection for the most vulnerable in the ACP countries.

- General budget support has been one of the main ways of improving economic governance, as it has promoted macroeconomic stability, improved public finance management and encouraged more strategic and efficient public expenditure.
- EU support has contributed to improved and more equitable access to basic services.

Amongst the weaker features, there are the following:

- In some cases, ACP partner countries have considered issues related to human rights and fundamental principles to be inconsistent with their own values and culture, resulting in a lack of political will to change or improve the human rights situation (actually, an inefficient application of art. 96 of the CPA).
- The expected results on increasing diversification and reducing commodity-dependency have not yet been achieved and the support provided directly to private sector organisations and productive sectors has been sporadic and not always compatible with the procedures and systems for providing EU support.
- Improvements to social infrastructures and services have, in some cases, stagnated.
- The legal obligation contained in Article 13 of the CPA, requiring countries to readmit their own nationals has not, in practice, been implemented satisfactorily, whilst other initiatives that go beyond the ACP-EU framework have better addressed migration issues.

Negotiation for a post-Cotonou Agreement officially opened in September 2018. Robert Dussey, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Togo, has been the Chief Negotiator of the ACP Group, with Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, as the EU Chief Negotiator. The chief negotiators met several times between 2018 and 2020 (without making public the details of either agreed or outstanding points) (Pichon 2021).

The main points brought by the new agreement, with respect to the CPA, are:

- Strong regional focus, with regional protocols having specific objectives, strategies and political dialogues targeted for each region.
- The EDF does not exist anymore, finance for development will depend on EU's budget allocation.
- The EPAs are no more part of the agreement, instead becoming stand-alone international agreements.

The development finance instruments and the migration regulations were amongst the most difficult themes discussed during the long consultations for a post-Cotonou Agreement. Particularly, on the development finance side, the ACP countries were not in favour of the EDF budgetisation; on the migration side, the ACP negotiating mandate called for greater consideration of the intra-ACP migration, to include the voluntary nature of returns to the country of origin and a ban on using development aid as a means of negotiating border controls (Pichon 2021). Therefore, we will focus on these two issues to analyse the EU in action, trying to assess the effectiveness of the EU in attaining its goals.

3.4.1 Goal 1: Aid Effectiveness and the mobilisation of financial resources for Africa

The conceptualisation of aid effectiveness started to assume a critical role in the international debate after the Cold War and was enhanced by the introduction of the millennium development goals (MDGs) (MDG 8 called specifically for creating and enhancing a global partnership for development). In 2011 at the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the four development effectiveness principles were set up: ownership of development priorities by developing countries; focus on inclusive partnerships; transparency; and mutual accountability. Transparency is critical for development aid effectiveness. Without transparency, there is no certainty about where the money goes and for what purpose, increasing the likelihood of illicit financing and corruption. The Aid Transparency Index reveals that transparency in the EU's financial assistance has increased significantly[84].

The EU's performance was enhanced. thanks to various recent measures that the EU implemented in this regard, for example, the recently launched EU Aid Explorer tool, which allows users to freely explore EU and MS spending on official development assistance. All services of the European Commission were ranked in the 'Good' category (donors with a score of between 60 and 80). The last OECD Development Cooperation Peer Reviews (OECD 2018) reveal that the EU has demonstrated global leadership and a strong commitment to development effectiveness. In particular, the EU has shown leadership in its efforts towards reaching global agreements on sustainable development and climate change, as well as in shaping the international humanitarian landscape. The EU's enhanced ownership and inclusiveness in partner countries has extensive use of budget support and a variety of delivery instruments (OECD 2018). The table in Annexe 8 reports the performance of the EU and Member States in pursuing effectiveness development principles, taken from the analysis of the 2019 Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) monitoring report. The GPEDC monitoring report reveals a deterioration in the EU's effectiveness, since the majority of the indicators observed in 2018 are decreasing with respect to 2016 levels (table in Annexe 8, third column). The only indicators showing an improvement are: alignment

[84]https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/aid-transparency-index-2020-efforts-improve-transparency-eu-financial-assistance-bear-fruit_en , consulted on 30 August 2021.

at objective level (percentage of development interventions whose objectives are drawn from country-led result frameworks for each partner country); annual predictability (measures the amount of development cooperation disbursed during the reporting year, as a proportion of the amount of development cooperation that had been scheduled at the beginning of the year for disbursement during the year); budget (the proportion of development cooperation funding disbursed for the public sector that used national budget execution procedures); and untied aid (share of development cooperation that is committed for disbursement in partner countries without legal and regulatory barriers to open competition for procurement).

In response to the call of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the EU promoted activities to enhance financing for development. The European Commission (EC) adopted a *Collect More and Spend Better approach* in 2015, to contribute to improving domestic resource mobilisation and public financial management in partner countries (OECD 2018).

Beyond the official development assistance, particularly after COVID-19, the role of the private sector in financing development has assumed increasing importance. However, the need to gather funds to boost sustainable and inclusive development, raised by the 2030 agenda, has been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic, which risks deteriorating the precarious socio-economic situation in most developing countries and fragile states. However, blending and involvement of the private sector in financing development has begun to be recommended by international communities. The EU followed this line, particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon gave the EU the legal possibility to manage multi-donor funds.

The European Commission started experiencing blending facilities for Africa in **2007 with the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF),** substituted by the Africa Investment Platform (AIP) in 2019, **the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF)** and the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (2015). Between 2007 and 2012, Regional Blending Facilities spread across the seven regions of EU external cooperation (other than neighbourhood and Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Caribbean, Asia, Pacific). The agenda for Change (2012) emphasised the role of blending in leveraging additional resources and increasing the impact of EU aid. In the same year, the **EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation (EUBEC) was created.**

In 2015, The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) on financing for development, part of Agenda 2030, further highlighted the need to mobilise more domestic resources for achieving the SDGs and more private finance. Recognising the need to move beyond traditional aid, multilateral development finance institutions called for moving 'from billions to trillions' (AfDB et al. 2015) in mobilising financial flows to achieve the SDGs, emphasising the role aid can play. These international developments highlighted the critical roles private sector engagement and finance play in development, including in EU-Africa relations.

Following the rising instability in Africa and the Mediterranean, the consequences of the global financial crisis and the New Agenda 2030, **in 2016 the European Commission launched the ambitious External Investment Plan (EIP),** specifically encouraging investments in Africa and the EU Neighbourhood region. In line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, the EU tried to develop an innovative financing model for achieving SDGs, mobilising public and private resources in Africa and the European neighbourhood countries, investing nearly EUR 1.3 billion in 52 blending projects. The plan is based on three pillars: (1) European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD); (2) Technical Assistance; (3) Promoting a conducive investment climate.

With the MFF 2021-2027, the EFSD will become EFSD+ and the primary instrument for EU cooperation with partner countries and the NDICI. The plan involves the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) (which offers guarantees primarily to the EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European development finance institutions (DFIs). In doing so, the EU has addressed the challenges posed in evaluating blended finance operations on the lack of diversification of implementing partners and a heavy focus on infrastructure projects and middle-income countries (OECD 2018).

The EIP is a systematic effort by the EU to pursue a more coherent and coordinated approach to stimulate sustainable investment in Africa and European neighbourhood countries. It was framed as part of the EU response to the perceived migration crisis, needed to address the root causes of illegal migration to Europe by promoting investment and job creation, notably in poorer and fragile countries. The EIP proposes an integrated framework, combining complementary means to leverage more private finance for a more significant sustainable development impact, in countries that are most in need. As the first pillar of the EIP, the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD)[85] is an enhanced tool to more significantly pursue blended finance opportunities in priority areas defined by the EU (Bilal et al. 2020). Whilst the effectiveness of the EFSD and guarantees remain to be seen, it demonstrates EU commitment to mobilise more and better private finance for sustainable development. The EIP also emphasises improving the investment climate in partner countries and the overall design of the EIP is meant to broaden and better integrate different dimensions of EU development cooperation, as well as to better integrate EU aid with EU trade interests and private sector promotion, in order to support geostrategic ambitions (Idem). However, it is worth underlining that, as stressed by Bilal et al. (2020), the

[85] The EFSD guarantee is a new risk-mitigating mechanism open to development finance institutions (DFIs). Once they are entrusted to manage EU funds, they can provide the guarantee to their clients (private investors and financing institutions) in developing countries. From http://respect.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2021/01/Bilal-Hoekman-Njinkeu-EU_Africa_August_2020.pdf

establishment of the EIP has been a very Euro-centric process, driven by European considerations, with no consultation with Africa.

As already stressed in the previous sections, 2020 and 2021 have been years of important changes in the context of EU-Africa development aid and finance. The key event has been the decision of the EU to finally budget the European Development Fund, under the unique instrument for financing development, NDICI. The Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, finally approved on December 17 2020, merges most of the existing instruments into the NDICI 'Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument'. The NDICI will allocate resources based on three main pillars: geographical preferences; specific projects in the areas of human rights and democracy, civil society, stability and peace; and a rapid response pillar to complement humanitarian aid, to be used should rapid action be needed to address foreign policy needs. The NDICI will also include a 'flexibility cushion', which will not be programmed in advance, but will be allocated based on emerging needs. In March 2021, the European Parliament and the Council endorsed the political agreement on the NDICI 'Global Europe' for the next MFF, supporting the EU's external action with an overall budget of EUR 79.5 billion. This includes EUR 60.38 billion for geographic programmes (at least EUR 19.32 billion for the neighbourhood, at least EUR 29.18 billion for Sub-Saharan Africa, EUR 8.48 billion for Asia and the Pacific, and for Americas and the Caribbean EUR 3.39 billion); EUR 6.36 billion for thematic programmes (Human Rights and Democracy, Civil Society Organisations, Peace, Stability and Peace Conflict Prevention and Global Challenges); and EUR 3.18 billion for rapid response actions. In addition, a 'cushion' of unallocated funds of EUR 9.53 billion was foreseen in case of unforeseen circumstances, new needs or emerging challenges and to promote new priorities.

The EDF was the main instrument for financing development in Sub-Saharan countries and the only instrument outside the EU budget. With the budgetisation of the EDF and the new flexible NDICI, from one side (the EUIs) the general thinking is that financing development will be more efficient and effective. On the other side (ACP countries), there was the fear that the allocation of funds would have become more EU-interest led. In fact, the ACP-EU financial cooperation will be governed by EU internal rules through the NDCI regulations and this, for some ACP states, represents a 'setback from the previous agreement' because the predictability of funds is largely lost and aid programming and management rules are not established jointly anymore. Finally, even if blending and public–private partnerships for raising funds for development are gaining increasing relevance in the international arena, there are some concerns coming from several scholars around the risk of prioritising business interests rather than development objectives.

> 'Over the next seven years, under the new EU financing instrument, 'Global Europe', EUR 29 billion is foreseen for Sub-Saharan Africa and EUR 12.5 billion is set aside for our Southern Neighbourhood, of which a significant part will go to North Africa. Our collective financial firepower will further increase with that of our Member States through the new Team Europe Initiatives in Africa. Discussions are ongoing on the priorities that should constitute the backbone of national and regional interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa with our African partners. Derisking private investment and sovereign lending in Africa will be an essential element of our collective efforts.' (May 2021 European Commission)

Beyond a new development funding architecture, the EU Commission has also changed the name and, in part, the structure of the main Directorate-General managing development aid and international partnerships. On 15 January 2021, the Directorate-General (DG) International cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) officially became Directorate-General (DG) for International Partnerships (DG INTPA)[86]. The transition, started in 2019, reflects the new geopolitical Commission's emphasis on the role of international partnership for building a stronger EU role in the global fight against poverty and the promotion of the SDGs. The directorates under DEVCO were: Sub-Sahara Africa and horizontal ACP matters; neighbourhood policy; Latin America and the Caribbean; Asia, Central Asia and the Pacific.

3.4.1.1 Development financing in the negotiation of a post-Cotonou partnership

This section aims at analysing how effective the EU has been in achieving its micro-goals in relation to development finance, looking at the negotiation process for a post-Cotonou partnership agreement between the European Union and the OACP (former ACP). Both the EU and the OACP issued the Negotiating Directives and the Negotiating Mandate in 2018 (the OACP in May and the EU in June). The table in Annexe 9 and 10 reports the comparison between the ACP mandate, the EU mandate and the agreed text for the post-Cotonou partnership.

As already mentioned in the previous sections, the budgetisation of the European Development Fund was one of the most debated points during the negotiation phase. The ACP group, in fact, was strongly in favour of maintaining the European Development Fund (EDF) as the main financial instrument in support of ACP-EU development cooperation (ACP 2018, art. 82).

86 https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/dg-international-cooperation-and-development-becomes-dg-international-partnerships_en, consulted on 30 July 2021.

Already by 2012 during the Sipopo Meeting, the ACP head of states were raising concerns about the possible reduction of the EDF allocation and, particularly, the ACP States: 'urge the EU and its Member States to refrain from taking unilateral measures which are prejudicial to our States, and to adhere to the legal framework of the Cotonou Agreement' (ACP 2012). This concern mainly stemmed from the concept of 'differentiation' raised in 'An Agenda for Change'. There, the EU stated that the EU must seek to 'target its resources where they are needed most and address poverty reduction and where they could have greatest impact' (European Commission 2011a, art.4), in order to maximise development impact and value for money[87]. To apply this differentiation approach, the EU development assistance allocation should follow certain criteria: country needs, country capacity (generation of domestic resources/absorption), country commitment and performance (i.e. investment in education, health, etc.) and, finally, the potential EU impact (in terms of the EU's ability to promote and support political, economic, social and environmental policy and an increasing leveraging effect for other sources of finance for development). Since this new approach 'for some countries may result in less or no EU development grant aid and the pursuit of different development relationship based on loans, technical cooperation or support for trilateral cooperation' (European Commission 2011a, art. 4), it generates some concerns from the ACP side, even though the concept of differentiation is not new in the context of ACP-EU cooperation[88].

In their mandate (officially adopted in May 2018), the OACP countries stressed that the EDF has represented one of the main factors making the ACP-EU partnership a unique development cooperation model (art. 84 ACP/00/011/18 FINAL). Amongst the main justifications raised in advocating the maintenance of the old instruments, the core issue seems to be related to the effectiveness of development finance. On one side, the EDF allowed both parties to 'co-manage' development cooperation, which was a unique feature of the instrument; on the other side, the seven-year programming of the EDF allowed for the predictability of resources, another key positive element of the instrument. In its mandate, the OACP group recognises the innovative approach to financing development, which had begun to be explored, particularly after the AAAA. Even so, Official Development Assistance is considered a critical development finance pillar, both for its 'classical' role of supporting governments and projects in developing countries and for its role as an instrument for 'supporting efforts to mobilise and channel financial resources from other sources to achieve SDGs' (ACP group 2018), as well as playing a key role in de-risking private investments.

[87] https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-fragility/wiki/agenda-change

[88] Art 2 CPA: 'cooperation arrangements and priorities shall vary according to a partner's level of development, its needs, its performance and its long term development strategy. Particular emphasis shall be placed on the regional dimension. Special treatment shall be given to the least developed countries. The vulnerability of landlocked and island countries shall be taken into account. Particular emphasis shall be placed on regional integration, including at continental level'.

Furthermore, the ODA's predictability and effective implementation of new forms of new loan financing instruments are also stressed, taking into account the needs of middle-income ACP countries and debt management. Beyond development financing instruments, the document also places emphasis on the need to enhance domestic resource mobilisation, to increase and facilitate remittances from diaspora and to further explore the potentiality of South-South and triangular cooperation, combining South-South and North-South cooperation.

The EU's mandate does not mention the EDF explicitly, but whilst regarding aid delivery modes, it states: 'The Agreement will state that different and complementary modalities and modes of aid delivery will be used, depending on each country's and region's capacities, needs and performance. The choice between the aid delivery modalities and modes will also take into account debt sustainability' (Council of the European Union 2018, art. 6). The document, in fact, includes an entire session dedicated to 'diversified cooperation' where it is stated: 'The Agreement will state that the Parties will agree to make available the appropriate means, both financial and non-financial, in order to fulfil the objectives, set out in this Agreement. Cooperation will be diversified, encompassing a range of policies and instruments, and will be tailored to specific needs, strategies, priorities and available resources, so as to reflect the growing variety of circumstances across countries and regions' (Ibid.).

In this section, in alignment with what was also stressed by the ACP group, the EU underlines its alignment with the AAAA, reiterating 'the importance of a comprehensive and integrated approach to mobilise financing and other means of implementation from all available sources (public/private, domestic/international) and all actors, including the possibility of third-country participation and including through innovative financing sources and instruments, knowledge, expertise, capacity building, technology and non-financial resources, as well as South-South and triangular cooperation consistent with development effectiveness principles'. Furthermore, the EU also reaffirms the commitment of providing 0.7% of its GNI as ODA by 2030, also recognising, as with the ACP document, the importance of hampering private sources of financing and remittances channels. The document also stresses that the development effectiveness principles will always be applied and joint programming should be promoted and strengthened.

With the approval of the new MFF 2021-2027, the EDF has been budgetised. The resources for financing development in Africa will come from the new instrument – NDICI – and will be financed by the EU budget and will not be under the new partnership agreement. The negotiated agreement, published in April 2021, contains an entire section dedicated to the 'means of cooperation and implementation' (Negotiated Agreement text initialled by the EU and OACPS chief negotiators on 15 April 2021, part IV), where the articles focus on:

- **effective and diversified means of cooperation (art. 81),** where both parties agree on the diversification of the means of cooperation;
- **international development cooperation (art. 82),** where both parties agree on prioritising the most vulnerable countries, where the resources have more impact and where the EU reaffirms their commitment to enhance development cooperation resources, making available the appropriate level of financial resources, underlining that this will be done 'in line with internal regulations and procedures'; also, the parties agree on the fact that cooperation may take different forms, any decision to provide budget support shall be based on a clear set of eligibility criteria and a careful assessment of the risks and benefits, to promote predictability and security of resource flows and step up efforts to further improve the way in which they manage and implement development cooperation; the **[EU Party]** and more advanced OACPS Members shall undertake to develop new forms of engagement, including innovative financial instruments and co-financing;
- **domestic public resources (art. 83)** OACPS members aim at enhancing revenue collection and both EU and OACPS parties agree to increase efforts to combat illicit financial flows and scale up international tax cooperation;
- **domestic international private resources (art.84),** where the parties acknowledge that private capital is vital in complementing national development efforts.

In conclusion, **the EU can be considered as an effective actor in this first goal analysed. The EU was able to use new mechanisms to finance development, also engaging private sectors and other development finance institutions. In particular, the EU has obtained consent from all its Member States to pursue, in a united way, the objectives stated in the negotiations mandate, budgetising the EDF. Whether this strategy will turn into an efficient partnership, increasing aid and, in general, development finance effectiveness, will be seen in the next few years.**

3.5 GOAL 2: MIGRATION AND MOBILITY

Migration and mobility are important aspects of the EU-Africa partnership. African migration has grown in line with overall population growth and, whilst more than one in every two African migrants moved to another African country, the others moved mostly to Europe, Western Asia or North America (European Commission, 2018). In 2000, the EU received

488,800 migrants from Africa, 791,800 in 2015 and 918, 100 in 2020[89], an increasing trend mainly driven by 'irregular migration'[90].

Migration has increasingly been recognised as an important driver for development (through remittances, knowledge transfer, investment, social factors, etc.) and, therefore, on the policy side creating opportunities for legal migration and supporting migrants' rights are clearly conditions for exploiting the full development potential of migration (Koeb and Hohmeister 2010). Nevertheless, the EU seems to increasingly use an approach to migration which is focused on securitisation of borders and limiting illegal migration.

By 1990, it was already clear that immigration was one of the key priorities of the EU, with the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Agreement.

In 2005, the European Council defined the Global Approach to Migration (GAM), further developed in 2007 and 2008, constituting the framework for the cooperation of the EU with third countries in the area of migration and asylum. In 2011, particularly after the Arab Spring, the need for a renewed strategy on migration, mainly with Africa, became evident. This was jeopardised by the rising issues of climate change (Stockholm Programme recognised climate change as a global challenge that is increasingly driving migration and displacement) and demographic transition in the continent. In the same year, GAM was evaluated and, despite confirming the added value of the approach and the valuable results achieved, it also affirmed that a new GAM should 'better reflect the strategic objectives of the Union and translate them into concrete proposals for dialogue and cooperation, notably with the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood, Africa, enlargement countries and with other strategic partners' (European Commission, 2011b).

The EU then adapted the new policy framework, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), with the objective of reaping the benefits that well-managed migration can bring and responding to the challenges of changing migration trends. The renewed GAMM focuses on four main priorities: (1) improving the organisation of legal migration and facilitated mobility; (2) preventing and reducing irregular migration in an efficient and humane way; (3) strengthening the synergies between migration and development; (4) strengthening international protection systems and the external dimension of asylum (Ibid.). Nevertheless, before the renewed GAMM, in 2007 following the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union launched the EU-Africa Partnership on Migration and Employment (MME). The partnership is linked to the African Union–European Union Summit. Over the years, the

[89] https://migration-demography-tools.jrc.ec.europa.eu/atlas-migration/, consulted on 30 August 2021.
[90] The EU defines 'irregular migration' as the 'Movement of persons to a new place of residence or transit that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries' https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/orphan-pages/glossary/irregular-migration_en

EU has established: dedicated bilateral and regional migration dialogues with countries of West, Central and North Africa (Rabat Process) and East Africa (Khartoum Process); and bilateral Mobility Partnerships (MP) and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) (with a number of strategic partners, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Nigeria)[91].

Beyond political dialogue and engagement, the EU also launched new instruments for financing migration and mobility related issues. In 2015, the Valletta Summit on migration brought together European and African Heads of State and Government, in an effort to strengthen cooperation and address both the challenges and the opportunities of migration. The political action plan adopted also launched the EU Emergency Trust Fund, a flexible and innovative funding mechanism drawing on both EU and Member State funds (and other donors). In 2018, the Board of the EUTF for Africa agreed on the need to further prioritise future actions, based on six priority areas: (1) return and reintegration; (2) refugee management (Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework); (3) completing progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry; (4) anti-trafficking measures; (5) essential stabilisation efforts in the Horn of Africa (in particular, in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia) and in the Sahel/Lake Chad region; (6) supporting migration dialogues. The last monitoring report on the EUTF highlighted some key achievements of the instruments relating to the complicated year of 2020 (in terms of delivering basic social services, providing assistance or protection to migrants in transit, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs, supporting plans and policy documents aimed at supporting governance and policymaker efforts and delivering assistance to combat COVID-19) (Altai Consulting 2021).

Nevertheless, it is also recognised that funding has also sustained initiatives related to migration in Africa that have natural contradictions with EU values, as too often happens when it comes to migration issues (i.e., support to the Libyan authorities and border migration control)[92]. In fact, during recent years, border control seems to have been increasingly the focus of the EU's action, particularly after the 2015-16 refugee crisis. In 2020, the Commission's communication on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum particularly emphasised the issue of return procedures (European Commission, 2020b). In the next paragraph, analysing the EU's micro-goals related to migration issues under the EU-OACP agreement, it will become evident how crucial the theme of return is for the EU.

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91 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/africa_en, Consulted on 30 July 2021.
92 https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf_libya_en.pdf, Consulted on 30 August and https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya_en Consulted on 30 August 2021.

3.5.1.1 Migration issues in the negotiation of a post-Cotonou partnership

This section aims at assessing the effectiveness of the EU in getting its negotiating priorities on migration into the post-Cotonou partnership, through the analysis of the European Union and the OACP (former ACP) negotiating mandates. Both the EU and the OACP issued the Negotiating Directives (or Mandate) in 2018 (the OACP in May and the EU in June). **The table in Annexe 10 reports the comparison between the ACP mandate, the EU mandate and the agreed text for the post-Cotonou partnership.**

As analysed in the previous sessions, the issue of migration, particularly irregular migration, has become one of the key priorities of the EU in its relations with Africa. Migration and mobility are amongst the six new key priority areas[93]. In the already cited EU joint communication (European Commission, 2016b), the EU set out some specific objectives related to mobility and migration in the context of a new EU-ACP partnership. Since the aim of the EU was to further regionalise the new partnership agreement, providing for specific regional protocols for Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, the migration and mobility objectives stated in the 2016 Joint Declaration are already part of the EU's priorities tailored to Africa. In line with the European agenda on Migration and its new partnership framework with third countries, the 2014 EU-Africa Migration and Mobility Declaration, as well as in the Valletta Summit Declaration and action plan, the EU's specific objectives were as follows:

- **Promote the conception and implementation of migration policies**, promoting regular channels and tackling irregular migration flows, including return and readmission;
- **Better organise intra- and inter-regional labour mobility**, facilitating institutional dialogue and cooperation along the migratory routes, and facilitating '**brain circulation'** through recognition of skills and qualification, dialogue on visas, and promotion of students, researchers and academic mobility. **Reduce the cost of remittances** and enhance the role and engagement of the diaspora;
- **Tackle irregular migration by putting in place adequate prevention measures**, including the fight against human trafficking and smuggling of migrants through

[93] The EU aims at setting up a more political cooperation, geared to achieving greater ambitions at local, national and international level, basing the new Agreement on six priority areas representing the main challenges for the next decades: 1) human rights, democracy and governance; 2) peace and security; 3) human and social development; 4) environmental sustainability and climate change; 5) inclusive sustainable economic growth and development; 6) migration and mobility.

integrated border management and the promotion of alternatives to irregular migration;

- **Address more effectively and efficiently return, readmission and reintegration challenges** (the provisions of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement need to be strengthened and made enforceable);
- **Address forced displacement and promote international protection, based on the principle of responsibility sharing**, by helping preserve and enhance human capital of those forced to flee their homes, helping ensure their protection and ultimately provide developmental benefits for the displaced and their hosts (for both populations fleeing their country and internally displaced people).

As already visible from the objectives stated in 2016, the EU is particularly interested in tackling irregular migration. Furthermore, in general, migration and mobility, under the new ACP-EU partnership, is defined by the EU as a key issue that will require 'more emphasis than in the past'. On the other hand, as already mentioned in the previous sections, the ACP negotiating mandate called for the inclusion of the voluntary nature of returns to the country of origin and, particularly, for a ban on using development aid as a means of negotiating border controls (Pichon 2021). Nevertheless, in December 2020, in a meeting between Commissioner Urpilainen and the European Parliament's committee on Development, the willingness to have a post-Cotonou Agreement going far beyond Article 13 of the CPA was highlighted, particularly enforcing and making more predictable the areas of return and readmission. In the ACP mandate (art. 158), it proposed to make the 'return and readmission process to the country of origin' as per art. 13 of the CPA on a voluntary basis. ACP countries also stress that Article 13 did not pay enough attention to the intra-ACP migration, the promotion of legal migration and the rights of movement of persons, which constitute the 'positive side of migration'. Furthermore, the EU mandate underlines the importance of recognising that regular migration and mobility can have positive impacts on sustainable development when properly managed. Nevertheless, the EU called for a new agreement, strengthening the commitment of the parties to cooperate in 'stemming the flows of irregular migration, in full respect of international asylum law, acknowledging negative impacts of irregular migration on countries of origin, transit and destination, including related humanitarian and security challenges, as well as the increased risk for migrants to experience human rights violations and to become victims of trafficking and abuses' (Council of the European Union 2018, Title VI Migration and mobility). Nevertheless, to 'turn mobility and migration into opportunities and address challenges together' is one of the specific priorities outlined by the EU for the future partnership with ACP countries. Looking at the new EU-OACP agreement, one of the key priorities is precisely to 'implement a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration, so as to reap the benefits of safe, orderly and regular migration and mobility, stem irregular migration whilst addressing its root causes, in full respect of international law and in accordance with the Parties' respective competences' (Negotiated Agreement text initialled by the EU and OACPS chief negotiators on 15 April 2021, art. 3 (f)). Title VI of the new EU-OACP Agreement is dedicated to migration and mobility, with the first chapter being dedicated to legal migration and mobility, whilst irregular migration is covered under Chapter 3, after the second chapter which is dedicated to migration and development, followed by a chapter on return, readmission and reintegration (chapter 4) and one on protection and asylum (chapter 5).

The fact that the **first chapter is dedicated to 'legal' migration** seems to suggest a reorientation in the migration paradigm between the two continents. The first article of the chapter (art. 63) can be considered innovative with respect to the previous partnership. In fact, the article stresses the importance for the parties to consider circular migration, also mentioning 'family reunification' and 'portability of pension'. Furthermore, a lot of attention seems to be placed on encouraging identification and filling of skill gaps, investing in job opportunities and labour migration policies, and improving the comparability of all qualifications.

Chapter Two on migration and development underlined the **capacity of well-managed migration to be a source of prosperity, innovation and sustainable development (art. 65),** the role that diasporas play in the development of their countries of origin, the relevance of South-South migration (creating challenges and opportunities), recognising and taking into account the **nexus between migration and natural disasters, climate change and environmental degradation (art. 69). In Article 67, the parties commit to reduce transaction costs of remittances to less than 3%**, to eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5% and to improve regulatory frameworks for enhanced involvement of non-traditional players

Chapter Three tackles irregular migration. **The parties commit to address together the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement (art. 70),** to increase joint efforts to prevent migrant smuggling and to work together in investigating and prosecuting related criminal organisations, likewise for **trafficking of persons (art.72);** the parties also commit to promote and support **integrated border management (art. 73).**

Chapter Four is dedicated to return, readmission and reintegration. **The parties reaffirm their right to return illegally staying third-country nationals**, and, differently from what was suggested in the ACP mandate, the legal obligation of each Member State of both parties to readmit their own nationals who are illegally present in the territory of another Member State (art. 74). As for reintegration, 'The Parties shall explore ways to cooperate in order to promote voluntary return and to facilitate sustainable reintegration of returned persons including, where relevant, through sustainable reintegration programmes'.

In conclusion, the EU can be considered as an effective actor in this specific case study. Indeed, the EU was able to pursue its strategies and the objectives stated in the initial negotiation mandate, even if integrating some requests outlined in the ACP mandate, the core issues, such as the obligation in returning illegal migrants, have been maintained.

3.6 CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

The section illustrated the EU's main goals and objectives related to development and cooperation with Africa. At the meso-level, the main goals have remained the same over the years and are aligned with the different frameworks that are in place for development and cooperation with Africa. For the analysis of effectiveness and, therefore, looking at certain micro-goals, we have looked at development finance and migration issues, since they were the most controversial during the post-Cotonou consultation, looking at the intentions of both the EU and the OACP at the start of the consultation and at what has been decided in the published post-Cotonou Agreement.

TRIGGER aims at exploring the effectiveness of the EU, in consideration of whether it is 'effective as an actor that achieves its goals, irrespective of whether such goals are desirable or not from an external viewpoint'. In the context of the negotiations with the OACP for a post-Cotonou Agreement, micro-goals related to financing development and migration, can be considered effective. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting some caveats in the analysis. The analysis of effectiveness does not take into account whether these goals are desirable or not for having an effective overall partnership (i.e., the analysis does not explore to what extent the abolition of the EDF instrument and the mandatory return of illegally staying third-country nationals have been achieved). Another caveat is that, whilst we can state that the EU has been an effective negotiator in the cases analysed, we have only picked out two micro-goals set under the same negotiation framework. Whilst these were chosen because they represented the most debated issues and, therefore, gave even more weight to the capacity of the EU to achieve its goals in the negotiations, they cannot, nor do they aim to, provide a general assessment of the EU's overall effectiveness. For example, the case of trade under the post-Cotonou Agreement has not been analysed in this study; nevertheless, the fact that EPAs have been taken out of the partnership could be considered as an element representing a lack of EU effectiveness in pursuing the objective of linking trade and development.

To conclude, the EU's effectiveness will certainly give different results, based on the goals taken into account, as well as the actors involved in the international arena. Furthermore, actorness will play a role in the capacity of the EU to achieve certain goals. Further studies will need to explore those links.

3.7 CONCLUSION: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Throughout the previous sections, we have explored the role of the EU in the evolving global governance landscape.

In the first section, we have provided an overview of the evolution of global governance and the EU's governance since the 1990s (and before). Global governance in development aid and relations with Africa have evolved, both in terms of tools used and of actors involved during recent decades. There are some general, interesting trends outlined by this research. The first is an increasing interest towards Africa from non-traditional actors, actors without an historical tied link to the colonisation period. This trend has been triggered by another one, the increasing South-South cooperation in the international arena. Countries from the 'Global South' find ways of cooperation amongst each other, which seem to be less based on conditionalities and more on the ability to understand the needs of partner countries. Another trend is shown in the tendency to move from traditional ODA to public–private financial frameworks and from the financing of development projects to financing investment for infrastructure development. All these trends are also followed and promoted by the EU. Nevertheless, the EU seems to be stuck between the attitude of an international organisation, focused on building partnership and coordinating actors, and that of a sovereign state protecting borders and internal interests and disincentivised migration. This controversial way of acting by the EU is embedded in its nature, but it risks compromising its capacity to act and be recognised as a unique and coherent actor in the international arena, at least as regards development and relations with Africa.

In the second section, we assessed the 'actorness' of the EU using the TRIGGER project's seven-dimension model. The assessment of the internal dimension of actorness (authority, autonomy and cohesion) reveals an increasing trend. As for the dimension of authority, this has seen a gradual shift from a 'moderate' level of authority in the period from 1995 to 2006, to a 'moderate/high' level of authority since the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). However, in practice, the possibility for the EU to act, based on the powers and competences conferred upon it by the Member States, must be assessed against the strong regional interests of some Member States in parts of Africa. As regards autonomy, there has been a remarkable increase between the 'first' (1995-2006), 'second' (2007-2016) and 'third partnership' (2017-present) periods, with the level of autonomy today assessed as being 'moderate/high'. Despite several initiatives to strengthen joint action and coordination on development programming, EU cohesion- remains a vital bargaining constellation sending mixed signals (mixed MS and EU interests). EU cohesion in this domain has been assessed as 'moderate/low' in the 'first' period (1995-2006), 'moderate' during the 'second' partnership phase (2007-2016) and also 'moderate' in the 'third partnership' phase (2017-present). The external dimensions of actorness show a decreasing trend over the period considered – except attractiveness – which kept a 'moderate/high' level of assessment (the EU still leads the field in Africa for trade, ODA and investment, with an increasing engagement in new investment platforms for financing development). In the analysis, the EU's level of recognition has shifted from 'moderate' in the 'first partnership', to 'moderate/high' during the 'second partnership'. The level assessed turned to 'moderate' in the final period observed, when the EU's development action in Africa seems to have increasingly lacked visibility (in Africa and at the international level), whilst other new actors (mainly China) are increasing their role in the continent. The levels attributed to the dimension of opportunity / necessity to act is 'moderate/high' during the 'first partnership', whilst it is only 'moderate/low' in the following period observed, given the repeated incidents in which the EU has missed an opportunity to act, as also testified by the growing presence of Turkey and China in various parts of Africa. The level assigned to the last dimension - credibility - is 'moderate/high' for the 'first partnership', 'moderate' for the 'second partnership' and 'moderate/low' for the final period considered, denoting a decreasing trend.

In the third section, we analysed the EU's effectiveness. We started by illustrating the EU's main goals and objectives related to development and cooperation with Africa. At the meso-level, the main goals have remained the same over the years and are aligned with the different frameworks that are in place for development and cooperation with Africa. For the analysis of effectiveness and, therefore, looking at certain micro-goals, we have looked at the development finance and migration issues, since they were the most controversial during the post-Cotonou consultation, looking at the intentions of both the EU and the OACP at the start of the consultation and at what has been decided in the published post-Cotonou Agreement. In the context of the negotiations with the OACP for a post-Cotonou Agreement, micro-goals related to financing development and migration, can be considered effectively achieved.

Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting some caveats in the analysis, such as the fact that it does not take into account whether these goals are desirable or not for having an effective overall partnership. We have only picked out two micro-goals, set under the same negotiation framework, though they cannot, nor do they aim to, provide a general assessment of the EU's overall effectiveness. EU effectiveness will certainly give different results, based on the goals taken into account, as well as the actors involved in the international arena, possibly affecting the achievement of these goals. Furthermore, actorness will play a role in the capacity of the EU to achieve certain goals. Further studies will need to explore those links.

In this concluding section, we build on the previous ones to highlight a number of factors that we believe are likely to determine the EU's actorness and effectiveness in development policy and relations with Africa. The following paragraphs briefly outline some possible sources of challenges and opportunities for the EU's actorness and effectiveness in development policy and relations with Africa.

A. THE NEED FOR COHERENCE

The need for coherence is one of the main challenges facing the EU, if it is to increase its actorness and effectiveness in development policy and relations with Africa. The coherence needed is transversal and includes: (1) coherence amongst EU stakeholders (the Member States and Agencies), (2) coherence between values and actions, (3) coherence amongst the different frameworks for cooperation with the continent.

The first point relates to what has been raised, particularly in the actorness section. The EU has tried to enhance cohesion amongst the agencies and between agencies and the Member States. However, the study reveals that there is still a bargaining constellation of interests amongst the actors involved. The EU counts on many different agencies for development policy, both national, for each Member State, and European ones (i.e., many DGs are involved in development and cooperation programmes). Moreover, the funding mechanisms for development and cooperation are split amongst different financial institutions (i.e., the EIB and the EBRD at the European level and several financial institutions from the Member States). This complicates the bureaucracy beyond development programmes and leads to inefficiencies, causing a decrease in trust from the developing countries involved.

The second point refers to the lack of coherence between the overarching goals and principles of the EU and its actions. One example is the migration issue. The EU's engagement is increasingly concentrated in border control and re-admission policies rather than visas, labour permits and humanitarian corridors, often turning to controversial agreements in terms of human rights protection (i.e., the case of Libya).

The third point refers to coherence amongst the different frameworks for cooperation with Africa. Whilst the macro-goals in the various schemes are coherent amongst each other and with the EU's values, the existence of many different channels of cooperation with the continent could undermine the continent-to-continent approach, pursuing a 'spaghetti bowl' approach that could lead to inefficiencies.

All the three previously mentioned sources of incoherence strongly undermine the credibility of the EU, particularly with one of its key partners for development which is Africa.

B. SUSTAINABLE TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

As shown in the previous sections, particularly the one on actorness, the EU is still one of the leading trade partners for Africa and trade has been one of the main tools for increasing development and cooperation with Africa for a long time. Nevertheless, the last AATM reports suggests that the continent is increasingly diversifying agricultural export destinations, with an increasingly smaller share going to the European Union (EU) and a growing share going to emerging and high-growth economies[94]. Overall, trade between the EU and Africa has remained unbalanced, with the EU mainly importing raw materials from Africa, whilst the latter imports manufactured goods. Between 2020 and 2021, many critical factors occurred in trade between the EU and Africa. As already highlighted in the actorness section, the imbalances in trade patterns were amongst those factors lowering the credibility of the EU, whilst the post-Cotonou Agreement does not include the European Partnership Agreements (EPAs). For the first time in decades of cooperation between the European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa, trade is not central to the legal cooperation framework. On the other hand, in February 2021, the Trade Policy Review Communication confirmed that Africa is a key partner for EU trade policy. The comprehensive strategy with Africa (European Commission 2020b) identifies trade and regional and continental economic integration as significant elements in promoting sustainable development in African countries. It is aligned with Agenda 2030, recognising international trade as an engine for inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction, as well as an important means to achieve the SDGs. Although trade remains an important factor for development and cooperation between the two continents, the EU still faces some significant challenges: (1) competing with other actors in the global arena who are increasingly acquiring importance as Africa's trade partner (i.e., China), (2) avoiding the European Green Deal (EGD) becoming a barrier to trade and (3) promoting the AfCFTA, initiated in 2021. All these three points are, in a certain way, linked to sustainable infrastructure development, which can be considered the main opportunity the EU has to increase its actorness and its effectiveness. The lack of infrastructure is one of the major problems preventing Africa from exploiting its trade-related untapped potential. If the EU was a key actor promoting sustainable infrastructure development, this would favour its position as a trade partner, facilitating the AfCFTA and accelerating the EU-Africa partnership green transition. The Global Gateway partnerships, announced by the European Commission on 15 September 2021, seems to go in that direction, seeking to increase investments in Africa to 'create a market for green hydrogen that connects the two shores of the Mediterranean'[95].

[94] AATM 2021, downloadable at https://www.resakss.org/node/6838
[95] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_21_4701

It could represent an occasion for the EU to regain actorness in the Mediterranean and Africa, particularly after the 25th anniversary of the Barcelona Process in 2020 recalling the partnership's failure, mainly in its willingness to better connect the two shores of the Mediterranean through the creation of a free trade area. Finally, it is worth stressing that following the pandemic, the number of people at risk of being vulnerable, food insecurity and poverty have increased dramatically. With this in mind, the EU's trade policies could play a key role in helping Africa to counteract these trends.

C. MIGRATION

This study has highlighted the fact that migration-related issues have represented an increasing source of misalignment between the EU and Africa. Future EU policies on migration issues will play a critical role in the EU's actorness with regard to its relations with Africa. The effectiveness section analysed the recent key EU initiatives on migration issues overall and with Africa. The EU can be considered as an effective negotiator in terms of migration during the post-Cotonou consultations; nevertheless, being an effective negotiator in pursuing one specific goal does not provide an overall idea of the efficacy implication of that goal's achievement. The EU is pursuing a migration policy which is increasingly focused on border control, blocking illegal migration and facilitating return of illegal migrants from Europe. Meanwhile, too few of the EU's actions and speeches are dedicated to improving worker and student exchanges, facilitating corridors for refugees and rethinking migration, in light of the increasing impact of the climate crisis and increasing poverty due to the pandemic. The EU has the opportunity to rebuild trust with African countries, moving the dialogue towards the previously mentioned points and this could be done during the EU-Africa Summit that is due to take place in February 2022. Nevertheless, if the EU follows the line drawn by the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the future of the partnership could be less successful[96].

D. GLOBAL HEALTH AND FUTURE PANDEMICS

COVID-19 represented an unprecedented challenge for the whole world. As already highlighted in the actorness section when analysing the dimension of opportunity and necessity to act, the EU has lost the opportunity to play a key role in Africa. The EU participated in the COVAX initiative but was not able to push the platform providing vaccines quickly and, in the middle of the crisis, with most of the wealthier countries securing more

[96] https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum_en; https://www.ceps.eu/download/publication/?id=33829&pdf=IPOL_STU2021697130_EN.pdf

doses than needed for its own citizens. Meanwhile, the EU also strongly countered both South Africa's and India's proposal for a patent waiver. African countries are calling for increased cooperation in research, development and sharing of knowledge. The distribution of vaccines is unequally skewed towards the richest countries and those where manufacturing companies are based. The EU tried to respond to this with purpose and engagement but with lack of results, undermining both actorness and effectiveness. On 18 May 12021, President Macron of France invited African and European leaders to Paris, together with heads of international and regional organisations, for a summit on financing African economies. The summit declaration builds on two pillars (1) addressing financing needs to support a prompt, green, sustainable and inclusive recovery; (2) supporting long-term growth, driven by a vibrant sector and entrepreneurial dynamic and the emergence and financing of qualify infrastructure projects. On 21 May 2021, The President of the European Commission and the President of the European Investment Bank outlined a new initiative under Team Europe: The Sustainable Healthcare Industry for Resilience in Africa (SHIRA) – a financing platform that will enable political and development finance partners to coordinate and strengthen health security and resilience in Africa. The ability of the EU to attain those initiatives in practice will be key for its actorness and effectiveness with Africa and development policy.

E. BEYOND AID

Finally, the challenge and opportunity for the future is to raise more and effective funds for Africa. To reach the SDGs, more public–private financing is needed. After COVID-19, and particularly for Africa, for countries struggling with scarce financial resources and over-indebtedness even before the pandemic, more funds will be needed to rebuild in a green, sustainable and resilient way. The need to raise funds for boosting sustainable and inclusive development raised by Agenda 2030 is hampered by the current pandemic, which risks deteriorating the precarious socio-economic situation in most developing countries and fragile states. As explored by this study, blending and involvement of the private sector in financing development has been recommended by the international communities for more than a decade and the EU followed this line, particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon. The challenge for the EU will be to maintain a key role as an actor for development, better coordinating its agencies for development and financial institutions (both national and international), to be able to implement and coordinate public–private partnerships, co-guarantee schemes and collaborative blended finance platforms.

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Annexe 1 - Some instruments for development in Africa other than ODA

Figure 6 - Some instruments for development in Africa other than ODA.



Figure 7 - Private finance mobilised by region, 2017-18 average



Annexe 2 - An overview of the EU's ODA

Figure 8 - EU Institutions' gross bilateral ODA overview.



	ODA		
	2018	2019	Change 2018/19 %
Current (USD m)	16.384,5	14.937,3	-8,8
Constant (2018 USD m)	16.384,5	15.502,9	-5,4
National Currency * (mill.	13.882,6	13.343,4	-3,9
ODA/GNI (%)			
Bilateral share (%)	98	98	

1	Turkey	1 677
2	Serbia	546
3	Egypt	536
4	Syrian Arab Republic	506
5	Morocco	456
6	Afghanistan	438
7	Ukraine	406
8	Tunisia	399
9	India	300
10	West Bank and Gaza Strip	267

	2019
Top 5 recipients	20%
Top 10 recipients	30%
Top 20 recipients	41%

Source: OECD-DAC elaboration, retrieved from https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1 , accessed 15 June 2021.
Note: EU Institutions' gross bilateral ODA, 2018-2019 average unless otherwise shown.

Figure 9 - EU Institutions' net total ODA to Africa 1995-2018



Source: Author's elaboration based on data extracted from OECD.Stat, accessed 20 April 2020.
Note: EU Institutions' net total ODA, in constant 2018 prices,USD.

Annexe 3 - EPAs signed and under negotiation[97]

The consultation on EPAs with **West Africa region** countries[98] involved two regional economic communities: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Western African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). EPAs were signed by all the countries in this regional group between 2014 and 2016, the only exception being Nigeria. EPA provision for these countries covers goods and development cooperation, with the possibility to start new negotiations for the inclusion of sustainable development, investment and other trade-related issues.

In **Central Africa** regional group countries[99], only Cameroon signed the agreement in July 2014. The EPA between Cameroon and the EU provides that all goods from Cameroon can enter the EU duty and quota-free and defines a gradual removal (over 15 years) on 80% of EU exports to Cameroon. It is a stepping-stone agreement, meaning that further negotiation could include other trade-related issues. It covers trade in goods, aid for trade, institutional issues and dispute settlement. Other countries in this region are bound by the EU's Everything but Arms scheme (EbA), allowing those countries to have duty-free and quota-free access to the EU's market. The exception to this is Congo, whose relations with the EU are regulated by the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preference (GSP) allowing duty reductions. Gabon did not sign the EPA and has not been eligible for GSP since 2014, when it started being classified as an upper-middle-income country. Interim EPA between the EU and five countries in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA)[100] began to be provisionally applied from 2012. Six countries in the region did not agree, whilst Zambia concluded negotiations in 2007. The agreement provides for the gradually opening up of EU exports to these countries and the EU elimination of duties and quota for imports from these countries. Furthermore, the EPA provides rules on development cooperation, rules of origin, fisheries and trade defence, and a dispute settlement mechanism. Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe declared their intention to move beyond trade in goods towards a more comprehensive agreement and the interim agreement includes cooperation on technical barriers to trade and standards on animals and plant health.

The **East African Community** (EAC)[101] finalised the negotiations for EPA with the EU in 2014. In 2016, Rwanda signed the agreement and Kenya ratified it. It covers trade in goods and development cooperation, with a specific chapter on fisheries, focused on reinforcing

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[97] Informations on EPAs retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/ consulted in June 2020.
[98] Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.
[99] Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), the Congo Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe.
[100] Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
[101] Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda.

cooperation on the sustainable use of resources. The agreement is in line with the EAC Common External Tariff and bans unjustified or discriminatory restrictions on imports and exports.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)[102] signed an EPA with the EU but without certain partners countries. Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe are official partners of the SADC but decided to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU as part of other regional groups, namely Central Africa or Eastern and Southern Africa. The agreement provisionally applies to all countries, except for Angola since 2016 (since 2018 for Mozambique). South Africa and EU trade relations have been regulated by the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) since 1999. In 2016, the EPA entered into a provisional application, repealing the trade component of TDCA. The EPA includes a bilateral protocol between the EU and South Africa on the protection of geographical indications and trade in wines and spirit. The agreement guarantees duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market and it also provides the possibility of shielding sensitive products from full liberalisation. There is a provision for a safeguards mechanism that can be deployed if imports from the EU are growing too quickly.

[102] Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini.

Annexe 4 - The complex EU development policy chain of command and instruments

Figure 10 - The complex EU development policy chain of command and instruments



* HR/VP: High Representative/Vice President; NDICI Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument; EUBEC: EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation; DB/DFIs: National Development Bank/ National Development Financial Institutions; EDFI: European Development Financial Institutions; EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; EIP: External Invesment Plan; EFSD+European Fund for Sustainable and Development +(reiforced);

Annexe 5 - Institutional stakeholders involved in the Africa-EU partnership and recurrent meetings, after 2010

Figure 11 - Institutional stakeholders involved in the Africa-EU partnership and main recurrent meetings (after 2010)

Source: Author's elaboration from https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/about-us/how-it-works

Annexe 6 - Guidance on scoring EU actorness in Africa-EU partnership and financing for development – what do different scores imply?

Dimensions	*It is "Low" if...*	*It is "Moderate/low" if...*	*It is "Moderate" if...*	*It is "Moderate/high" if...*	*It is "High" if...*
Authority	Most of the legal competences are detained by the MS, the EU play a marginal role in defining and implementing policies	Transfer of some legal competences or monitoring to the EU without strong enforcement	Shared legal competences, EU defines development priorities, but MS still play a central role	Transfer of some legal competences or monitoring with increasing enforcement	Most of the legal competences are detained by the EU and there are monitoring and enforcement opportunities for the EU towards MS
Autonomy	Little EU capacity to act (human/economic resources), no EU dedicated agency/institution; most of the capacity is detained by MS	Low amount of EU capacity with high influence of MS	Moderate amount of EU capacity (human/economic resources), not clear division of labor between EUIs and MS	High amount of EU capacity with some influence of MS	EU has a high capacity to act (human/economic resources), and well and clearly organized EUIs dedicated; most of the capacity is detained by EU agencies
Cohesion	Lack of joint EU interests and norms, and weak intra-EU cohesion and EU-MS cohesion	Some joint interests but mainly individual MS values and interests prevails	Bargaining constellation of interests and signals on values and interests (both intra-EU level and EUIs-MS level)	Consistency numerous joint EU interests and norms and consistent intra-EU and EU-MS cohesion	Strong consistent joint EU interests and norms, strong intra-EU cohesion and EU-MS cohesion
Recognition	No participation of the EU as a development actor in some international fora/multilateral negotiation; EU is not perceived nor sought after as conversation partner as part of agreements and negotiations	Low participation of the EU as a development actor in some international fora/multilateral negotiation; occasionally EU is not perceived nor sought after as conversation partner as part of	Participation of the EU as a development actor in some international fora/multilateral negotiation; is perceived as a partner for development aid but not more than MS	Participation of the EU as a development actor in some international fora/multilateral negotiation; is perceived as a partner for development occasionally more than MS	Active participation of the EU as a development actor in some international fora/multilateral negotiation; EU is perceived /sought after as conversation partner as part of agreements and negotiations

Attractiveness	No consideration of EU's development policy/best practice; no (or very little) willingness to cooperate with EU	Low consideration of EU's development policy/best practice, and low willingness to cooperate with EU	Moderate consideration of EU's development policy/best practice; moderate willingness to cooperate with EU	High consideration of EU's development policy/best practice; high willingness to cooperate with EU	High and growing consideration of EU's development policy/best practice; widespread and stable willingness to cooperate with EU
Opportunity/Necessity to act	Counterintuitive or no reaction: to unexpected crises / events / opportunities to enhance or shape development policies	Little reaction: to unexpected crises / events / opportunities to enhance or shape development policies	Moderate reaction: to unexpected crises / events / opportunities to enhance or shape development policies	Active reaction: to unexpected crises / events / opportunities to enhance or shape development policies	Active, swift and anticipatory reaction: to unexpected crises / events/ opportunities to enhance or shape development policies
Credibility/ trust	The EU does not hold up to its standards, and has only little reputation of planned efforts	The EU has little reputation of planned efforts; inconsistency between objective and practical action	The EU has moderate reputation of planned efforts (depending on partners) and receive some critics of inconsistency between objective and practical action	The EU has a considerable reputation of planned efforts and generally hold up to its standard	The EU hold up to its standard and has a high reputation of planned efforts

***Source**: authors' elaboration based on TRIGGER actorness' dimensions definition. The cells highlighted in blue represent the EU's overall level per dimension as for the assessment (last partnership phase analysed*

ANNEX 7 - EU, EIB and EBRD offices in African countries

African Countries	EU Delegations	EIB Offices	EBRD Offices
Algeria	•		
Angola	•		
Benin	•		
Botswana	•		
Burkina Faso	•		
Burundi	•		
Cameroon	•	•	
Cape Verde	•		
Central African Republic	•		
Chad	•		
Comoros			
Democratic Republic of the Congo	•		
Djibouti	•		
Egypt	•	•	•
Equatorial Guinea			
Eritrea	•		
Eswatini	•		
Ethiopia	•	•	
Gabon	•		
Gambia	•		
Ghana	•		
Guinea	•		
Guinea-Bissau	•		
Ivory Coast	•	•	
Kenya	•	•	
Lesotho			
Liberia	•		
Libya	•		
Madagascar	•		
Malawi	•		
Mali	•		
Mauritania	•		
Mauritius	•		
Mayotte (France)			
Morocco	•	•	•
Mozambique	•		
Namibia	•		
Niger	•		
Nigeria	•		
Republic of the Congo	•		
Réunion (France)			
Rwanda	•		
Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha (UK)			
São Tomé and Príncipe			
Senegal	•	•	
Seychelles			
Sierra Leone	•		
Somalia	•		
South Africa	•	•	
South Sudan	•		

Sudan	•		
Tanzania	•		
Togo	•		
Tunisia	•	•	•
Uganda	•		
Zambia	•		
Zimbabwe	•		

***Source**: EEAS, EIB, EBRD official website, consulted on January 2021*
***Note**: the dot means that there is an office in the countr*

Annexe 8 – EU's Aid effectiveness: main indicators and trends (2016 and 2018)

Indicator	EU in Africa		Trend	EU in partner countries overall (average other donors)		Trend
	2016	2018		2016	2018	
Development partners use of country-led results frameworks	65%	62%	-3%	65% (66%)	59% (64%)	-6%
Alignment at objectives level	81%	84%	3%	79% (85%)	80% (83%)	1%
Alignement at results level	62%	56%	-6%	62% (62%)	54% (59%)	-8%
Alignement at monitoring and statisctics level	53%	43%	-10%	43% (52%)	53% (50%)	10%
Percentage of New Interventions that Plan a Final Evaluation with Government Involvement	54%	52%	-2%	51% (48%)	46% (59%)	-5%
Annual Predictability	73%	84%	11%	75% (83%)	83% (87%)	8%
Medium Term Predictability	66%	56%	-10%	61% (71%)	46% (67%)	-15%
Development co-operation is included in budgets subject to parliamentary oversight	55%	36%	-19%	54% (66%)	35% (61%)	-19%
Use of partner country public financial management systems	53%	47%	-6%	49% (50%)	48% (49%)	-1%
Budget	46%	47%	1%	47% (52%)	48% (56%)	1%
Financial reporting	59%	48%	-11%	53% (57%)	48% (52%)	-5%
Audit	54%	46%	-8%	48% (57%)	47% (53%)	-1%
Procurement	56%	48%	-8%	49% (37%)	49% (53%)	0%
Untied aid	89%	93%	4%	84% (78%)	92% (81%)	8%

Source: Author's elaboration based on data retrieved from 'Effective Development Cooperation. Does the EU deliver? Detailed Analysis of the EU Performance. Output 2 – Detailed Analysis of the EU Institutions and Member States performance'. Consortium BKP Development. Submitted to DG DEVCO A2 Date: 05/05/2020
Note: The data presented in the report examines the performance of the EU and Member States, building on the analysis

of the 2019 Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) monitoring report. The GPEDC regularly monitors progress on implementation through a biannual and voluntary monitoring exercise, the latest rounds of which have been conducted in 2014, 2016, with the last concluded in 2018.

Annexe 9 – Main objectives for a new ACP-EU partnership

EU Negotiation Mandate	ACP Negotiation Mandate	ACP-EU new Partnership
• Forging a comprehensive partnership focussed on building peaceful, stable, well-governed, prosperous and resilient states and societies • Accelerating progress towards the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals and, in particular, poverty eradication • Building effective alliances in international settings, with a view to driving global action forward.	• Alignment to Agenda 2030 and the SDGs as the overarching development framework • Commitment to democracy, peace and security, post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation • Promotion of regional integration and respect for the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and proportionality in relation to regional and continental groupings, as well as maintaining the geographical and geopolitical character of the ACP Group • Unequivocal support for multilateralism and a fair and equitable rules-based world order for facilitating international dialogue • Promotion of preferential trading arrangements, including those amongst ACP countries. as envisaged by the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) or the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) • Increase the role of the private sector in the social and economic transformation of ACP Member States • Provision of a dedicated multiannual financial mechanism available to all ACP States, including those that have or will graduate to Middle-Income Status, delivering substantial and predictable resources for financing development objectives and incorporating the internationally agreed principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. • Enhancement of the preferential trading arrangements, in both goods and services and development cooperation provisions of EPAs/Interim EPAs, to ensure that ACP States, *inter alia*, derive greater trade benefits and the developmental gains on which the EPAs are premised.	• Promote, protect and fulfil human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, paying particular attention to gender equality • Build peaceful and resilient states and societies, tackling ongoing and emerging threats to peace and security • Foster human and social development and, in particular to eradicate poverty and address inequalities, ensuring that everyone enjoys a life of dignity and that no one is left behind, with special attention paid to women and girls • Mobilise investment, support trade and foster private-sector development, with a view to achieving sustainable and inclusive growth and creating decent jobs for all • Combat climate change, protect the environment and ensure the sustainable management of natural resources • Implement a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration, so as to reap the benefits of safe, orderly and regular migration and mobility, stem irregular migration whilst addressing its root causes, in full respect of international law and in accordance with the Parties' respective competences.

Source: Author's elaboration based on official documents.

Annexe 10 – Compared tables of content: The ACP Negotiation Mandate, the EU Negotiation Mandate and the new EU-OACP Agreement (April 2021).

ACP Mandate	EU Mandate	New EU-OACP Agreement
TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I - CONTEXT PART II - GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE NEGOTIATION PART III - OBJECTIVES OF A POST-COTONOU AGREEMENT PART IV - CROSS-CUTTING THEMES A. Capacity Building B. Vulnerability and Resilience-Building C. Ocean and Seas D. Climate Change E. Gender Equality F. Health G. Youth and the Demographic Dividend H. Culture and Development I. Peace, Security and Democracy PART V - STRATEGIC THEMATIC PILLARS PILLAR 1 - TRADE, INVESTMENT, INDUSTRIALISATION AND SERVICE 1- BACKGROUND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 2-AREAS OF COOPERATION A. Trade in Goods and Services B. Investment C. Industrialisation PILLAR 2 - DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE, INNOVATION AND RESEARCH 1- BACKGROUND 2- SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES **3- DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION** **A. The Benefits of Development Finance Cooperation** **B. Intra-ACP Cooperation** **C. Institutional Arrangement**	1. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT 2. FOUNDATION PART 1 - COMMON PROVISIONS Title I - Objectives Title II - Principles Title III - Political dialogue Title IV - Policy coherence for development PART 2 - STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Title I - Human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law and good governance Title II - Human development and dignity Title III - Inclusive sustainable economic development Title IV - Environmental sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of natural resources Title V – Peace, security and justice **Title VI - Migration and mobility** PART 3 - INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 3. EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP Part 1 - BASIS FOR COOPERATION Part 2 - STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Title I - Peace and security Title II - Human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, and good governance Title III - Human development and dignity Title IV - Inclusive sustainable economic development **Title V - Mobility and migration** Title VI - Environmental	PART I - GENERAL PROVISIONS PART II - STRATEGIC PRIORITIES TITLE I - HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND GOVERNANCE IN PEOPLE-CENTRED AND RIGHTS-BASED SOCIETIES TITLE II - PEACE AND SECURITY TITLE III - HUMAN AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TITLE IV - INCLUSIVE, SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT TITLE V - ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE **TITLE VI - MIGRATION AND MOBILITY** PART III - GLOBAL ALLIANCES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION PART IV - MEANS OF COOPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION PART V - INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK PART VI - FINAL PROVISIONS REGIONAL PROTOCOLS: AFRICA REGIONAL PROTOCOL PART I - FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION PART II - KEY AREAS OF COOPERATION TITLE I - INCLUSIVE SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT TITLE II - HUMAN AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TITLE III - ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

D. Main Areas of Development Finance Support E. Technology, Science, Innovation and Research F. Research and Innovation in Strengthening Health Systems PILLAR 3 - POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND ADVOCACY 1- BACKGROUND 2- SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 3- GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE 4- AREAS OF COOPERATION A. Political Dialogue and SDGs B. Peace and Security C. Political Dialogue Processes **D. Political Dialogue and Migration** E. Advocacy F. Actors of Political Dialogue PART VI - PROVISIONS FOR LDCS, LLDCS, SIDS, MICS AND HIMICS PART VII - PARTIES/ ACTORS PART VIIII - INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK PART IX - FINAL PROVISIONS	sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of natural resources 4. EU-CARIBBEAN PARTNERSHIP Part 1 - BASIS FOR COOPERATION Part 2 - STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Title I - Environmental sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of natural resources Title II - Inclusive and sustainable economic development Title III - Human security, human rights, and good governance Title IV - Human development and social cohesion 5. EU-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP Part 1 BASIS FOR COOPERATION Part 2 STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Title I - Environmental sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of natural resources Title II - Inclusive and sustainable economic development Title III -Security, human rights, and good governance Title IV - Human development and social cohesion 6. DIVERSIFIED COOPERATION 7. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 8. FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE IV - PEACE AND SECURITY 106 TITLE V - HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE **TITLE VI - MIGRATION AND MOBILITY** CARRIBEAN REGIONAL PROTOCOL: PART I - FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION PART II - KEY AREAS OF COOPERATION TITLE I - INCLUSIVE SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT TITLE II - ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES TITLE III - HUMAN RIGHTS, GOVERNANCE, PEACE AND SECURITY TITLE IV- HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL COHESION AND MOBILITY PACIFIC REGIONAL PROTOCOL: PART I - FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION PART II - KEY AREAS OF COOPERATION TITLE I - ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE TITLE II - INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TITLE III - OCEANS, SEAS AND FISHERIES TITLE IV - SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE TITLE V - HUMAN AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ANNEXES ANNEXE I: RETURN AND READMISSION PROCESSES ANNEXE II: OPERATIONS OF THE

		EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK DECLARATIONS **EU DECLARATION ON MEANS OF COOPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION** DECLARATION BY THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT BOUND BY THE AFRICA REGIONAL PROTOCOL THAT ARE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES

Source: Author's elaboration based on official documents
Note: Parts highlighted in pink refer to the first set of micro-goals analysed while parts highlighted in green refer to the second set of micro-goals analysed.

Annexe 11 – The Atlas of Migration, European Commission's Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD) (Africa's profile)

European Commission | Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography



Atlas of Migration (online) - Non-EU countries and territories - Generated 08 July 2021

3

ABOUT EMEA

The Euro-Mediterranean Economists Association (EMEA) is a Barcelona-based regional think-tank established in 2012 that serves as a leading independent and innovative policy research institution; a forum for debate on the political and socio-economic reforms in Mediterranean and Africa; and promoter of actions and initiatives that fulfill objectives of sustainability, inclusiveness, regional integration and prosperity. It strives to contribute to the rethinking of the Euro-Mediterranean and Africa partnerships in view of the new dynamics of an emerging multi-polar world and amidst of protracted crises. EMEA has a large network of economists, high-level experts and institutional partners (research institutes, think tanks and universities) in the Euro-Mediterranean and Africa. EMEA builds on the collaborative research network MEDPRO (funded by the EU's Seventh Framework Programme (2009-13) and provides forward-looking thinking and political and socio-economic integrated analyses on the Euro-Mediterranean region. EMEA is also the promoter and co-funder of the Euro-Mediterranean and African Network for Economic Studies (EMANES), co-funded by the European Commission (DG NEAR) between 2015 and 2019. A is a regional network composed of 30 institutions and more than 100 experts and researchers in the Mediterranean region and Africa.

The Euro-Mediterranean and African Network for Economic Studies (EMANES) aims to provide a renewed vision for socio-economic development in the Mediterranean region and Africa, mainly focussing on employment creation, social inclusion, sustainable development and regional integration. It performs economic and policy research, exploring the pillars of inclusive and sustainable economic models in the Euro-Mediterranean region and Africa, along the following **research areas**:

1. Institutions and institutional reforms;
2. Private sector, micro, small and medium sized enterprises and social business development;
3. Entrepreneurship and innovation;
4. Human capital development, education, labour markets and migration;
5. Demographics, health and social protection;
6. Macroeconomic policy , inequality and social inclusion;
7. Inclusive and sustainable finance;
8. Regional integration, trade, investment and infrastructure;
9. Energy, water, environment and sustainable development;
10. Euro-Mediterranean partnership;
11. Scenario analysis and foresight;
12. Other evolving research areas.

EMANES is a network of research institutions and think tanks from the Mediterranean and Africa. Between 2014-2019, the network was co-funded by the European Commission – under Grant Contract N° ENPI/2014/354-488 and EMANES Partners and Associates. EMANES is built on four core principles: independence, excellence, policy relevance and a deep knowledge of EU-Mediterranean aand Africa ffairs.

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